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Dina Ji And Others v. Daddi And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant filed a suit for injunction and possession on the strength of a registered sale deed dated 28 April 1966 executed by Smt. Yashoda Bai in his favour covering agricultural lands and houses. The property had originally belonged to Yashoda Bai’s husband; on his death she became a limited owner and, after the Hindu Succession Act came into force, an absolute owner. On 28 April 1963 she adopted respondent Nain Singh and executed an unregistered “Deed of Adoption” which, besides recording the adoption, declared that the adopted son would immediately become entitled to all the property and that she would thereafter have no right to alienate it.
The trial court decreed the suit. The first appellate court reversed the decree. The High Court, in Second Appeal No. 617 of 1989 (judgment dated 13 December 1971), upheld the first appellate court, holding that the covenant in the adoption deed divested Yashoda Bai of her property and invalidated her subsequent transfer to the appellant. The present appeal was filed in the Supreme Court by special leave.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the covenant in the unregistered adoption deed, purporting to divest the adoptive mother of her property and confer immediate rights on the adopted son, was valid and admissible in evidence in light of Section 17(1)(b) read with Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908.
- How proviso (c) to Section 12 and Section 13 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 affect the adoptive mother’s right to alienate her property after adoption.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Deed of Adoption is divisible: the first part evidences adoption and is admissible; the second part seeks to relinquish the adoptive mother’s rights and confer immediate rights on the adopted son.
- The second part operates as a present transfer of property and therefore attracts Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act; being unregistered, it is inadmissible under Section 49.
- Consequently, the High Court erred in relying on the covenant to hold that Yashoda Bai had no title to transfer to the appellant.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent’s legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court first referred to proviso (c) of Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, noting that an adopted child cannot divest any estate that had already vested in another person before the adoption. Thus, adoption alone did not deprive Yashoda Bai of her absolute ownership acquired under the Hindu Succession Act.
Section 13 of the same Act allows adoptive parents, “subject to any agreement to the contrary,” to dispose of their property. The Court acknowledged that the covenant in the adoption deed amounted to such an agreement, limiting the adoptive mother’s power. However, it held that this covenant squarely fell within Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act because it created an immediate right in immovable property in favour of the adopted son and extinguished the adoptive mother’s right.
As the deed was unregistered, Section 49 of the Registration Act barred its admissibility for affecting immovable property. The High Court had overlooked this statutory bar. Without the inadmissible covenant, Yashoda Bai retained full title and could validly execute the 1966 registered sale deed in favour of the appellant. Accordingly, the decrees of the lower appellate court and the High Court were legally unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; judgments of the High Court and the first appellate court set aside; trial court decree restored.
The decision reinstates the appellant’s title and possession under the 1966 sale deed. The Court emphasized that any instrument divesting an owner of immovable property must comply with the mandatory registration requirements; an unregistered document cannot be relied upon to curtail proprietary rights. No broader precedent was expressly set, and no order as to costs was made.
Order
1. This appeal arises out of the judgment dated December 13, 1971 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Second Appeal No. 617 of 1989, wherein the learned Judge of the High Court dismissed the second appeal filed by the present appellant.
2. The present appellant filed a suit for injunction and possession on the basis of a registered sale deed dated April 28, 1966 executed by Smt. Yashoda Bai in his favour with respect to immovable property including agricultural lands and houses.
3. The property originally belonged to her husband and after his death she got it as a limited owner and by influx of time and by coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, she acquired the rights of an absolute owner. On April 28, 1963, she adopted respondent Nain Singh as her son and executed a document said to be the Deed of Adoption. This document is not a registered document and the trial court admitted it in evidence in proof of adoption. This document, in addition to recital of the factum of adoption in presence of panchayat in accordance with the custom of the community also contained a covenant wherein she had stated that after this deed of adoption her adopted son will be entitled (hakdar) to the whole property including movable and immovable and she will have no right to alienate any part of the property after this deed of adoption.
4. The trial court decreed the suit. The first appellate court dismissed the suit setting aside the decree passed by the trial court. The learned Judge of the High Court considering the impact of Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act rightly held that the adopted son, in view of the proviso (c) to Section 12, will only be entitled to property after the death of the adoptive mother but the learned Judge felt that the further covenant in the adoption deed deprived her of that right and conferred that right on the adopted son, on this basis the learned Judge of the High Court came to the conclusion that the widow after executing this deed of adoption had no right left in the property and therefore a transfer executed by her will not confer any title on the plaintiff. It is on this basis that the High Court maintained the judgment of the lower appellate court dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-appellant. Against this, by special leave, this appeal has come to this Court.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the document which is described as a deed of adoption, in substance, is in two parts. One recites the factum of adoption and the second contains the covenant wherein she has relinquished her rights in the property and conferred rights on adopted son. According to the learned counsel, so far as it refers to adoption, the courts below were right in admitting the document as an evidence of adoption but so far as it refers to a deed of relinquishment or conferment of right on the adopted son, it will be hit by Section 17(1)(b) read with Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act and, therefore, the High Court was not right in relying on this clause to come to the conclusion that the widow Smt. Yashoda Bai had no right to transfer the property in favour of plaintiff-appellant.
6. Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act reads as follows:
“12. Effects of adoption.) An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family:
Provided that:
(a) the child cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have married if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth;
(b) any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth;
(c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption.”
7. Proviso (c) of this section departs from the Hindu general law and makes it clear that the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which has vested in him or her before the adoption. It is clear that in the present case, Smt. Yashoda Bai who was the limited owner of the property after the death of her husband and after Hindu Succession Act came into force, has become an absolute owner and therefore the property of her husband vested in her and therefore merely by adopting a child she could not be deprived of any of her rights in the property. The adoption would come into play and the adopted child could get the rights for which he is entitled after her death as is clear from the scheme of Section 12 proviso (c).
8. Section 13 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act reads:
“13. Right of adoptive parents to dispose of their properties.— Subject to any agreement to the contrary, an adoption does not deprive the adoptive father or mother of the power to dispose of his or her property by transfer inter vivos or by will.”
9. This section enacts that when the parties intend to limit the operation of proviso (c) to Section 12, it is open to them by an agreement and it appears that what she included in the present deed of adoption was an agreement to the contrary as contemplated in Section 13 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act.
10. Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act clearly provides that such a document where any right in movable property is either assigned or extinguished will require registration. It could not be disputed that this part of the deed which refers to creation of an immediate right in the adopted son and the divesting of the right of the adoptive mother in the property will squarely fall within the ambit of Section 17(1)(b) and therefore under Section 49 of the Registration Act, this could not be admitted if it is not a registered document. Unfortunately, the Hon'ble Judge of the High Court did not notice this aspect of the matter and felt that what could not be done because of the proviso (c) to Section 12 has been specifically provided in the document itself but this part of the document could not be read in evidence as it could not be admitted. In view of this, the appeal is allowed. The judgments of the High Court and that of the lower appellate court are set aside and that of the trial court is restored. In view of these special circumstances, there is no order as to costs.
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