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Union Of India And Others v. Haji Mastan Mirza .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent, Haji Mastan Mirza, was first detained under Section 3(1)(c) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) by an order dated 17 September 1974. After a formal release on 19 December 1974, he was immediately re-detained under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1973 (COFEPOSA) by the Union Finance Minister. Grounds of detention were served on 23 December 1974 and a declaration under Section 5(1) of COFEPOSA followed on 19 January 1975.
During the national Emergency (25 June 1975–21 March 1977) the respondent could not approach the courts. He was released on 23 March 1977. Thereafter, a notice under Section 6(1) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (SAFEMA) was issued, culminating in an order under Section 7 forfeiting his and his relatives’ properties. Appeals against that forfeiture are still pending before the SAFEMA Appellate Tribunal.
In April 1981 the respondent filed Criminal Application No. 780 of 1981 before the Bombay High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 CrPC seeking to quash the COFEPOSA detention order, the Section 5(1) declaration, and the ensuing SAFEMA proceedings. A Division Bench (Gadgil J. and Kotwal J.) accepted the challenge, principally because copies of documents relied upon in the grounds of detention had never been supplied to the respondent. The Union of India appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondent’s writ petition was maintainable despite pending SAFEMA appeals and the lapse of time since his release.
- Whether the detention order dated 19 December 1974 under COFEPOSA was void for non-supply of material documents referred to and relied upon in the grounds of detention.
- Whether proceedings and orders under Sections 6(1) and 7 of SAFEMA could survive if the underlying COFEPOSA detention was invalidated.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gurdip Singh v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 419 | Failure to supply copies of documents relied upon in the grounds of detention vitiates the detention order. | The Court invoked this precedent to hold that non-supply of documents to the respondent rendered his COFEPOSA detention illegal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Maintainability. The Supreme Court held that the pendency of appeals under SAFEMA did not bar the respondent’s writ petition. Because the Emergency prevented him from seeking timely relief, the delay in filing could not estop him. Moreover, counsel for the Union did not dispute maintainability.
Statutory Link between COFEPOSA and SAFEMA. Under Section 2(2) of SAFEMA, action under Sections 6 and 7 is permissible only if a valid COFEPOSA detention order exists. Therefore, the validity of the 19 December 1974 detention order was a “condition precedent” to the forfeiture proceedings.
Non-supply of Documents. It was undisputed before the High Court—and accepted in the Supreme Court—that no copies of the documents referred to in, and relied upon for, the grounds of detention were ever given to the respondent. The Court emphasised that without those documents the respondent could not make an effective representation, a constitutional safeguard repeatedly affirmed in earlier decisions, including Gurdip Singh.
Consequences. Owing to the admitted non-supply of essential documents, the Court concluded that the detention was “bad in law.” As the foundational detention was void, the SAFEMA notice and forfeiture order predicated upon it were likewise unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: Appeal Dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Bombay High Court’s judgment, declaring the detention order of 19 December 1974, the Section 5(1) declaration, and all SAFEMA proceedings based upon them to be illegal, null, and void.
Implications: The respondent’s properties cannot be forfeited under the impugned SAFEMA proceedings, and the Union of India is restrained from further action based on the void detention order. The decision does not create new precedent but reiterates the established principle that failure to supply relied-upon documents fatally vitiates preventive-detention orders.
A. Varadarajan, J.— This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No. 780 of 1981 filed by the respondent Haji Mastan Mirza, allowing the criminal appeal and declaring that the order of detention dated December 19, 1974 passed by the Minister of Finance, Government of India under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1973, (COFEPOSA) is illegal, null and void ab initio and inoperative, and quashing that order as well as the declaration under Section 5(1) of the COFEPOSA made on January 18, 1975 and also consequently quashing the notice issued under Section 6(1) and the order made under Section 7 of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, (SAFEMA) 1976 and restraining the appellant from taking any action whatsoever on the basis of the order of detention dated December 19, 1974. The main ground on which the order of detention dated December 19, 1974 and the declaration dated January 18, 1975 were quashed by the learned Judges of the High Court is that the respondent was not served with copies of documents referred to and relied upon in the grounds of detention served on the respondent on December 19, 1974.
2. An order dated September 17, 1974 was passed for detention of the respondent under Section 3(1)(c) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) and the grounds of detention were served on him on September 23, 1974 after he surrendered on September 18, 1974. There was a formal release of the respondent from detention under the MISA on December 19, 1974, and he was immediately detained under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA by the aforesaid order dated December 19, 1974 passed by the Minister of Finance of the Government of India on the basis of the materials placed before him by his Joint Secretary. The grounds of detention were served on the respondent on December 23, 1974. A declaration under Section 5(1) of COFEPOSA was served on the respondent on January 19, 1975. Emergency was proclaimed throughout the country by the President on June 25, 1975 and it continued to be in force until March 21, 1977. The respondent was released on March 23, 1977.
3. A show-cause notice under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA was issued to the respondent and his relatives and alleged associates founded on the respondent's detention under the aforesaid order dated December 19, 1974 made under Section 3(1) of COFEPOSA. Pursuant to that notice an order under Section 7 of SAFEMA was passed forfeiting the properties of the respondent and his relatives. The respondent and all the other aggrieved persons except one filed appeals against that order before the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the provisions of that Act. Those appeals are said to be still pending. The persons who filed those appeals have filed Miscellaneous Petition No. 548 of 1977 on or about April 25, 1977 in the Bombay High Court, challenging the vires of certain provisions of COFEPOSA and SAFEMA. That petition is pending even now.
4. The respondent filed the Criminal Application No. 780 of 1981 under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Bombay High Court in April 1981, challenging the validity of the impugned order of detention dated December 19, 1974 and the declaration dated January 18, 1975, passed and made under Section 3(1) and Section 5(1) of COFEPOSA for showing that the action taken under Section 6(1) and Section 7 of SAFEMA is unsustainable.
5. The learned Counsel for the respondent conceded before us that the respondent is not challenging the vires of any of the provisions of COFEPOSA and SAFEMA in the present appeal. The said petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging the validity of the order of detention and declaration passed under COFEPOSA and the notice and order issued under Sections 6(1) and 7 of SAFEMA was heard by Gadgil and Kotwal, JJ., constituting the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. Kotwal, J., considered all the grounds urged before him and accepted most of them including two grounds viz. non-application of mind of the Detaining Authority to the material placed before him before he passed the impugned order of detention dated December 19, 1974 and the failure of the appellant to supply copies of the documents clearly and unmistakably relied upon for arriving at the subjective satisfaction that the respondent's detention under COFEPOSA is necessary and referred to in the grounds of detention served upon him for holding that the order of detention passed under Section 3(1) and declaration made under Section 5(1) of COFEPOSA is void ab initio and that the action taken under Section 6(1) and Section 7 of SAFEMA pursuant to that order of detention is liable to be struck down while holding that the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is maintainable and that the effect of the order of detention dated December 19, 1974 could not be said to be any longer in force after the respondent had been released from detention on March 23, 1977 inasmuch as action under Section 6(1) and Section 7 of SAFEMA has been taken only pursuant to that order of detention.
6. Gadgil, J., while disagreeing with Kotwal, J., on the question of the application of the mind of the Detaining Authority to the materials placed before him before he passed the impugned order of detention clearly agreed with Kotwal, J., that the respondent was not supplied with the copies of the documents relied upon in the grounds of detention supplied to him and consequently Gadgil, J., also held that the respondent is entitled to the relief claimed by him before the High Court. Thus both the learned Judges agreed in holding that the impugned order of detention dated December 19, 1974 and the declaration dated January 18, 1975 passed and made under Sections 3(1) and 5(1) respectively of COFEPOSA and the notice and order for forfeiture of the respondent's properties issued and made under Section 6(1) and Section 7 respectively of SAFEMA are invalid and in restraining the appellants from taking any action under SAFEMA based on the said order of detention dated December 19, 1974.
7. The pendency of the appeal filed under the provisions of SAFEMA against the order for forfeiture of the respondent's properties made under the provisions of that Act is not a bar to the present proceeding. The respondent was in detention under MISA from September 17, 1974 to December 19, 1974 and thereafter under COFEPOSA until March 23, 1977. During the period of his detention under COFEPOSA from December 19, 1974 to March 23, 1977 proclamation of emergency in the country was in force from June 25, 1975 to March 21, 1977. Therefore, for a major part of the period of the respondent's detention under COFEPOSA he could not move any Court of law for redress against his detention and he was released on March 23, 1977 soon after the emergency was lifted on March 21, 1977. In these circumstances the fact that the respondent did not challenge his detention under COFEPOSA before his release cannot operate as estoppel against his right of moving the court for having the order of detention quashed when that order was sought to be used as a basis for taking action against him under Sections 6 and 7 of SAFEMA. We therefore hold that the respondent's petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is maintainable. We may state that this question of maintainability of the respondent's petition was not disputed by the learned Counsel for the appellant before us.
8. Section 6(1) of SAFEMA providing for the issue of notice before proceedings can be taken for forfeiture of properties of the persons governed by the provisions of that Act reads thus:
“If, having regard to the value of the properties held by any person to whom this Act applies, either by himself or through any other person on his behalf, his known sources of income, earnings or assets, and any other information or material available to it as a result of action taken under Section 18 or otherwise, the competent authority has reason to believe (the reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing) that all or any of such properties are illegally acquired properties, it may serve a notice upon such person (hereinafter referred to as the person affected) calling upon him, within such time as may be specified in the notice, which shall not be ordinarily less than thirty days, to indicate the sources of his income, earnings or assets, out of which or by means of which he has acquired such property, the evidence on which he relied and other relevant information and particulars, and to show cause why all or any of such properties, as the case may be, should not be declared to be illegally acquired properties and forfeited to the Central Government under this Act.”
9. Section 7 of the Act which empowers the competent authority to forfeit to the Central Government any property held by the competent authority to have been illegally acquired reads thus:
“7. (1) The competent authority may, after considering the explanation, if any, to the show-cause notice issued under Section 6, and the materials available before it and after giving to the person affected and in a case where the person affected holds any property specified in the notice through any other person, to such other person also a reasonable opportunity of being heard, by order, record a finding whether all or any of the properties in question are illegally acquired properties.
(2) Where the competent authority is satisfied that some of the properties referred to in the show-cause notice are illegally acquired properties but is not able to identify specifically such properties, then, it shall be lawful for the competent authority to specify the properties which, to the best of its judgment, are illegally acquired properties and record a finding accordingly under sub-section (1).
(3) Where the competent authority records a finding under this section to the effect that any property is illegally acquired property, it shall declare that such property shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, stand forfeited to the Central Government free from all encumbrances.”
10. A reading of Section 6(1) of SAFEMA would show that action under Sections 6 and 7 can be taken against only persons to whom that Act applies. Section 2(1) of that Act specifies the persons to whom the Act applies. Sub-section (2) of Section 2 says that the Act applies to every person in respect of whom an order for detention has been made under COFEPOSA provided that such order of detention has not been set aside by a Court of competent jurisdiction. In the present case action has been taken against the respondent under Sections 6(1) and 7 read only with Section 2(2) of the Act. Therefore, a valid order of detention under COFEPOSA is a condition precedent to proceedings being taken under Sections 6 and 7 of SAFEMA. If the impugned order of detention dated December 19, 1974 is set aside for any reason, the proceedings taken under Sections 6 and 7 of SAFEMA cannot stand. Therefore, we have to consider whether the impugned order of detention dated December 19, 1974 under COFEPOSA is void and has to be quashed.
11. It is seen from para 17 of the judgment of Kotwal, J., that it was not disputed before the learned Judges of the High Court that no copy of any of the documents was ever supplied to the respondent. That fact was admitted in unmistakable terms not only in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents before the High Court but also in the course of the arguments of their learned counsel. Kotwal, J., has held that the documents referred to in the grounds and relied upon for the purpose of the respondent's detention are such that without copies thereof being supplied to the respondent he could not have been in a position to make any effective representation against his detention. There was no dispute before the learned Judges of the High Court that the documents referred to in the grounds of detention and relied upon for the purpose of detention are material documents and that the respondent could not have made any effective representation without copies of those documents. The respondents before the High Court however sought by their counter-affidavit to justify the non-supply of the copies of the documents. The explanation for the non-supply of the documents cannot be a substitute for the copies of the documents without which the respondent could not have made any effective representation against his detention. This Court has repeatedly held in several decisions that the failure to supply copies of documents referred to and relied upon in the grounds of detention for the purpose of detention under COFEPOSA vitiates the detention itself. In Gurdip Singh v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 419 the person detained under Section 3(1) of COFEPOSA applied for the supply of copies of the documents forming the material on which the order of detention had been made but they were refused to be supplied to him. Nor were the grounds supplied to the detenu accompanied by the copies of documents forming the basis thereof. It was held in that decision to which one of us is a party that the detention was bad in law.
12. In the present case also copies of documents which were indisputably material documents and were referred to in the grounds of detention and relied upon for the purpose of detention were admittedly not supplied to the respondent. Therefore, the detention of the respondent was bad in law and the order of detention could not be sustained and is liable to be quashed. Consequently, action taken under Sections 6 and 7 of SAFEMA is baseless and unsustainable in law. The conclusion reached by the learned Judges of the High Court based on that ground is correct. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.
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