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Panchdeo Narain Srivastava v. Km. Jyoti Sahay And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant–plaintiff instituted Title Suit No. 122 of 1978 in the Court of the Third Munsif at Patna seeking a declaration that he was entitled to withdraw a sum of money deposited by the second defendant. In his original plaint he described himself as the “son of uterine brother” of Rama Shanker Prasad. He later applied to amend the plaint by deleting the word “uterine.” The trial court allowed the amendment.
The first respondent filed Civil Revision No. 921 of 1980 before the Patna High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A learned Single Judge allowed the revision, holding that deletion of the word “uterine” would “amount to change in the basis of the claim.” The plaintiff obtained special leave and brought the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was justified in setting aside the trial court’s order permitting amendment of the plaint.
- Whether deletion of the word “uterine,” which might withdraw or qualify an admission, constitutes a valid ground to refuse amendment at the trial stage.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The amendment was necessary for the effective adjudication of the dispute, and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing it.
- Even if the deletion of the word “uterine” had substantive significance, that fact alone did not justify interference under the limited revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.
- Procedural law should facilitate, not obstruct, substantive justice, as recognised by this Court in prior decisions.
Respondents’ Arguments
- The amendment sought to withdraw an “important admission,” namely the plaintiff’s earlier description of his relationship, which should not be allowed.
- They relied on an unreported Supreme Court decision where a High Court’s reversal of an amendment order was upheld, contending that the present case was analogous.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| M/s Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, (1978) 2 SCC 91; (1978) 2 SCR 614 | Procedural law is intended to facilitate, not obstruct, substantive justice; amendments should ordinarily be allowed to decide real issues. | Relied on to reinforce that the trial court correctly permitted the amendment and that the High Court should not have interfered in revision. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court observed that, even assuming the deletion of “uterine” carried significant implications for the merits, that fact did not furnish a valid ground for the High Court to overturn the trial court’s discretionary order. Relying on Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, the Court reiterated that procedural rules exist to advance substantive justice, and that pleadings may be amended—even to withdraw or explain admissions—when necessary to resolve the real controversy.
The Court emphasised the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC: interference is permissible only where the subordinate court has acted without jurisdiction, failed to exercise jurisdiction, or committed a material irregularity. Finding none of these defects in the trial court’s order, the Supreme Court held that the High Court’s intervention was “untenable.” The unreported decision cited by the respondents was distinguished as being confined to its own facts and not laying down any general principle.
Holding and Implications
The appeal was ALLOWED. The Supreme Court set aside the Patna High Court’s judgment and restored the trial court’s order permitting amendment of the plaint.
Implications: The plaintiff may proceed with the amended plaint, and the respondents are at liberty to cross-examine him on all relevant matters. The decision reaffirms the liberal approach to amendments and underscores the circumscribed nature of the High Court’s revisional power under Section 115 CPC. No broader precedent was established beyond reiteration of settled principles.
Order
1. This appeal neither calls for an elaborate judgment nor a detailed discussion of the point involved in the appeal. We do not propose to give exhaustive reasons in support of our decision for in our opinion decisions on the subject are legion and we consider it unnecessary to refer to them in details.
2. Appellant-plaintiff filed Title Suit No. 122 of 1978 in the Court of Third Munsif at Patna for a declaration that he is entitled to withdraw a certain amount deposited by the second defendant in the court. Two respondents were impleaded as defendants in the plaint. Appellant-plaintiff had described himself as the son of uterine brother of Rama Shanker Prasad. Subsequently plaintiff moved an application for amendment of the plaint inter alia seeking deletion of the word “Uterine” from the plaint. The trial court granted the application for amendment. First respondent preferred CR 921 of 1980 in the High Court of Judicature at Patna. The learned Judge of the High Court after setting out the history of litigation allowed the revision application of the first respondent observing as under:
“I however feel satisfied at least to this extent that in view of the legal position, this word ‘Uterine’ has got a significance and may work in favour of either side to a very great extent. In this context therefore as it would amount to change in the basis of the claim I am of the view that the amendment should not have been allowed.”
This is the only reason which appealed to the learned Single Judge for interfering with an order granting amendment in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The original plaintiff has preferred this appeal by special leave.
3. Even if the High Court was justified in holding that the deletion of the word ‘Uterine’ has some significance and may work in favour of either side to a very great extent yet that itself would not provide any justification for rejecting the amendment in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. We may, in this connection, refer to Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram (1978) 2 SCC 91, (1978) 2 SCR 614 wherein this Court after a review of number of decisions speaking through Beg, C.J observed that procedural law is intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the course of substantive justice. But the learned counsel for the respondents contended that by the device of amendment a very important admission is being withdrawn. An admission made by a party may be withdrawn or may be explained away. Therefore, it cannot be said that by amendment an admission of fact cannot be withdrawn. The learned Trial Judge, granting the application for amendment was satisfied that in order to effectively adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties, amendment of the pleading was necessary. The High Court in its revisional jurisdiction for a reason which is untenable ought not to have interfered with the order made by the trial court. The learned counsel for the respondents in this connection read one unreported decision of this Court in which this Court upheld the decision of the High Court setting aside the order granting amendment in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. We have gone through the judgment. The decision does not lay down any particular principle of law and appears to be a decision on its own facts. And ordinarily, it is well settled that unless there is an error in exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court, the High Court would not interfere with the order in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
4. Viewed from this angle, we find no justification for the High Court interfering with the order made by the learned trial court granting the application for amendment to the plaint. We accordingly allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the order of the learned Trial Judge.
5. At the request of the learned counsel for the respondents, it is hereby clarified that it will be open to the respondents to cross-examine the plaintiff on all points on which plaintiff can be legitimately cross-examined and this decision would neither bar nor preclude any question that can be legally put to the plaintiff in his cross-examination. There will be no order as to costs of the hearing in this Court.
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