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Tarlok Singh Petitioner/ V.
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant is one of several shopkeepers occupying Shop No. 15, along with 56 similarly situated licensees, on railway land at the Golebagh site in Amritsar. After the railway constructed the shops in April 1981, the Municipal Corporation, Amritsar, revoked its earlier sanction and issued composite show-cause notices to the shopkeepers under Sections 269(1) and 270(1) of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, in October 1981.
Upon receiving their replies, the Commissioner ordered demolition of the shops on 9 November 1981. The appellant appealed to the District Judge under Section 269(2). When the District Judge refused the appellant’s application to record evidence, the appellant filed Civil Writ Petition No. 5548 of 1982 before the Punjab & Haryana High Court. A Division Bench held that the District Judge could consider additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure if he deemed it necessary. Challenging that view, the appellant sought leave to appeal, which was granted, leading to the present decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, by virtue of Section 384 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, an appeal before the District Judge under Section 269(2) must follow the full procedure of a civil suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, including framing of issues and recording of evidence, or whether the District Judge may apply those procedures only “as far as they can be made applicable.”
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Section 384 mandates that the procedure of a civil suit in the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) be followed in toto during an appeal, requiring framing of issues, pleadings, and recording of evidence.
Respondent Municipal Corporation's Arguments
- The phrase “as far as it can be made applicable” in Section 384 permits flexibility; an appeal is a continuation of a suit, so only the CPC’s appellate procedure need be adopted.
- The District Judge therefore has discretion to follow suit-procedure only when necessary and can rely on Order 41 Rule 27 to admit additional evidence.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court closely examined the text of Section 384:
“The procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in the disposal of applications, appeals or references…”
Key analytical steps:
- The section expressly lists three kinds of proceedings—applications, appeals, and references—indicating that identical suit-procedure is not invariably required for each.
- Although “suits” are not defined in the CPC, an appeal is generally viewed as a continuation of the suit. Hence, the CPC’s appellate provisions are inherently included within “procedure of a suit.”
- The qualifying words “as far as it can be made applicable” demonstrate legislative intent to allow the District Judge to adapt CPC procedures to the nature of the proceeding rather than to impose the entire framework mechanically.
- Therefore, while the District Judge may permit additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 when justice so requires, he is not compelled to follow every step of original-suit procedure (plaint, written statement, fresh issues, full oral evidence, etc.).
- The High Court’s guidance—leaving the admission of additional evidence to the District Judge’s discretion—accurately reflects this interpretation.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Implications: The Court affirms that in appeals, references, or applications under the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, the District Judge should apply CPC procedures only to the extent they suit the proceeding’s nature. The decision upholds judicial discretion to admit additional evidence but dispels any notion that a full-fledged trial process is compulsory in such statutory appeals. No broader precedent is set beyond clarifying the scope of Section 384.
G.L Oza, J.— Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises out of the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No. 5548 of 1982 dated December 17, 1982.
3. The appellant is a shopkeeper occupying Shop No. 15 situated on the road alongside the railway line, Golebagh site in the city of Amritsar. There are 56 other shops similarly situated which are occupied by other allottees like the petitioner. The premises in occupation of the petitioner and other shopkeepers are on licences given by the railway since April 1981. After the sanction was given to railway for construction of these shops some dispute arose and the corporation chose to revoke the sanction and ultimately as a result of litigation the present petitioner and the other shopkeepers similarly situated were given a notice to show cause by the Municipal Corporation, Amritsar under Section 269(1) of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976. This was a composite notice also under Section 270(1) of the said Act. The petitioner received this notice alongwith other shopkeepers in the first half of October 1981.
4. The petitioner and other shopkeepers submitted their replies to the Commissioner of Municipal Corporation and the Commissioner passed an order directing the demolition of the shops on November 9, 1981. This order was served on the petitioner and all other shopkeepers. The petitioner being aggrieved by this order preferred an appeal before the District Judge under Section 269 sub-clause (2). In this appeal before the District Judge the District Judge rejected an application submitted by the petitioner for recording of evidence and it was against this order passed by the District Judge that the petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court wherein the Division Bench of the High Court took a view that if the District Judge so feels the application for recording of evidence could be considered under Order 41 Rule 27.
5. The only question raised in this appeal is about the interpretation of Section 384. It was contended before us by the learned Counsel for the appellant that in view of the language of Section 384 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 in this appeal before the District Judge the procedure of a civil suit as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure will have to be followed and on the basis of this provision it was contended that the District Judge was bound to follow the procedure of a civil suit thereby framing of issues and recording of evidence is necessary whereas the learned Counsel for the respondent Municipal Corporation contended that the language of Section 384 only provides that in these proceedings before the District Judge the procedure of a civil suit as far as possible will be followed. It was, therefore, contended that the expression “civil suit” in Section 384 includes an appeal as an appeal is nothing but a continuation of proceedings of the civil suit and therefore the meaning of Section 384 could only be that in case of appeal the procedure of appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure shall be followed.
6. Learned Counsel for the parties also draw our attention to various facts and the manner in which the shops were initially allotted and the grievance that the Municipal Corporation had about the allotment of these shops to the particular persons. But in our opinion those are matters not relevant for the purpose of decision of this case. The only question that arises is as to whether in an appeal filed under Section 269 sub-clause (2) the procedure of a civil suit as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure will have to be followed in view of language of Section 384 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976. Section 384 reads as follows:
“The procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in the dispose of applications, appeals or references that may he made to the court of the District Judge under this Act or any bye-law made thereunder.”
7. This provision talks of the procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to a suit shall be followed but it also refers to “as far as it can be made applicable” and the phrase that follows refers to an application, appeal or reference.
8. This, therefore, clearly indicates that in the appeal, application or reference the same procedure need not be followed although it talks of the procedure of a civil suit but it is also mentioned that as far as it can be made applicable this goes to show that the procedure of a civil suit will have to be followed if it is consistent with the proceedings pending before the District Judge.
9. The suit has not been specifically defined in the Code and from the scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure it appears that an appeal also is a continuation of the suit. The language used in Section 384 therefore only indicates that the procedure as contemplated in the Code of Civil Procedure will have to be followed in these proceedings under this Act when the matter goes to the District Judge either by way of an application, reference or appeal. The procedure of this suit will include even the procedure of an appeal and it is because of this that the phrase as far as it can be made applicable has been used in this section. It, therefore, could not be contended that in an appeal under Section 269 sub-clause (2) before a District Judge the procedure of a suit as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure (filing of plaint, written statements, issues, recording of evidence) will be necessary. The three proceedings contemplated in Section 384 are application, reference and appeal and therefore out of the scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure pertaining to the procedure of a civil suit or an appeal the relevant provisions will have to be applied for purposes of guidance of procedure and therefore the use of the phrase as far as it can be made applicable clearly indicates that it is not expected in any one of these proceedings to follow the procedure of a suit technically and strictly in accordance with the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. It is only for purposes of guidance that the procedure of a suit as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure can be considered and it will be the discretion of the authority (the District Judge) to apply as far as it could be applied in the appropriate proceedings. In our view, therefore, what High Court said, appears to be proper as the High Court stated in the impugned judgment that if the District Judge so feels, he may allow any additional evidence to be led under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In fact, it would be enough to say that in an appropriate case whenever the District Judge feels satisfied he may give an opportunity to the parties to lead evidence as it will be open to the District Judge to apply the procedure as far as it can be made applicable in the facts and circumstances of each case. We, therefore. see no substance in this appeal. It is, therefore, dismissed. In the circumstances, no order as to costs.
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