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Gammon India Limited v. Niranjan Dass .

Supreme Court Of India
Dec 5, 1983
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Factual and Procedural Background

Shri Niranjan Dass joined the appellant-company on 10 April 1962 as a senior clerk under an appointment order that allowed the company to post him anywhere in India or abroad. On 14 September 1967 he received a one-month notice of termination stating that, because of “reduction in the volume of business … as a result of recession,” his services would not be required after 14 October 1967.

The respondent raised an industrial dispute. By order dated 30 May 1968 the appropriate Government referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, framing the issue: “Whether the retrenchment of Shri Niranjan Dass is unjustified or illegal and, if so, what directions are necessary?”

• 25 February 1969 – The Industrial Tribunal declared the retrenchment illegal, held the respondent to be in continuous service, and awarded consequential benefits.
• The company challenged the award in Civil Writ No. 462/1969 before the Delhi High Court. A single judge set aside the award, treating the termination as one consequent on closure of the Delhi office and therefore governed by Section 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
• In Letters Patent Appeal No. 25/1970 a Division Bench reversed the single judge, restored the award and ruled that the matter had to be examined strictly as a case of retrenchment under the original reference.
• The company obtained special leave and appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondent’s termination constituted “retrenchment” under Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or termination consequent on closure under Section 25-FFF.
  2. If it was retrenchment, whether the mandatory conditions precedent in Section 25-F (notice and compensation) had been complied with and, if not, what relief followed.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant Company

  • Contended that the Delhi (Central Zone) office was closed in 1967-68; the respondent’s services therefore ended due to closure, attracting Section 25-FFF, which does not require payment of compensation as a condition precedent.
  • Led evidence before the Tribunal attempting to establish dates of closure of the zonal and central offices.

Respondent (Employee)

  • Maintained that the notice cited only reduction in work, not closure; hence the termination was a retrenchment.
  • Pointed out that the company failed to comply with Section 25-F prerequisites (compensation and notice/pay in lieu thereof), rendering the retrenchment void ab initio.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union, AIR 1957 SC 95 Earlier (traditional) view of retrenchment limited to surplus labour in a running industry. Notice cited for historical context; Court noted that the narrow view no longer holds after subsequent decisions.
State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money, (1976) 1 SCC 822 Broad interpretation that every termination not covered by the statutory exceptions amounts to retrenchment. Relied upon to classify the respondent’s termination as retrenchment.
Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa, (1976) 4 SCC 222 Same broad principle of retrenchment. Supports the conclusion that Section 25-F conditions must be fulfilled.
Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala, (1980) 3 SCC 340 Continuation of the broad approach to the definition of retrenchment. Cited to reinforce that the company’s act fell within “retrenchment.”
Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherjee, (1977) 4 SCC 415 Reiterated that exclusions in Section 2(oo) are exhaustive. Used to demonstrate that the present case did not fall within any exclusion.
Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s Bharat Electronics Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 225 Further affirmation of the broad definition of retrenchment. Bolstered the respondent’s position that the termination was retrenchment.
L. Robert D’Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway, (1982) 1 SCC 645 Latest in the line of cases adopting an expansive meaning of retrenchment. Cited to confirm that, absent an excluded category, termination equals retrenchment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court focused on the contents of the termination notice. The only reason stated was “reduction in the volume of business … as a result of recession.” No mention was made of closure of the Delhi office. The Court deemed it “unthinkable” that a genuine closure would not be referred to in such a notice. Evidence of later closure attempts was insufficient to alter the character of the notice.

Applying the statutory definition, the Court held:

  • The termination did not fall under any of the exclusions in Section 2(oo)(a)-(c); therefore it was “retrenchment.”
  • Under Section 25-F, payment of retrenchment compensation and compliance with notice requirements are conditions precedent to effecting retrenchment.
  • The company admittedly failed to meet these pre-conditions; consequently, the retrenchment was void ab initio.

The single judge’s treatment of the case as one of closure under Section 25-FFF was rejected. The Tribunal’s award was “correct and unassailable,” and the Division Bench was right to restore it.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed; Award of Industrial Tribunal Restored.

Consequences for the parties:

  • The respondent is deemed to have remained in continuous service until the date of superannuation; if already superannuated, he is entitled to all terminal benefits.
  • Back wages, including all revisions, increments, allowances, leave encashment, bonus etc., are payable with 12% interest from their respective due dates.
  • Costs of Rs 5,000 are payable to the Legal Aid Cell named by the respondent’s counsel.

The decision applies settled Supreme Court precedent on the meaning of “retrenchment.” It affirms the necessity of strict compliance with Section 25-F but does not set out any new legal principle beyond reinforcing existing jurisprudence.

Show all summary ...

D.A Desai, J.— Respondent Shri Niranjan Dass was employed as a senior clerk by the appellant company as per the appointment order contained in the letter dated April 10, 1962. The letter of appointment inter alia provided that the respondent may be posted anywhere in India or abroad as per the requirements of the company and it was signed by its Zonal Manager, Central Zone, Delhi. Respondent continued to serve in that capacity when on September 14, 1967, he was served with a notice terminating his services. The notice reads as under:

“Due to the reduction in the volume of business of the company as a result of the recession in (sic) services will not be required by the company after October 14, 1967, and this may be treated as statutory notice of one month of termination of your service.
Your leave shall run concurrently with the notice period, and you may avail of leave due to you, if any, during the notice period.
Personnel Section at Head Office have been advised to settle your dues, and you may write to them in the matter.
We take this opportunity to thank you for your past services, and it is very unfortunate that the present circumstances have compelled us to issue this notice.
Should it be possible for us to offer you a job at any of our works sites at a later date, we shall make you a fresh offer at that time.”

Respondent raised an industrial dispute and the appropriate Government by the Order dated May 30, 1968 referred the industrial dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. The reference was couched in the language.

“Whether the retrenchment of Shri Niranjan Dass is unjustified or illegal and if so, what directions are necessary in this respect.”

By the award dated February 25, 1969, the Industrial Tribunal held that the retrenchment of the respondent was illegal and unjustified and gave a declaration that he continues to be in service of the appellant company and is entitled to his wages till he is lawfully retrenched. Appellant company challenged the award in Civil Writ No. 462 of 1969 filed by it in the High Court of Delhi. A learned Single Judge held that as the Delhi office of the appellant company was closed, the case of the respondent would be governed by Section 25-FFF being termination consequent upon closure, and therefore payment of compensation was not a condition precedent and the termination of service was valid. The learned Judge accordingly set aside the award and remitted the matter to the Tribunal to decide what directions, if any, are necessary in respect of retrenchment of respondent in the light of the discussion in the judgment. Respondent preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 25 of 1970 against the decision of the learned Single Judge. A Division Bench of Delhi High Court held that the reference made by the appropriate Government required the Industrial Tribunal to consider whether the retrenchment was illegal or unjustified and therefore it was implicit in the reference itself that it was a case of retrenchment, validity of which was to be examined in the reference and therefore it was not open to the learned Single Judge to change the ‘base’ of the reference and to come to the conclusion that the case was one of closure of the industrial undertaking governed by Section 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act. Approaching the matter from this angle, the Division Bench set aside the decision of the learned Single Judge and restored the award made by the Industrial Tribunal. Hence this appeal by the company by special leave.

2. The Industrial Tribunal held that respondent was retrenched from service by the appellant and the pre-conditions for a valid retrenchment were not complied with and therefore the respondent was entitled to a declaration that he continues to be in service with all the benefits flowing from the said declaration. A learned Single Judge of the High Court interfered with this award holding that the appellant company had closed its Delhi office and therefore the termination of service was consequent upon the closure and even if it constitutes retrenchment, the case would be governed by Section 25-FFF which does not prescribe payment of compensation as a condition-precedent to a valid termination of service by way of retrenchment. In the Letters Patent Appeal at the instance of the respondent, the Division Bench set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge holding that it was not open to the learned Single Judge to hold that it was a case of closure covered by Section 25-FFF because it was implicit in the reference that the case was one of retrenchment and the only question with the Industrial Tribunal was called upon to decide was whether the retrenchment was unjustified or illegal. It is not necessary to examine the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court whether the assumption underlying an order of reference is unquestionable at the hearing of the reference. The question, however, is whether the learned Single Judge, who interfered with the award of the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that the case was one of closure covered by Section 25-FFF or the Industrial Tribunal was right in holding that it is a case of retrenchment covered by Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act. This point can be answered by mere reference to the notice served by the appellant company on the respondent intimating to him that his services will no more be required effective from October 14, 1967. The notice as a whole has been extracted hereinbefore. The notice recites that as a result of recession in the volume of work of the company, services of the respondent would no more be required by the company after October 14, 1967 and this notice may be treated as a statutory notice as contemplated by Section 25-F(a). There is not even a whisper in the notice that as the Delhi office is being closed down, the services of the respondent would not be required. An attempt was made while leading evidence before the Industrial Tribunal to show that the Zonal office at Delhi was closed on January 31, 1968 while the Central Zone office was closed somewhere in October, 1967. If by September, 1967, the appellant company had resolved to close the office at Delhi to which the respondent was attached, it is unthinkable that that aspect would not be recited in the notice. The necessity for termination of service of the respondent recited in the notice was recession in the work handled by the company. Not even one word is stated in the notice that the office to which the respondent was attached was in the process of being closed down, so his services would no more be required. On a true construction of the notice, it would appear that the respondent had become surplus on account of reduction in volume of work and that constitutes retrenchment even in the traditional sense of the term as interpreted in Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union AIR 1957 SC 95, 1956 SCR 172, (1957) 1 LLJ 235, (1957) 11 FJR 262 though that view does not hold the field in view of the recent decisions of this Court in State Bank of India v.N. Sundara Money (1976) 1 SCC 822, (1976) 3 SCR 160, 1976 Lab IC 769; Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa (1976) 4 SCC 222, AIR 1977 SC 31, (1977) 1 SCR 586; Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala (1980) 3 SCC 340, (1980) 3 SCR 884, (1980) 2 LLJ 72; Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherjee (1977) 4 SCC 415, (1978) 1 SCR 591, (1979) 55 FJR 210; Mohan Lal v. Management of Bharat Electronics Ltd. (1981) 3 SCC 225, AIR 1981 SC 1253, (1981) 3 SCR 518 and L. Robert D'Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway (1982) 1 SCC 645, AIR 1982 SC 854, (1982) 3 SCR 251, 1982 Lab IC 811. The recitals and averments in the notice leave no room for doubt that the service of the respondent was terminated for the reason that on account of recession and reduction in the volume of work of the company, respondent has become surplus. Even apart from this, the termination of service for the reasons mentioned in the notice is not covered by any of the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 2(oo) which defines retrenchment and it is by now well-settled that where the termination of service does not fall within any of the excluded categories, the termination would be ipso facto retrenchment. It was not even attempted to be urged that the case of the respondent would fall in any of the excluded categories. It is therefore indisputably a case of retrenchment.

3. It is not disputed that the prerequisite for a valid retrenchment as laid down in Section 25-F has not been complied with and therefore the retrenchment bringing about termination of service is ab initio void. Viewed from this angle, the award of the Industrial Tribunal was correct and unassailable and the learned Single Judge was in error in interfering with the same. Undoubtedly, the Division Bench of the High Court has set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and restored the award for reasons of its own. However, for the reasons herein indicated, the decision of the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 25 of 1970 is upheld and confirmed and this appeal must therefore fail and accordingly it is dismissed.

4. In the course of hearing of this appeal, it was stated that the respondent has reached the age of superannuation therefore physical reinstatement in service is not possible. Appellant will have to establish that fact but in the event, the appellant shows that under a valid rule, respondent has reached the age of superannuation and therefore physical reinstatement is not possible, it is hereby declared that the respondent shall continue to be in service uninterruptedly from the date of the attempted termination of service till the date of superannuation. Respondent would be entitled to all back wages including the benefit of revised wages or salary if during the period there is revision of pay-scales with yearly increment, revised dearness allowance or variable dearness allowance and all terminal benefits if he has reached the age of superannuation such as Provident Fund, Gratuity etc. Back wages should be calculated as if the respondent continued in service uninterrupted. He is also entitled to leave encashment and bonus if other workmen in the same category were paid the same. It appears that the respondent has been unlawfully kept out of service, therefore it is but just that the appellant company shall pay all the arrears as calculated according to the directions herein given with 12 per cent interest from the date the amount became due and payable till realisation. Appellant shall also pay costs to the respondent quantified at Rs 5000. The appellant is directed to pay the amount as herein directed to be paid within 3 months from today.

5. Mr Jitendra Sharma learned counsel for the respondent stated that the costs awarded to the respondent be paid to the Legal Aid Cell set up by Indian Association of Lawyers in collaboration with Womens' Council.

6. Order accordingly.