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Pandurang And Others v. State Of Maharashtra .
Factual and Procedural Background
The State of Maharashtra filed an appeal in the High Court of Bombay challenging the acquittal of the present appellants in a prosecution under Section 7(1) read with Sections 16 and 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The offence carried a punishment exceeding two years’ imprisonment. Under the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960, such an appeal was required to be heard by a Division Bench. Instead, a learned Single Judge heard the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and recorded conviction and sentence against the appellants. The present decision addresses the legal consequence of that procedural departure and the competence of the Single Judge to decide the appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under Rule 1 read with Rule 2-11(e) of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960, an appeal against acquittal in an offence punishable with imprisonment exceeding two years must be heard by a Division Bench rather than a Single Judge.
- If a matter required to be decided by a Division Bench is decided by a Single Judge, whether the resulting conviction and sentence are merely irregular or are void and a nullity for lack of jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of M.P. v. Dewadas, (1982) 1 SCC 552; AIR 1982 SC 800; (1982) 3 SCR 81 | Reinforces the view that a decision rendered by a forum lacking competence with regard to the subject-matter is a nullity. | Relied upon to support setting aside the Single Judge’s judgment as non-existent in law and to remit the matter for decision by a competent Division Bench. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court anchored its analysis in the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960, specifically Rule 1 read with Rule 2-11(e), which require that appeals of the present kind—against acquittal for offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding two years—be heard by a Division Bench. As the Single Judge decided the State’s appeal, the court treated the issue as one of total lack of jurisdiction rather than a mere procedural irregularity.
The court emphasized that the accused had a right, under the operative rules, to have the appeal determined by at least two Judges. This right could be altered only by amending the rules; it could not be denied by administrative error, negligence, or any other reason. Negligence could neither serve as an alibi nor cure the illegality so as to deprive the accused of the bench-strength safeguard built into the rules.
On principle, the court held that even a correct decision rendered on the merits by an incompetent forum is no decision in the eye of law. A judgment delivered by a court lacking competence over the subject-matter is a nullity; it is non-existent in law. The court stated that its view was reinforced by the decision in State of M.P. v. Dewadas.
Applying these principles, the conviction and sentence recorded by the Single Judge were set aside as nullities. The court directed that the matter be placed before a Division Bench of the High Court for fresh hearing, with reasonable opportunity to both sides and expeditious disposal. The court also observed that the Registry of the High Court ought to have recognized the correct procedural posture to avoid needless waste of judicial time, especially in light of mounting arrears.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; SINGLE JUDGE’S JUDGMENT SET ASIDE AS A NULLITY; MATTER REMANDED TO THE HIGH COURT FOR HEARING BY A DIVISION BENCH.
Implications: The immediate effect is that the conviction and sentence recorded by the Single Judge are nullified, and the appeal against acquittal will be reheard by a Division Bench, with both sides afforded reasonable opportunity and an expectation of expeditious disposal. The opinion underscores strict adherence to bench composition rules and cautions court registries to prevent mislisting that leads to wasted judicial effort. The decision applies established principles and does not purport to set any new precedent beyond reinforcing the existing rule on forum competence.
M.P Thakkar, J.— “Right”, or “wrong”, “guilty” or “not guilty”, is not the question. Whether the learned Single Judge had the “right” to hear and decide the appeal and hold that the appellants were guilty whilst setting aside their acquittal by the judgment under appeal Criminal Appeal No. 90 of 1983 is the question which has surfaced in the context of a judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge which according to the relevant rules of the High Court was required to be heard and decided by a Division Bench.
2. The State of Maharashtra (respondent herein) preferred an appeal to the High Court of Bombay in order to challenge the order of acquittal rendered by the lower court in favour of the present appellants. The acquittal was in respect of an offence under Section 7(1) read with Sections 16 and 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The offence was punishable with a sentence of imprisonment exceeding two years. The appeal was, therefore, required to be heard by a Division Bench of the High Court and not by a learned Single Judge.
3. Such is the problem that has arisen in the context of Rule 1 read with Rule 2-11(e) of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960. What then is the consequence? Is the order of conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Single Judge who allowed the appeal merely irregular or void?
4. When a matter required to be decided by a Division Bench of the High Court is decided by a learned Single Judge, the judgment would be a nullity, the matter having been heard by a court which had no competence to hear the matter, it being a matter of total lack of jurisdiction. The accused was entitled to be heard by at least two learned Judges constituting a Division Bench and had a right to claim a verdict as regards his guilt or innocence at the hands of the two learned Judges. This right cannot be taken away except by amending the rules. So long as the rules are in operation it would be arbitrary and discriminatory to deny him this right regardless of whether it is done by reason of negligence or otherwise. Deliberately, it cannot be done. Negligence can neither be invoked as an alibi, nor can cure the infirmity or illegality, so as to rob the accused of his right under the rules. What can be done only by at least two learned Judges cannot be done by one learned Judge. Even if the decision is right on merits, it is by a forum which is lacking in competence with regard to the subject-matter. Even a “right” decision by a “wrong” forum is no decision. It is non-existent in the eye of law. And hence a nullity. The judgment under appeal is therefore no judgment in the eye of law. This Court in State of M.P v. Dewadas (1982) 1 SCC 552, AIR 1982 SC 800, (1982) 3 SCR 81 has taken a view which reinforces our view. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge, and send the matter back to the High Court for being placed before a Division Bench of the High Court, which will afford reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides and dispose it of in accordance with law, expeditiously. We wish to add that the Registry of the High Court was expected to have realized the true position and ought not to have created a situation which resulted in waste of court time, once for hearing the appeal, and next time, to consider the effect of the rules. No court can afford this luxury with the mountain of arrears which every court is carrying these days.
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