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Tholan v. State Of Tamil Nadu .,
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, Tholan, was tried in Sessions Case No. 134/78 before the Sessions Judge, Salem, for the stabbing death of Sampat on 2 September 1978. Relying on eyewitness testimony (PWs 1–3) and medical evidence, the Sessions Court convicted him of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and imposed a life sentence. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal on 4 February 1981, affirming both conviction and sentence. The appellant then sought special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India. Leave was granted, limited to the “nature of the offence and sentence.”
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the single knife-blow delivered by the appellant, in the circumstances proved, constituted “murder” under Section 302 IPC or the lesser offence of “culpable homicide not amounting to murder” under Section 304 IPC.
- Consequently, what sentence, if any, was appropriate.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The occurrence was sudden, arising out of a spur-of-the-moment altercation unrelated to any prior enmity with the deceased.
- Only one knife blow was inflicted; therefore it cannot be said with reasonable certainty that the appellant intended either to kill Sampat or to cause an injury that was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
- Given these circumstances, the conviction should be reduced to an offence under Section 304 IPC.
State's Arguments
- By wielding a knife and striking the deceased on a vital part of the body (the chest), the appellant must be taken to have intended to cause that very injury, which medical evidence shows was sufficient to cause death; hence Part III of Section 300 IPC applied and the conviction under Section 302 IPC should stand.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana, (1981) 3 SCC 616 | Tests for determining intention versus knowledge in single-blow homicide cases. | Relied upon to show that intention to cause fatal injury cannot automatically be inferred from one blow; supports reduction to Section 304 Part II. |
| Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, (1981) 4 SCC 484 | Distinction between Sections 302 and 304 when only one fatal injury is inflicted. | Used to bolster the view that requisite intent for murder was absent here. |
| Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab, (1981) 4 SCC 245 | Guidelines on assessing intention in sudden quarrel situations. | Cited to demonstrate that a sudden altercation can negate intention to kill. |
| Hari Ram v. State of Haryana, (1983) 1 SCC 193 | Role of surrounding circumstances in gauging mens rea. | Supported the conclusion that only knowledge, not intent to murder, could be attributed. |
| Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 342 | Further clarification of intent vs. knowledge where a single stab wound proves fatal. | Reinforced the appropriateness of convicting under Section 304 Part II. |
| Ram Sunder v. State of U.P. | Similar fact pattern illustrating application of Section 304 Part II. | Added to the chain of authority permitting reduction of the charge. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court first accepted the concurrent factual finding that the appellant delivered a single knife blow to the deceased’s chest, which caused death. It next analysed the circumstances leading to the blow: the appellant’s dispute was actually with the organisers of a chit fund, not with the deceased; Sampat’s involvement was accidental, arising only when he asked the appellant not to use abusive language in front of women. No prior malice toward Sampat was shown.
Because the encounter was sudden, the Court doubted the presence of the specific intent required for “murder” under Parts I or III of Section 300 IPC. While the State argued intent should be inferred from the choice of weapon and the part of the body struck, the Court canvassed several Supreme Court precedents (listed above) establishing that a single stab, delivered in a sudden quarrel without prior enmity, often evidences only “knowledge” that death was likely, not an “intention” to cause death or such bodily injury as is sufficient to cause death.
Applying these authorities, the Court held that the appellant possessed knowledge that his act was likely to cause death, thereby satisfying the ingredients of Section 304 Part II IPC. Exception 1 to Section 300 was considered but ultimately deemed unnecessary; the conviction could be reduced solely on the absence of requisite intent.
Holding and Implications
Conviction under Section 302 IPC set aside; appellant convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentenced to five years’ rigorous imprisonment.
Immediate effect: the appellant’s life sentence is replaced by a fixed term of five years. The judgment follows established Supreme Court jurisprudence on single-blow homicides and does not articulate any novel principle beyond reaffirming that intent cannot be presumed merely from the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part in the heat of a sudden quarrel.
1. Special leave granted.
2. Appellant Tholan was convicted by the learned Sessions Judge, Salem in Sessions Case No. 134/78 for committing murder of Sampat, son of Marimutba Pathar on September 2, 1978 and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. His appeal to the High Court of Madras was dismissed by a Division Bench on February 4, 1981.
3. Few facts relevant for the disposal of this appeal are that one K.G Rajan was running a chit with the help of PW 4 Chinnu. The profit derived by this venture was being utilised to help needy school children by giving them free slates and such other articles of everyday use for school children. The balance available for this activity at the relevant time was Rs 600. It appears that the appellant and his brother Raman gave a bid at the auction for a chit in the amount of Rs 30 and were paid the chit amount. Appellant thereafter approached Raman with a request for a loan of Rs 100 but PW 4 Chinnu informed him that it was not possible to grant loan. Some altercation took place in which the appellant is said to have used abusive language. PW 1 Subramaniam and deceased Sampat are brothers. They were residing in adjacent houses in Boyar Street. On September 2, 1978 around 7 p.m appellant came near the house of deceased Sampat complaining against the organisers of the chit. At that time he was in front of the house of one Palaniammal, who on hearing the shouts of the appellant asked him to go away. The appellant in turn abused Palaniammal. At that time deceased Sampat came out of his house and cautioned appellant not to indulge in abusive language, as the ladies were present and told him to go away. The appellant questioned the authority of the deceased to ask him to go away. Both were remonstrating with each other when appellant took out a knife from his waist and stabbed deceased Sampat on the right side of his chest and pushed the deceased to a distance of 25 feet and left him there and went away. Sampat succumbed to his injury which in course of post-mortem examination was found to be an incised gaping wound obliquely placed over the front of right side of the chest 1 cm away from the right aternal box dox on the fourth intercostal space and 5 cm medial to the right nipple of size 3 cm × 1 cm at the maximum point. Depth was not probed. The external wound was spindle shaped with clear-cut edges on both sides and sharp point on either ends with blood clots. On internal examination fracture of fifth and sixth ribs were noticed. The depth of the wound was probed up to middle lobe of the right lung and proceeding up to right atrial cavity. The cause of death was stated to be shock and haemorrhage on account of the stab injury and the corresponding internal injury to vital organs like the heart and the lung. This injury, in the opinion of the Medical Officer, was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
4. In his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant stated that he and his brother-in-law took chits of Rs 30 each and received the amount when he demanded accounts, PW 4 Chinnu and Shri K.G Rajan accompanied by others came to beat him and therefore, he ran away and did not know what happened. He denied having given a knife blow to deceased Sampat and also denied having pointed out the place from which knife was recovered.
5. The learned Sessions Judge after taking into consideration the evidence of eyewitnesses PW 1 Subramaniam, PW 2 and PW 3 and other evidence held the appellant guilty of committing murder of deceased Sampat and convicted and sentenced him as hereinabove stated.
6. The High Court broadly agreed with the findings of the learned Sessions Judge and dismissed the appeal and confirmed the conviction.
7. When the petition for special leave to appeal came up at the admission stage, notice limited to the question of nature of offence and sentence was ordered to be issued. Thereafter, this matter came up for hearing today when we granted limited leave and with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and for the respondent proceeded to hear the appeal.
8. The fact that appellant gave a blow with a knife to deceased Sampat which landed on the front of the right side chest and this injury resulted in death of Sampat is not open to dispute and not questioned before us.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that having regard to the genesis of the occurrence and the surrounding circumstances and the fact that one blow with a knife was given which happened to land on the chest, it cannot be said with reasonable certainty that appellant intended to commit murder of deceased Sampat or appellant intended to cause the particular injury and the injury intended to be inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
10. Keeping in view the submission, it is necessary to recapitulate the genesis in which the occurrence took place and the surrounding circumstances.
11. K.G Rajan with the help of PW 4 Chinnu was running a chit. Appellant and his brother Raman participated in the auction and took one chit for Rs 30 each. Appellant then approached PW 4 Chinnu with a request for loan but PW 4 Chinnu replied that he had no power or authority to grant loan for more than Rs 30. Some altercation took place between the accused and PW 4 Chinnu. This part of the occurrence which is relied upon as motive for the offence took place in the office of the Panchayat of which K.G Rajan was at the relevant time the President. It also transpired from the evidence that K.G Rajan and PW 4 Chinnu belonged to one political party and the appellant belonged to a different political party. Now we fail to see any connection between K.G Rajan and PW 4 Chinnu on the one side and PW 1 Subramaniam and his deceased brother Sampat on the other side. The inter-connection is not established save and except saying that on September 2, 1978 around 7 p.m appellant came near the house of deceased Sampat and started remonstrating about the conduct of the organisers of the chit. How deceased Sampat was interested in the chit conducted by K.G Rajan and PW 4 Chinnu is not established and the link is tenuous. It appears that the appellant while remonstrating about the conduct of the organisers of the chit started using filthy language whereupon one Palaniammal who was in the courtyard of the house told the accused to move away from the place in front of her house. Accused objected to Palaniammal asking him to move away and abused her. It is at this stage deceased Sampat came from his house which appears to be situated near the house of Palaniammal and told the accused not to use vulgar language because the ladies were present and asked him to move away from that place. The appellant questioned the authority of deceased Sampat to ask him to move away and an altercation ensued between them. Appellant is supposed to have threatened deceased Sampat that he would settle a score with him and immediately thereupon he took out what is described as M.O 1 Soori knife from his waist and gave one blow to Sampat which landed on his right side of chest. Eyewitnesses also alleged that thereafter appellant put his hand on the neck of deceased and pushed him to a distance of 25 feet and thereafter the deceased Sampat fell down and appellant ran away. This is the version of the prosecution as to the origin of the occurrence and we would proceed on the basis that that represents a true and accurate account about the genesis of the occurrence because both the courts have accepted the same and there is nothing to depart from this concurrent finding of fact.
12. It is equally not in dispute that appellant gave only one blow with a knife. Appellant had no quarrel or dispute with deceased Sampat. It is not shown that deceased Sampat had anything to do with the chit organised by K.G Rajan. No malice has been alleged to have been entertained by the accused towards deceased Sampat. The incident occurred on the spur of the moment. It appears that the house of the deceased Sampat was somewhere near the house in which the organisers or at least one of them was residing. Appellant had his dispute and grievance with the organisers of the chit. It is the prosecution case that accused abused organisers of the chit. Deceased Sampat is not shown to be the organiser of the chit. Probably when the deceased Sampat told the accused not to misbehave in the presence of ladies and not to use vulgar and filthy language, the appellant retorted by questioning the authority of Sampat to ask him to leave the place. Presence of Sampat is wholly accidental. Altercation with Sampat was on the spur of the moment, even the meeting was accidental. There arose a situation in which appellant probably misguided by his own egocentric nature objected as to why Sampat should ask him to leave the place and in this background he gave one blow with a knife which landed on the right side chest of the deceased, which has proved fatal. Could the appellant be said to have committed murder? In other words, whether Part I or Part III of Section 300 IPC would be attracted in the facts of this case. Even Mr Rangam learned counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu could not very seriously contend that the appellant intended to commit murder of Sampat. His submission was that at any rate appellant, when he wielded a weapon like a knife and gave a blow on the chest, a vital part of the body, must have intended to cause that particular injury and this injury is objectively found by the medical evidence to be fatal and therefore Part III of Section 300 would be attracted. On this aspect, the decisions are legion and it is not necessary to recapitulate them here merely to cover idle parade of familiar knowledge. One can profitably refer to Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana (1981) 3 SCC 616, AIR 1981 SC 1552, 1981 Cri LJ 1136, Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab (1981) 4 SCC 484, AIR 1982 SC 55, Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab (1981) 4 SCC 245, AIR 1982 SC 126 and Hari Ram v. State of Haryana (1983) 1 SCC 193, AIR 1983 SC 185, 1983 Cri LJ 346. To this list two more cases can be added : Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 342 and Ram Sunder v. State of U.P Having regard to the ratio of each of these decisions, we are satisfied that even if Exception I is not attracted, the requisite intention cannot be attributed to the appellant. But in the circumstances herein discussed he wielded a weapon like a knife and therefore he can be attributed with the knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death. In such a situation, he would be guilty of committing an offence under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, a sentence of 5 years would be quite adequate.
13. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the conviction of the appellant for an offence under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of life imprisonment are set aside and the appellant is convicted for having committed an offence under Section 304 Part II IPC and he is sentenced to suffer RI for 5 years. The appeal is allowed to the extent herein indicated.
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