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Keisam Kumar Singh And Another v. State Of Manipur .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants, Keisam Kumar Singh, Bijoy Singh and Sagolsem Ibotomcha Singh, were tried before the Sessions Judge for the murder of one Raghumani Singh on 14 December 1970. According to the prosecution, the deceased and two friends—PW 1 (Oken Singh) and PW 2 (Manihar Singh)—took food at Hotel Deluxe around 4:30 p.m., watched the film “Romeo and Juliet” at Usha Talkies from 5:15 p.m. to 7:30 p.m., and returned to the hotel in search of a misplaced fountain pen. An altercation occurred in Room No. 2, occupied by the three accused. Shortly thereafter, while the deceased and the two witnesses walked near Keisampat Bridge, the accused confronted them; Ibotomcha allegedly stabbed the deceased in the stomach under the illumination of nearby electric poles. The accused fled.
The Sessions Judge acquitted all three accused, but the High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted them under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. The present appeals to the Supreme Court were dismissed on 16 July 1985; the opinion at hand supplies the Court’s reasons for that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court rightly reversed the Sessions Judge’s acquittal and convicted the appellants for murder under Section 302/34 IPC.
- Whether the identification of the accused by PW 1 and PW 2—both at a Test Identification (TI) parade and in court—was reliable and sufficient for conviction when the accused were previously unknown to the witnesses.
- Whether the Sessions Judge erred in relying on speculative discrepancies regarding timing, lighting, and local inspection findings to acquit the accused.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 415 (1956 Cri LJ 805) | A court’s personal observations during local inspection cannot replace evidence because they are not subject to cross-examination. | Used to criticise the Sessions Judge for treating his local inspection as substantive evidence, thereby exceeding his jurisdiction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court examined both the Sessions Judge’s acquittal and the High Court’s reversal. It found the trial court’s reasoning “perverse” and based on conjecture:
- Identification: The Sessions Judge doubted the witnesses’ ability to identify unknown assailants. The Supreme Court held that PW 1 and PW 2 had multiple opportunities—at the hotel and the scene—to observe the accused, and that electric-pole lighting was adequate. Prompt lodging of the FIR (at 9:20 p.m.) further strengthened credibility.
- Timing Discrepancies: The trial court’s view that meals at 4 p.m. were implausible, or that cinema timing precluded the witnesses’ presence at the hotel, was branded speculative; no evidence showed precise time-keeping by any participant.
- Lighting Conditions: Contrary to the trial court’s finding of insufficient light, evidence established at least one—and possibly three—electric poles near the scene, adequate for recognition.
- Lack of Motive to Falsely Implicate: There was no evidence of prior enmity; therefore, the Court saw no reason for PW 1 and PW 2 to falsely accuse the appellants.
- Local Inspection: Relying on Pritam Singh, the Court held that the Sessions Judge improperly allowed his personal observations from a local inspection to supplant the evidentiary record.
Given these deficiencies, the Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that no reasonable view could justify acquittal on the evidence presented.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: Appeals dismissed; convictions and sentences imposed by the High Court are affirmed.
Implications: The decision reinstates the convictions of all three appellants and underscores that speculative reasoning, misuse of local inspections, and dismissal of credible eyewitness testimony cannot ground an acquittal. The ruling does not announce new precedent but reinforces existing principles on appreciation of evidence and limitations on judicial fact-finding during inspections.
S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.— By our Order dated July 16, 1985, we had dismissed the appeals. We now proceed to give reasons for the same.
2. The prosecution case has been detailed in the judgments of the High Court and the trial court and it is not necessary for us to repeat the same all over again. The accused, Keisam Kumar Singh, Bijoy Singh and Sagolsem Ibotomcha Singh were put on trial before the Sessions Judge for an offence under Section 302/34 Indian Penal Code for causing murder of the deceased, Raghumani Singh.
3. The entire case hinges on the evidence of the two eyewitnesses, PW 1 (Oken Singh) and PW 2 (Manihar Singh), who were actually friends of the deceased and belonged to the same village which was situated within the jurisdiction of Moirang police station.
4. According to the prosecution, on December 14, 1970, PWs 1 and 2 accompanied by the deceased, went to Hotel Deluxe and took their meals in Room No. 2 at about 4.30 p.m Thereafter, they visited Usha Talkies to see the film “Romeo and Juliet” which started at 5.15 p.m and ended at 7.30 p.m
5. The learned trial Judge seems to have made an absolutely artificial and computerised approach regarding the timings of the various places visited by PWs 1 and 2 and the deceased. It was further alleged that after the show had ended, PW 1 found his fountain pen missing and when the same could not be traced in the cinema hall, they went to Hotel Deluxe. On reaching the hotel, the deceased went inside room No. 2 and found it occupied by the three accused persons, on which Bijoy Singh took exception to the conduct of the deceased, Raghumani Singh, entering the room without permission and disturbing them. This resulted in a short altercation and exchange of abuses. The deceased asked his friends to go to the residence of one Mirtunjoy Singh to get back his book which he had loaned to him. While they were proceeding towards Keisampat Bridge on Paon Road and had proceeded about 300 to 400 yards from the hotel, they found the accused persons standing on the western side near the office of the Industries Department. Bijoy Singh ordered them to halt and the three accused rushed towards them and when the deceased and PWs 1 and 2 tried to get away, Bijoy Singh and Keisam Kumar obstructed the way of Raghumani. Thereafter, the accused, Ibotomcha stabbed the deceased with a dagger in his stomach. After the stabbing incident, the accused ran away from the place of occurrence.
6. It is the common case of the parties that two of the three accused were not earlier known to PWs 1 and 2, the two main eyewitnesses, who saw the assault on the deceased and recognised the assailants in the light which was coming from an electric pole. It is also not disputed that the accused were put at a TI parade shortly after their arrest and PWs 1 and 2 identified them both in the TI parade and also before the trial court. The defence was one of complete denial of the occurrence.
7. We have gone through the judgments of the High Court and the Sessions Judge and we are convinced that the learned Sessions Judge had acquitted the accused on the basis of trivial discrepancies which do not affect the main case of the prosecution. To begin with, one of the main reasons given by the Sessions Judge is that as the accused were not known to the witnesses they could not have been identified by them, forgetting that before the incident there were several opportunities for the witnesses to have seen the accused though for a very short while viz. at the hotel and at the place of occurrence. The occurrence had taken place at about 7.30 p.m PW 1 had lodged the FIR promptly at about 9.20 p.m There was no time for concoction. Only Bijoy Singh is named in the FIR and it is stated that the other two could be identified. It is significant to note that no major part is attributed to Bijoy Singh by PWs 1 and 2. It is the prosecution case that only accused (Ibotomcha) stabbed the deceased. Secondly, there was electric light where the deceased was stabbed which also was sufficient to enable the witnesses (PWs 1 and 2) to identify the assailants.
8. Another insipid reason given by the Sessions Judge was that the story of the deceased and PWs 1 and 2 having gone to the Hotel does not appear to be true for two reasons— (1) that the witnesses had taken their meals at Hotel Deluxe at 4 p.m which was not a time for anybody to take meals, and (2) that as the cinema hall manager had said that the show had finished at 7.30 p.m, the witnesses could have reached Hotel Deluxe only after 7.30 p.m
9. All these arguments are based purely on speculation and surmises. There is no evidence to show that either the cinema hall manager or the witnesses (PWs 1 and 2) had any watch with them nor was there anything to show that the room in the hotel where the said altercation took place had any wall-clock. It was, therefore, not open to the learned Sessions Judge to have presumed all these things in order to acquit the accused.
10. The reasoning of the Sessions Judge that nobody would take meals at 4 p.m seems to be unacceptable. Here also, the Sessions Judge gravely erred in proceeding on the footing that the witnesses must have taken food at 12 noon or 1 p.m and, therefore, they could not have again taken food at 4 p.m There is no clear evidence to prove these facts. Assuming that the conclusion of the learned Sessions Judge is true, it cannot be overlooked that the witnesses may have felt hungry or desired to take some snacks in the hotel before proceeding to the cinema hall where they were to stay for two hours and could not have come out before the show was over. This reasoning, therefore, also is based on pure surmises.
11. The learned Sessions Judge also found that there could not have been any light at the place of occurrence but the evidence, however, runs counter to this finding. There is clear evidence to show that there were as many as three electric poles near about the place of occurrence and even if instead of three there was only one pole, that would be sufficient for any person to witness the occurrence and identify the assailants, not to speak of the witnesses (PWs 1 and 2) who had already seen the accused in the hotel before the occurrence.
12. There is no evidence of any previous enmity between the accused and the deceased and there is no reason why PWs 1 and 2 should have falsely implicated the accused particularly when they had identified them (accused) at the TI parade as also in the court.
13. Lastly, the learned Sessions Judge relied on the local inspection made by him. Here, the High Court rightly pointed out that the learned Sessions Judge had committed a serious error of law. Normally, a court is entitled to make a local inspection and even if such an inspection is made, it can never take the place of evidence or proof but is really meant for appreciating the position at the spot. The Sessions Judge seems to have converted himself into a witness in order to draw full support to the defence case by what he may have seen.
14. This Court in Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1956 SC 415, 1956 Cri LJ 805 observed thus: (p. 424, col. 1)
“A Magistrate is certainly not entitled to allow his view or observation to take the place of evidence because such view or observation of his cannot be tested by cross-examination and the accused would certainly not be in a position to furnish any explanation in regard to the same.”
15. We are satisfied that in the instant case the learned Sessions Judge has exceeded his jurisdiction in making a local inspection.
16. These are the main reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge for having acquitted the accused and rejecting the testimony of PWs 1 and 2 who were independent witnesses.
17. For the reasons given above, we are satisfied that the judgment of the Sessions Judge is perverse and based mainly on surmises and conjectures without any attempt to appreciate the evidence in a proper and scientific manner. We are also satisfied that this is not a case where two views, on the evidence, could be reasonably possible. We, therefore, find no merit in these appeals. We uphold the convictions and sentences imposed by the High Court and dismiss the appeals.
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