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Sital Prasad Saxena (Dead) By Lrs. v. Union Of India And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Shri Sital Prasad Saxena filed Civil Suit No. 46-A of 1969 against the Union of India, the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India, and the Accountant-General, Madhya Pradesh, seeking a declaration regarding his status and arrears of salary. The trial court dismissed the suit on 7 July 1969, and the dismissal was affirmed by the First Additional District Judge in Civil Appeal No. 36-A of 1970 on 4 August 1970.
Sital Prasad Saxena then filed Second Appeal No. 10 of 1971 before the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Jabalpur Bench). He died on 25 February 1976 while the appeal was pending. On 7 October 1978, Mahendra Kumar Saxena, claiming to be his son, filed three applications: (i) under Order XXII Rule 3 CPC for substitution of legal representatives, (ii) under Order XXII Rule 9 CPC to set aside any abatement, and (iii) under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone delay.
A single judge of the High Court referred these applications to the trial court for an inquiry and report on the date of death and the heirs’ knowledge of the appeal. The trial court reported that Mahendra Kumar Saxena had knowledge of the appeal before 7 October 1978. Relying heavily on this report and treating the matter as if in revision, the High Court refused to condone the delay, declined substitution, and declared the second appeal abated. The heirs obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether sufficient cause was shown for condoning the delay in filing the application for substitution of the deceased appellant’s heirs under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Order XXII CPC.
- Whether the High Court erred in treating the trial court’s report as binding instead of independently evaluating it while exercising appellate jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The sons were unaware of the pendency of the second appeal until shortly before the applications were filed, constituting sufficient cause for delay.
- The High Court was obliged to examine the evidence itself rather than defer to the trial court’s findings as if exercising revisional powers.
- Procedural rules should be applied liberally, consistent with the principles enunciated in Bhagwan Swaroop v. Mool Chand and Hans Raj v. Sundar Lal Aggarwal.
Respondents’ (Union of India) Arguments
- The applicants had not shown sufficient cause for the delay; therefore, the abatement should stand and substitution be refused.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bhagwan Swaroop v. Mool Chand (1983) 2 SCC 132 | Liberal approach in condoning delay for substitution; procedural rules should advance justice, not punish parties. | Relied on to emphasise that sufficient cause should be interpreted broadly and that heirs are not expected to monitor appeals constantly. |
| Hans Raj v. Sundar Lal Aggarwal (1982) 1 SCC 476 | Same principle: procedural provisions must be applied to facilitate decisions on merits. | Cited to support condonation of delay and setting aside abatement. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed two fundamental errors:
- It treated the trial court’s inquiry report as if exercising revisional jurisdiction, merely adopting the trial court’s view rather than forming an independent appraisal of the evidence regarding the heirs' knowledge of the appeal.
- It failed to recognise that litigants, especially rural family members, cannot be expected to keep constant vigil over proceedings pending far away; hence strict adherence to limitation periods would defeat justice.
The Court reiterated that procedural rules are “designed to advance justice and should not be interpreted as penal statutes.” Considering the nature of the litigation and the possibility that the deceased father had not informed his sons about the case, it was inappropriate to infer prior knowledge and thereby refuse substitution.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeals are allowed. The orders of the High Court refusing to condone delay, declining substitution, and declaring the second appeal abated are set aside. Delay is condoned, abatement is set aside, and the heirs of the deceased appellant are brought on record. The matter is remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits.
Implications: The decision immediately revives Second Appeal No. 10 of 1971 and directs its expeditious disposal. While the Court applies established principles, it reinforces the liberal approach toward procedural delays, particularly in substitution matters, but does not create a new legal precedent beyond reaffirming existing doctrine.
D.A Desai, J.— One Shri Sital Prasad Saxena filed Civil Suit 46-A of 1969 against (1) Union of India (2) Comptroller and Auditor-General of India and (3) Accountant-General, Madhya Pradesh for a declaration about the status of his post and arrears of salary in respect of the post in which he was entitled to continue. The suit came up for hearing before the fifth Civil Judge, Class II, Gwalior who by his judgment and decree dated July 7, 1969 dismissed the Suit. Plaintiff Sital Prasad Saxena preferred Civil Appeal 36-A of 1970 against that judgment and decree of the trial court in the District Court at Gwalior. The appeal came up for hearing before the learned First Additional District Judge who agreed with the findings recorded by the trial court and accordingly by his judgment and order dated August 4, 1970 dismissed the appeal. Plaintiff Sital Prasad Saxena preferred Second Appeal 10 of 1971 in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh — Jabalpur Bench.
2. During the pendency of the appeal in the High Court, plaintiff-appellant Sital Prasad Saxena expired on February 25, 1976. One Mahendra Kumar Saxena claiming to be one of the sons of late Sital Prasad Saxena moved an application being I.A 5582 of 1978 under Order XXII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure for substitution of heirs and legal representatives of the deceased appellant with a view to prosecuting the appeal. He simultaneously moved another application being I.A 5744 of 1978 under Order XXII Rule 9 CPC requesting the Court that if the appeal has abated for failure to seek substitution within the prescribed period of limitation, the abatement of the appeal may be set aside. He also moved another application being I.A 5745 of 1978 for seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
3. A learned Single Judge of the High Court by his order dated January 29, 1981 directed that all the three miscellaneous applications be transmitted to the trial court for enquiry and report regarding the date of death of Sital Prasad Saxena and knowledge about the pendency of the appeal of the heirs and legal representatives in order to ascertain whether the applicant had made out sufficient cause for condoning the delay which if permitted, would enable the Court to set aside the abatement. The trial court after recording the evidence of the parties submitted the report which in terms included a finding that Mahendra Kumar Saxena had knowledge about the pendency of the second appeal before October 7, 1978, the date on which he moved the aforementioned applications. It appears that on the receipt of the report of the trial court Mahendra Kumar Saxena and other legal representatives of the deceased appellant moved an application being I.A 2722 of 1981 praying for an opportunity to examine another son of the deceased appellant viz. Shailendra Kumar Saxena. They also filed objections controverting the finding recorded by the trial court.
4. It appears that the Union of India resisted the applications contending that the petitioner has failed to make out sufficient cause for the delay in seeking substitution and therefore no case is made out for condoning the delay and setting aside abatement. The position adopted by Union of India is a bit surprising for us.
5. The High Court after minutely examining the rival contentions held that the conclusion reached by the trial court is such that the learned Judge would not like to take a different view of the matter. The approach of the High Court suggests that it was exercising revisional jurisdiction while examining the report of the trial court. This approach does not commend to us. Accordingly the learned Judge rejected the various applications thereby declining to condone the delay which alone would permit him to set aside the abatement with the result that appeal was disposed of as having abated. Hence this appeal by special leave.
6. We heard Mr S.S Khanduja, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr G.D Gupta, learned counsel for the respondents. Approach to the applications seeking condonation of delay in moving the application for substitution of parties who died during the pendency of civil appeal in the High Court has to be as observed by this Court in Bhagwan Swaroop v. Mool Chand (1983) 2 SCC 132 and Hans Raj v. Sundar Lal Aggarwal (1982) 1 SCC 476. In the present case the High Court unfortunately committed an error in rejecting the application for condoning the delay. It is the High Court which had to satisfy itself that the petitioner made out sufficient cause which prevented him from moving the application for substitution in time and not the trial court. The High Court may call for report of the trial court but then cannot adopt the approach of a court exercising revisional jurisdiction. It must examine the material collected by the trial court and come to its own conclusion. In this case the High Court observed that it was not persuaded to take a view different from the one taken by the trial court. This is impermissible. The second error was that once an appeal is pending in the High Court, the heirs are not expected to keep a constant watch on the continued existence of parties to the appeal before the High Court which has a seat far away from where parties in rural areas may be residing. And in a traditional rural family the father may not have informed his son about the litigation in which he was involved and was a party. Let it be recalled what has been said umpteen times that rules of procedure are designed to advance justice and should be so interpreted as not to make them penal statutes for punishing erring parties.
7. The deceased appellant has left behind him his sons. It is a moot point whether the father acquainted his son/sons about his litigation for seeking relief in respect of his service. If this is the nature of litigation, we are not inclined to draw the inference drawn by the trial court that son/sons knew about the pendency of appeal.
8. Having heard learned counsel on either side we are satisfied that both the trial court as well as the High Court were in error in not condoning the delay in seeking substitution of heirs and legal representatives of the deceased/appellant in time. Cause for delay as urged appears to us to be sufficient which prevented them from moving the petition for substitution. We are satisfied that sufficient cause was made for condoning the delay. Accordingly, we first set aside the order passed in I.A 5745 of 1978 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay and grant the same. We set aside the order disposing of the appeal having abated and set aside the abatement. We condone the delay in seeking substitution and grant substitution. Accordingly, the heirs and legal representatives who applied for substitution in place of the deceased appellant are directed to be brought on record. The appeal succeeds to this extent and is allowed and the orders of the High Court herein above set out are set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for disposal in the light of the observations made herein. Since the matter is an old one the High Court may dispose of it as expeditiously as possible. There will be no order as to costs. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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