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Bhagirathsinh v. State Of Gujarat
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant was accused of assaulting one Popatlal Sorathia with a knife inside a hospital on 17 August 1983, resulting in registration of an offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. After his arrest he was remanded to judicial custody. On 22 August 1983 the appellant sought bail from the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rajkot, who rejected the application on 29 August 1983. The same day, the appellant approached the Sessions Judge, who, by a reasoned order, granted bail on a bond of Rs 5,000 with surety.
The State of Gujarat then moved Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 1724 of 1983 before the High Court seeking cancellation of the bail. A Single Judge of the High Court cancelled the bail, primarily relying on the gravity of the offence and the victim’s status as a social and political worker. The appellant challenged that order before the Supreme Court, which granted special leave to appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court erred in cancelling the bail granted by the Sessions Judge, particularly in light of the principles governing cancellation of bail and the factors relevant to such a decision.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court began by reiterating that it normally does not interfere with discretionary orders granting or refusing bail. However, it found the High Court’s approach to cancellation to be fundamentally flawed:
- The High Court focused on factors such as the victim’s social standing, the location of the assault, and the number of injuries—matters relevant, if at all, to the initial grant of bail, not its cancellation.
- Cancellation of bail requires “very cogent and overwhelming circumstances.” The correct considerations are (a) the likelihood of the accused appearing for trial and (b) the risk of his tampering with evidence or abusing the liberty.
- The High Court’s order was “conspicuous by its silence” on these two decisive considerations. There was no indication that the appellant would abscond or interfere with evidence; moreover, the victim was alive and out of danger, and three months had elapsed since the incident.
- By substituting its own view on whether bail should have been granted, the High Court ignored the limited scope of a cancellation proceeding and improperly interfered with the Sessions Judge’s discretionary order.
Finding the High Court “misdirected,” the Supreme Court held that intervention was necessary “in the interest of justice.”
Holding and Implications
Held: The appeal is allowed; the High Court’s order cancelling bail is set aside and the Sessions Judge’s order granting bail is restored, subject to the following modified conditions:
- The appellant shall furnish two fresh bail bonds of Rs 5,000 each with solvent sureties.
- He must report to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rajkot, at 11 a.m. on the first Monday of every month until the commencement of trial, thereafter being subject to further orders of the trial court.
- All other conditions imposed by the Sessions Judge remain unchanged.
Implications: The decision reinforces the stringent standard for cancelling bail, underscoring that bail cannot be withdrawn merely because of the seriousness of the charge or the victim’s status. Unless there is a real risk of flight or evidence tampering, discretionary orders granting bail should not be disturbed. No new legal precedent was set, but the judgment affirms the existing liberal approach toward bail and the limited grounds for its cancellation.
1. Special leave granted.
2. Ordinarily this Court is not inclined to interfere with the orders either granting or refusing to grant bail to an accused person either facing a criminal trial or whose case after conviction is pending in appeal. However, this is not a case where bail is granted or refused but the order granting the bail by the learned Sessions Judge was set aside by the High Court adopting an approach which does not commend to us.
3. It is alleged that the appellant gave blows with a knife to one Popatlal Sorathia, who had come to visit an indoor patient Navalsinh Bhatti on August 17, 1983 around 9.45 a.m Appellant was accosted by the policemen on duty. An offence under Section 307 IPC was registered against him and the appellant was taken into custody and was subsequently remanded to judicial custody. An application for releasing him on bail was made on August 22, 1983 to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rajkot. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rajkot was pleased to dismiss the same by his order dated August 29, 1983.
4. On the same day, an application for releasing the appellant on bail was moved before the learned Sessions Judge. A notice was issued to the learned Public Prosecutor. After hearing both the sides, the learned Sessions Judge by a well-reasoned order directed that the appellant be released on bail on his furnishing security in the amount of Rs 5000 and personal bond of the like amount.
5. It appears that the State of Gujarat filed Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 1724 of 1983 in the High Court of Gujarat seeking cancellation of the order granting bail to the appellant. A learned Single Judge of the High Court held that once a prima facie case is established, the learned Sessions Judge ought to have taken into consideration the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed. The charge against the appellant is that he has committed an offence punishable under Section 307, IPC and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act and even on the date of hearing of this appeal before us on November 18, 1983, the Court was informed that the victim is alive and at present there is no danger to his life. Nearly 3 months have rolled by from the date of the offence. We fail to understand what the learned Judge of the High Court desires to convey when he says that once a prima facie case is established, it is necessary for the court to examine the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence was committed. If there is no prima facie case there is no question of considering other circumstances. But even where a prima facie case is established, the approach of the court in the matter of bail is not that the accused should be detained by way of punishment but whether the presence of the accused would be readily available for trial or that he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering with evidence. We would have certainly overlooked this aspect of the matter if the approach of the learned Judge was otherwise one which would commend to us. It however appears that the learned Judge was impressed by some of the most irrelevant considerations which prima facie emerge from the following observations of the learned Judge which permeates his whole order running into about 13 pages.
6. Says the learned Judge:
“The learned Judge ought to have seen the fact that the helpless victim had gone to the hospital for pre-operation check-up. He was a leading social and political worker. He was an active worker and Secretary of Gundagiri Nivaran Samiti which had raised a campaign against the atrocities allegedly having been committed by the Rajputs of Girasiya community. Admittedly the respondent is Girasiya and the complainant who was an active worker and Secretary of Gundagiri Nivaran Samiti had become a victim at the hands of the respondent. The learned Judge ought to have taken into consideration the material fact that the incident had taken place in the premises of the hospital which may terrorise a number of sick persons who might be getting treatment in the hospital.”
At another place, the learned Judge has observed that the learned Sessions Judge has ignored the fact that a social and political worker was attacked in the hospital premises with a knife having 9″ blade and as many as 11 injuries were caused to a helpless victim.
7. In our opinion, the learned Judge appears to have misdirected himself while examining the question of directing cancellation of bail by interfering with a discretionary order made by the learned Sessions Judge. One could have appreciated the anxiety of the learned Judge of the High Court that in the circumstances found by him that the victim attacked was a social and political worker and therefore the accused should not be granted bail but we fail to appreciate how that circumstance should be considered so overriding as to permit interference with a discretionary order of the learned Sessions Judge granting bail. The High Court completely overlooked the fact that it was not for it to decide whether the bail should be granted but the application before it was for cancellation of the bail. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order seeking cancellation of the bail and the trend today is towards granting bail because it is now well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the power to grant bail is not to be exercised as if the punishment before trial is being imposed. The only material considerations in such a situation are whether the accused would be readily available for his trial and whether he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering with evidence. The order made by the High Court is conspicuous by its silence on these two relevant considerations. It is for these reasons that we consider in the interest of justice a compelling necessity to interfere with the order made by the High Court.
8. We accordingly allow this appeal and set aside the order made by the learned High Court Judge and restore the one made by the learned Sessions Judge with following modifications:
(i) The appellant shall be released or if he is on bail continue to be on bail on his furnishing two fresh bail-bonds each in the amount of Rs 5000 supported by a solvent security.
(ii) The appellant shall report on first Monday every month before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rajkot at 11 a.m till his trial commences. Thereafter he would be subject to the further orders that may be made in this behalf by the court which would try him.
(iii) Other conditions imposed by the learned Sessions Judge remain unaltered.
9. Order accordingly.
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