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Shyamlal Sharma And Others v. Union Of India .
Factual and Procedural Background
Following the judgment reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398, which dismissed a batch of transferred cases concerning disciplinary action against railway employees, several review petitions—including Review Petition No. 530 of 1985 in Transfer Petition No. 13 of 1982—were filed by the affected workmen (e.g., Shyam Nandan Parsad Sharma and others) against the Union of India and railway authorities. The petitioners asserted that they had not been allowed to argue their individual matters on merits because, during the earlier hearing, all sides had proceeded on the understanding that only seven common questions framed by the then Chief Justice would be considered, leaving case-specific issues to be dealt with separately.
A four-judge majority (Bhagwati, C.J., and Tulzapurkar, Pathak & Madon, JJ.) dismissed the review petitions in limine, recording that “we find no substance in them.” Justice M. P. Thakkar dissented, opining that the petitions raised substantial grounds and should be admitted for a full hearing after notice to the respondents.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in the circumstances alleged, the petitioners were denied an opportunity to argue the individual merits of their cases, thereby justifying admission of the review petitions.
- Whether the earlier ruling that the President’s “pleasure” under Article 310(1) can be exercised by subordinate authorities (under rules framed pursuant to Article 309) requires reconsideration on constitutional grounds.
- Whether dispensing with an inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) during an all-India railway strike, and thereby excluding the principles of natural justice, was legally sustainable.
- Whether uncontroverted factual averments—such as those concerning petitioner Narpat Singh’s medical leave—render the earlier dismissal orders vulnerable for non-application of mind or reliance on “no evidence.”
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners’ Arguments
- The earlier hearing was confined to seven common questions; individual petitions were neither argued nor decided on their specific facts, causing prejudice.
- In petitioner Narpat Singh’s case, medical records showed authorized sick leave, contradicting the finding of unauthorised absence; similar factual errors vitiate other dismissals.
- Delegating the President’s constitutional power under Article 310(1) to lower functionaries such as a Divisional Mechanical Engineer effectively rewrites the Constitution and is impermissible.
- Even blacklistees are entitled to natural justice; denying the same to workmen who went on strike violates equality and fairness principles.
- Labeling the strike as “holding the country to ransom” overlooks workers’ constitutional right to seek socio-economic justice; such characterisation cannot justify bypassing inquiries under Article 311(2)(b).
Respondents’ arguments were not recorded in the text, as no notice had been issued on the review petitions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| (1985) 3 SCC 398 (the main judgment under review) | Held that the President’s pleasure under Article 310(1) may be exercised by authorities specified in rules framed under Article 309. | The dissenting judge identified this proposition as raising serious constitutional questions warranting review. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Majority (Bhagwati, C.J., Tulzapurkar, Pathak and Madon, JJ.): The majority issued a terse order stating that, having considered the grounds advanced, they found “no substance” in the review petitions. They therefore dismissed the petitions without issuing notice or granting oral hearing.
Dissent (M. P. Thakkar, J.): Justice Thakkar articulated several reasons why the petitions merited admission and notice:
- Ground 8 plausibly alleged that individual merits were never argued; this uncontested assertion could not be brushed aside without hearing the petitioners.
- Ground 9, illustrated by Narpat Singh’s medical-leave records, suggested the impugned dismissal orders might rest on “no evidence” and display non-application of mind.
- The constitutional propriety of allowing subordinate officials to wield the President’s pleasure under Article 310(1) was neither argued nor examined fully; such delegation raises foundational questions of constitutional structure.
- Consistency with natural-justice jurisprudence—where even black marketeers receive a hearing—mandates at least a hearing on the quantum of punishment inflicted on workmen.
- The majority’s characterisation of the strike as prejudicial to the nation cannot, per se, render an inquiry “not reasonably practicable” for every workman under Article 311(2)(b); this requires individualized assessment.
On these grounds, Justice Thakkar concluded that the review petitions presented “good and substantial” questions, necessitating their admission and a full hearing after service of notice on the respondents.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The review petitions were DISMISSED by the four-judge majority; Justice Thakkar dissented.
Implications: The dismissal leaves the earlier judgment reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398 intact, and the petitioners receive no further opportunity to contest the disciplinary actions. Because the majority offered no expanded reasoning, the order sets no new ratio decidendi beyond reaffirming the finality of the earlier decision. The dissent, while highlighting significant constitutional and procedural concerns, does not affect the outcome.
1. We have considered the grounds urged in the review petitions and since we find no substance in them, the review petitions are dismissed.
2. Per M.P Thakkar, J. (dissenting) (dated 26-11-1985) — While it is not agreeable to disagree with the majority, my conscience commands, and my sense of duty demands, that I should disagree. Disagree with the proposed order dismissing the review petitions in limine with the remark that “we find no substance in them”, without affording to the petitioners any opportunity of hearing in the Court to substantiate the grounds urged by them.
3. One of the grounds urged, ground No. 8 in the petitions, is:
“8. That during the course of arguments the parties had proceeded on the assumption that the Hon'ble Court would decide only the 7 questions framed by the then Hon'ble Chief Justice and the individual petitions on merits would be dealt with either by the Division Benches of this Hon'ble Court or by the respective High Courts. It was on this assumption that the parties addressed their arguments and submissions only on those general questions. It is for this reason that written submissions were made only in TC No. 55 of 1982 amongst all the Railway matters. None of the petitioners had been given any opportunity to argue their cases on merits. The judgment under review dismissed all the transferred cases and thus all these petitions stand decided on merits also. It is, therefore, necessary that in the interest of justice, the petitioner should be given another opportunity to argue their petitions on merits. That this has caused serious prejudice to their cases is apparent from the facts of a few cases reference whereto is made hereinafter.”
It is not possible to say that there is no substance in this ground because no notices have been issued on the review petitions and the averments have not been controverted by the other side. So also it is not stated in the majority judgment that the averment is factually untrue. Reference may be made to Ground number 9 in Review Petitions Nos. 571 to 586-A of 1985 which reads as under:
“9. That it may be submitted that the petitioner Shri Narpat Singh had been served with the Office Order identical to the one reproduced in para 3 above and was charged with stoppage of work from 3-2-1981 and missing from his place of duty and for intimidating and pressurising the loyal employees for not joining duty.
The fact is that the petitioner, Narpat Singh is a patient of Asthma and was under the treatment of the Railway Medical Authorities between December 1980 to 1-2-1981 as outdoor patient. On 2-2-1981 while on duty as Shedman in DSL/Shed BGKt in shift 6 hours to 14 hours, he developed breathing difficulties and was unable to perform his duties. He obtained sick memo G/92 on 2-2-1981 from GFO/DSL BGKt and while leaving duty proper charge was handed over by the petitioner. He was advised complete rest and sick certificate No. 62 of 2-2-1981 for 27 days was submitted.
In these circumstances the petitioner could not be treated as on unauthorised absence from work from 3-2-1981 when he had obtained G-92 on 2-2-1981 and had sent in his sick certificate and had observed all due formalities of reporting sick as required under the Rules. Had the cases been argued on merits, the petitioner, Narpat Singh would have shown to the Hon'ble Court as to how he could not be treated on unauthorised absence and that the dismissal order has been mala fidely issued in a mechanical manner and cannot be sustained.”
4. That the matter of Narpat Singh was not argued on its individual merits is correct. Unless the factual averments made in para 9 are shown to be untrue, these may be considered adequate to vitiate the impugned order on the ground that it manifests non-application of mind and is built on “no evidence”. This is a good ground to entertain the review petition and issue notice to the other side for hearing in the Court.
5. In the majority judgment (1985) 3 SCC 398 the proposition of law has been enunciated that the pleasure under Article 310(1) can be exercised even by an authority specified in the Act or rules made under Article 309 (proviso) in the passage quoted below:
“Thus, though under Article 310(1) the tenure of a government servant is at the pleasure of the President or the Governor, the exercise of such pleasure can be either by the President or the Governor acting with the aid and on the advice of the Council of Ministers or by the authority specified in Acts made under Article 309 or in rules made under such Acts or made under the proviso to Article 309; and in the case of clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311(2), the inquiry is to be dispensed with not on the personal satisfaction of the President or the Governor but on his satisfaction arrived at with the aid and on the advice of the Council of Ministers.”
(emphasis supplied)
Serious constitutional questions, such as the following, arise in this context: When the Constitution advisedly invests powers in regard to the exercise of pleasure on the incumbents of highest executive office can these powers be exercised by any other official, say Divisional Mechanical Engineer (DME)? By a process of interpretation (and not amendment) can it be so construed that what the President by virtue of Article 310(1) can do, the DME of the Railway can do by virtue of the same article? It would virtually amount to amending Article 310(1) by adding the words “or by any other authority....” That is to say to rewrite an article in the Constitution. Is this permissible? What is more, the power under Article 310(1) is exercisable even by the President or the Governor, not on his personal satisfaction, but with the aid and on the advice of the Council of Ministers. Can the same power be exercised by a DME or any other lower functionary acting on his own, there being no question of his acting with the aid or advice of the Council of Ministers? Can the DME who does not even act in the name of the President, surrogate for the President? It is certainly an important constitutional issue which requires to be examined, but has not been examined, from this perspective though the point was debated. This is another ground to entertain the review petition and to issue a notice to the other side for hearing in the Court.
6. Another ground for entertaining the review petition is this: Will it not be tantamount to speaking in two voices to hold that principles of natural justice need not be complied with even in regard to the quantum of punishment to be inflicted on a workman, even though the law declared so far demands that even a black marketeer cannot be blacklisted without observing the principles of natural justice? Is a workman who “sweats” for the Nation not entitled to the same treatment as a black marketeer who “bleeds” the Nation?
7. An extremely serious and important ground for review also arises in the context of the doctrine enunciated in the following passages: [, SCC (L&S) pp. 796-97, paras 170 and 173]
“It may be that the railway servants went on these strikes with the object of forcing the Government to meet their demands. Their demands were for their private gain and in their private interest. In seeking to have these demands conceded they caused untold hardship to the public and prejudicially affected public good and public interest and the good and interest of the nation.
In the context of an all-India strike where a very large number of railway servants had struck work, the railway services paralysed, loyal workers and superior officers assaulted and intimidated, the country held to ransom, the economy of the country and public interest and public good prejudicially affected, prompt and immediate action was called for to bring the situation to normal. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that an inquiry was reasonably practicable.”
The workers certainly have a right to struggle and strive for economic justice in a country the Constitution of which, in the preamble, proclaims it to be a “Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic”. Going on strike in the course of such a struggle cannot be characterised as holding the country to ransom and be frowned upon. Nor can they be condemned as seekers of private gain for endeavouring to remove their economic distress and plight to bring about a just society. And it cannot be said on that account that it is not “reasonably practicable” to hold the inquiry in the case of any workman if there is a country-wide general strike by workers. Article 311(2)(b) was surely not designed by the Founding Fathers in order to enable “breaking” a strike called in support of workers' demands for socio-economic justice. The issue therefore deserves to be examined in the light of this perspective and the review petitions deserve to be admitted.
8. On these grounds and in the light of the other grounds urged in the review petitions, the review petitions deserve to be heard in the Court. It is therefore directed that the review petitions be admitted, notices be issued to the respondents, and the matters may be placed in the Court for further hearing.
Review Petition No. 530 of 1985 in Transfer Petition No. 13 of 1982
SHYAM NANDAN PARSAD SHARMA AND OTHERS . . Petitioners;
Versus
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS . . Respondents.
Order (dated 8-11-1985) [on behalf of Bhagwati, C.J and Tulzapurkar, Pathak and Madon, JJ.]
9. We have considered the grounds urged in the review petition and since we find no substance in them, the review petition is dismissed.
10. Per M.P Thakkar, J. (dissenting) (dated 26-11-1985)— The grounds urged in the review petitions are good and substantial. The review petitions are therefore admitted, and directed to be placed for hearing in the court.
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