Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Sushil Kumar And Others v. State Of Haryana And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Dec 8, 1987
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges a High Court order that reversed the Judicial Magistrate, Hissar, who had refused to frame charges against the appellants under Sections 471 and 474 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The underlying dispute arose from a partnership business. The appellant Sushil Kumar filed a civil suit against Smt. Shakuntala Devi (wife of Inder Prakash, Respondent 2) and obtained a temporary injunction based on a copy of a partnership deed, restraining her and her husband from interfering with possession of certain property.

Respondent 2 lodged a police report alleging the partnership deed was forged and that the appellants had committed offences under Sections 465, 468, 471, 474, 120-B, and 420 IPC. After submission of a challan, the Magistrate framed charges under Sections 465, 468, 120-B, and 420 IPC but declined to frame charges under Sections 471 and 474 IPC, holding that cognizance under those sections could not be taken without a complaint from the civil court in view of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Code).

The State preferred a revision; the Additional Sessions Judge, Hissar, upheld the Magistrate’s order. Respondent 2 then moved the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. A Single Judge of the High Court reversed the lower courts, holding that as the document was not forged during the period it was in court custody, the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) did not apply, and directed the Magistrate to frame fresh charges. The appellants obtained special leave and filed the present appeal.

According to the first information report, the deed was allegedly forged by Sushil Kumar and Shiv Nandan in concert with officials of the Income Tax Department, and thereafter a copy of the forged deed was produced in the civil suit. The original was not filed; the temporary injunction was obtained on the strength of the copy.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code bars cognizance of offences under Sections 471 and 474 IPC when only a copy of the allegedly forged document, and not the original, was produced or given in evidence in a court proceeding.
  2. Whether the Magistrate could refrain from framing charges under Sections 471 and 474 IPC on the ground that a complaint from the civil court was necessary in the circumstances of this case.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sanmukhsingh v. King, AIR 1950 PC 31; 1949 LR 77 IA 7 Production of a copy of an allegedly forged document does not amount to the document itself being “produced or given in evidence” for the purpose of the bar under provisions corresponding to Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code. Relied upon to conclude that because only a copy was produced in the civil suit and not the original, the statutory bar in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code was not triggered.
Budhu Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (1963) 3 SCR 376 Followed the Privy Council’s view in Sanmukhsingh on the meaning of “document produced or given in evidence.” Cited as supporting authority reinforcing that the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) does not apply where only a copy, and not the original document, was produced in court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court focused on the scope of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code, which bars cognizance of certain offences alleged to have been committed in respect of “a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court.” It noted that the original allegedly forged partnership deed was not produced in the civil court; only a copy was submitted and a temporary injunction was granted on that basis.

Interpreting the statutory language, the Court applied the Privy Council’s decision in Sanmukhsingh v. King, which held that producing a copy of an allegedly forged document is not the same as producing the document itself, and thus the bar does not apply. This interpretation was acknowledged as consistent with the plain grammatical meaning of the words and practical common sense, and it had been followed in Budhu Ram v. State of Rajasthan.

The Court stated that even assuming the High Court’s specific reasoning (that the document was not forged while in court custody) was incorrect, the result reached by the High Court was nonetheless supportable on the correct legal ground: the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) was inapplicable because the original document was never produced in court. Consequently, there was no requirement of a complaint from the civil court to take cognizance or to frame charges under Sections 471 and 474 IPC.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED; HIGH COURT'S DIRECTION TO FRAME FRESH CHARGES CONFIRMED (ON A DIFFERENT GROUND)

Implications: The immediate effect is that the Magistrate must proceed to frame fresh charges under Sections 471 and 474 IPC. The decision clarifies that the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code does not arise when only a copy of the allegedly forged document is produced in court, not the original. The ruling applies established principles and does not purport to set out a new legal standard beyond the cited authorities.

Show all summary ...

L.M Sharma, J.— This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana reversing the order of the Judicial Magistrate, Hissar refusing to frame charges against the appellants under Sections 471 and 474 of the Indian Penal Code. The dispute between the parties arose out of a difference between them in connection with a partnership business. The appellant Sushil Kumar filed a civil suit against Smt Shakuntala Devi, wife of Inder Prakash, Respondent 2. Relying upon a copy of a deed of partnership, he obtained a temporary injunction restraining her and her husband from interfering with the possession of a certain property. Respondent 2, thereupon, lodged a report with the police against the appellants alleging that the partnership deed was a forged one and that they being parties to the forgery had committed offences punishable under Sections 465, 468, 471, 474, 120-B and 420 IPC. A challan was submitted and the learned Magistrate framed charges against the appellants under Sections 465, 468, 120-B and 420 IPC, but refrained from framing any charge under Sections 471 and 474 IPC holding that he could not take cognizance under these sections in the absence of a complaint from the civil court.

2. The State preferred a revision and the Additional Sessions Judge, Hissar, who heard the application upheld the order of the Magistrate. Respondent 2, therefore, moved the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) and a learned Single Judge reversed the decision holding that as the document was not forged during the period it was in court custody the bar of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code was not attracted. The Magistrate was accordingly directed to frame fresh charges. The appellants, after obtaining special leave, are challenging this order in the present appeal.

3. According to the allegations in the first information report the partnership deed in question was forged by the appellant Sushil Kumar and Shiv Nandan in league with the officials of the Income Tax Department and Sushil Kumar, thereafter, produced a copy of the forged deed in the suit. The original document was not filed in the civil court, and temporary injunction was obtained on the strength of its copy. We shall assume that the reasoning given by the High Court in support of its judgment is not correct but that does not help the appellants. Sub-section (1)(b)(ii) of Section 195 of the Code lays down that no court shall take cognizance of any offence described in the sections mentioned therein when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of “a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court”. Interpreting the similar language of the corresponding provision in the earlier Criminal Procedure Code of 1898, the Privy Council in Sanmukhsingh v. King AIR 1950 PC 31, 1949 LR 77 IA 7 observed that by production of a copy of the allegedly forged document it cannot be said that the document itself was given in evidence. This view, as pointed out, accords with the plain grammatical meaning of the words and is also supported by the practical common sense. The judgment of the Judicial Committee was followed in Budhu Ram v. State of Rajasthan (1963) 3 SCR 376. Accordingly, we hold that since the document alleged to have been forged was not in the present case produced in the court, the provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code have no application. We, therefore, confirm the High Court's direction, but on a different ground as indicated. The appeal is dismissed.