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Hussain Sasan Saheb Kaladgi v. State Of Maharashtra .
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion concerns an appeal by a plaintiff who was served with an order dated April 28, 1965 (Exhibit 25) reverting him to the post of a primary teacher from the post of Assistant Deputy Educational Inspector (ADEI). The plaintiff challenged this reversion order on the basis that he had been appointed as a “direct recruit” to the post of ADEI and therefore could not be reverted to a lower post as if he were a promotee.
The trial court accepted the plaintiff’s contention, granted a declaration that he continued in service on the premise that the reversion order was illegal, and also decreed salary amounts in his favour. The State of Maharashtra appealed to the High Court of Bombay, which allowed the State’s appeal, reversed the trial court decree, and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff then approached this Court by certificate under Article 133(1)(b) of the Constitution of India.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a person appointed as a “direct recruit” to the post of ADEI could lawfully be “reverted” to the lower post of a primary teacher by the impugned order (Exhibit 25 dated April 28, 1965).
- Whether the High Court was justified in sustaining the reversion on the basis of an argument that the appointment was temporary and could have been terminated under applicable service conditions, despite no termination having been made in fact.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court noted that before the High Court the learned Government Pleader conceded that the plaintiff’s appointment as ADEI was a direct appointment and not a departmental promotion from the post of primary teacher. The Court treated this concession as determinative of the core question, because (as stated in the opinion) a direct recruit cannot be reverted to a lower post; only a promotee can be reverted to the post from which he was promoted.
The Court criticized the High Court for entertaining an argument that the appointment was temporary and could have been terminated under service conditions. Even assuming such a power existed, the Court emphasized that no termination power had in fact been invoked and the appellant’s services were not terminated; instead, an order of “reversion” was passed. Because no termination occurred, the existence of a rule permitting termination was deemed irrelevant to the legality of the reversion order actually made.
On this reasoning, the Court held that the State’s order reverting the appellant was clearly unsustainable in light of his status as a direct recruit, and that the High Court was misled by an irrelevant line of argument. Accordingly, the High Court’s decision was found to be “thoroughly unsustainable.”
Holding and Implications
ALLOWED: The appeal was allowed; the judgment and decree of the High Court were set aside; and the judgment and decree of the trial court were restored.
As a direct consequence, the trial court’s declaration (that the reversion order was illegal and that the appellant continued in service on that premise) and the trial court’s decree regarding salary stood reinstated. The parties were directed to bear their costs throughout. The opinion does not indicate that any new precedent was set beyond resolving the dispute on the stated elementary service-law propositions and the irrelevance of an uninvoked termination power to justify an actual reversion order.
M.P Thakkar, J.— This is an appeal by an unsuccessful plaintiff who was served with an order dated April 28, 1965 (Exhibit 25) reverting him to the post of a primary teacher. The appellant challenged the impugned order on the ground that he was a “direct recruit” to the post of Assistant Deputy Educational Inspector (ADEI) and that under the circumstances, there was no question of reverting him to the lower post of a “primary teacher”. The trial court upheld the contention of the appellant and passed a decree in his favour granting a declaration that he continued in service on the premise that the impugned order as per Exhibit 25 dated April 28, 1965 reverting him from the post of ADEI held by him, to the lower post of a primary teacher was illegal. The trial court also passed a decree for the salary amount. The State of Maharashtra preferred an appeal to the High Court of Bombay. The High Court allowed the appeal, reversed and set aside the decree passed by the trial court, and dismissed the suit. Thereupon the appellant has approached this Court by certificate under Article 133(1)(b) of the Constitution of India.
2. Before the High Court it was conceded by the learned Government Pleader that the appellant was appointed to the post of ADEI as a “direct recruit” and that he was not a departmental promotee who had been promoted from the post of primary teacher to the post of ADEI. This is abundantly clear from the following passage extracted from the judgment of the High Court:
“Before us the learned Government Pleader conceded that the appointment of the plaintiff as ADEI appears to be a direct appointment and not a matter of departmental promotion. He may be ineligible in terms of requisite departmental service as a teacher, but he had the educational qualifications required for the post and he had directly applied for the post, though the application had to come through proper channel in view of the fact that the plaintiff was in service.”
In view of this concession, the High Court should have straightway dismissed the appeal. A direct recruit to a post, it cannot be gainsaid, cannot be reverted to a lower post. It is only a promotee who can be reverted from the promotion post to the lower post from which he was promoted. These propositions are so elementary that the same are incapable of being disputed and have not been disputed. The High Court presumably realised that the matter was inarguable and there was no escape from the conclusion reached by the trial court. The High Court was however carried away by an irrelevant argument which had no bearing on the issue before the Court. What was argued before the High Court was that in any case his appointment was a temporary one and it could have been terminated as per the conditions of service applicable to him. Assuming that his appointment was a temporary one and it could have been so terminated, the fact remains that in point of fact no such power had been invoked and the services of the appellant had not been terminated at all. If his services had been so terminated under the relevant rule, the question could possibly have arisen as to whether or not such termination could have been lawfully made. No such termination having taken place, the existence of the rule was altogether irrelevant. The State had passed an order which clearly was unsustainable in view of the fact that the appellant was a direct recruit and there was no question of reverting him to any lower post. The High Court should not have allowed itself to be misled by the misleading argument regarding the service condition under which the services of the appellant could possibly have been, but were not in fact, terminated. The view taken by the High Court is thoroughly unsustainable. The appeal must, therefore, be allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the High Court must accordingly be set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court must be restored. The parties will bear their costs throughout.
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