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Mohammad Idris And Another v. Rustam Jehangir Babuji And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners were alleged to have breached an undertaking given in Suit No. 2308 of 1983 before the Bombay High Court. A learned Single Judge issued a notice to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt. After hearing, the Single Judge found the petitioners guilty of “gross contempt” and committed each of them to civil jail for one month.
Exercising their statutory right under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the petitioners appealed to a Division Bench of the High Court, which dismissed the appeal. The petitioners then approached the Supreme Court by way of a special-leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, after availing an appeal to a Division Bench under Section 19(1)(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, the petitioners still possessed a further appeal “as of right” to the Supreme Court.
- Whether the finding of contempt and the ancillary directions issued by the Single Judge were justified on merits.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act allegedly conferred an additional, automatic right of appeal to the Supreme Court even after the Division Bench’s decision.
- The undertaking allegedly breached did not pertain to the property in question, and therefore the Single Judge erred in issuing further remedial directions alongside punishment.
The opinion does not record any separate arguments from the respondents.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Purushotam Dass Goel v. B. S. Dhillon (1978) 2 SCC 370 | Illustrated appellate provisions under the Contempt of Courts Act | The Court deemed the case “entirely irrelevant” to the present controversy and did not rely on it. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
On the statutory right of appeal: The Supreme Court read Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act as granting only a single statutory appeal. When a contempt order is passed by a Single Judge, the appeal lies to a Division Bench. If the original order is by a Bench, the appeal lies directly to the Supreme Court. Once the appeal to the Division Bench is exhausted, no further statutory appeal remains. Thus, the petitioners had to invoke Article 136, and could not claim an “appeal as of right.”
On the merits of contempt: The Court affirmed the Single Judge’s finding of a “clear breach” of the undertaking. It held that the additional directions issued were appropriate to “close the breach” and were within the court’s powers when punishing for contempt. The petitioners’ contentions were found to be without substance.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The special-leave petition is dismissed; the conviction for contempt and the one-month civil jail sentence remain intact.
Implications: The dismissal exhausts the petitioners’ remedies, requiring them to serve the sentence. The decision reaffirms that Section 19(1) allows only one statutory appeal in contempt matters and does not create an automatic second appeal to the Supreme Court. No new legal doctrine was established.
O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.— On an allegation that the petitioners had acted in breach of an undertaking given by them in Suit 2308 of 1983 in the High Court of Bombay, a notice was issued to them to show cause why they should not be committed for contempt of court. Cause was sought to be shown. A learned Single Judge of the High Court recorded the following finding:
“In my judgment the action of Defendants 4 and 6 clearly shows utter contempt for the orders of the court and undertaking given by them. I have no hesitation in holding that these defendants have committed gross contempt of court ... in my judgment, there is no circumstance whatsoever to take any lenient view of the gross contempt committed by Defendants 4 and 6 and both of them are liable to be punished under the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act.”
2. On those findings the learned Single Judge committed each of the two petitioners to the civil jail for the period of one month. Against the order of the learned Single Judge, the petitioners preferred an appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench and the present special leave petition has been filed against the judgment of the Division Bench. Shri Ramesh N. Keshwani, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that though the petition for special leave to appeal has been filed under Article 136 of the Constitution, the petitioners have, in law, an appeal as of right under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act. The submission has only to be stated to be rejected as totally lacking in substance. Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act is as follows:
“An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt—
(a) where the order or decision is that of a Single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court;
(b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court:
Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union Territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.”
3. If the order of commital for contempt of court is made by a Single Judge of the High Court, there is one statutory right of appeal to a Division Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court. If the order of commital for contempt of court is made by a Bench, an appeal lies as of right to the Supreme Court. Where an appeal is filed against the order of the learned Single Judge to a Division Bench, the statutory right of appeal gets exhausted and there is no further right of appeal to the Supreme Court. Shri Keshwani cited to us Purushotam Dass Goel v.B.S Dhillon (1978) 2 SCC 370, AIR 1978 SC 1014, (1978) 3 SCR 510. The decision is entirely irrelevant.
4. On merits, the learned counsel submitted that the undertaking given was not in respect of the property concerned and that in any case the learned Single Judge was not justified in giving certain directions in addition to punishing the petitioners for contempt of court. We find no substance in the submissions made by the learned counsel. There was a clear breach of the undertaking given by the petitioners and we are of the opinion that the Single Judge was quite right in giving appropriate directions to close the breach. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed.
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