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Harish Chander And Others v. Ghisa Ram And Another

Supreme Court Of India
Dec 18, 1980
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants purchased agricultural land from Respondents 2–4 through a registered sale deed dated 29 September 1967. Respondent 1, claiming to be the existing tenant, instituted a suit for possession by way of pre-emption. The trial court decreed the suit in his favour, relying chiefly on revenue records that showed his tenancy from 1959-60 onward. The first appellate court and subsequently the High Court of Punjab & Haryana affirmed the decree. The present proceeding is an appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court challenging those concurrent findings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the date of sale, Respondent 1 or the appellants were in possession of the disputed land as tenants.
  2. Consequently, whether Respondent 1 possessed a preferential right of pre-emption under the applicable law.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Asserted that they, not Respondent 1, had been tenants since 1965 pursuant to a lease from the vendor, Kanti Prasad.
  • Questioned the reliability of Khasra-girdawari entries showing Respondent 1 as tenant, relying instead on:
    • An application (Ext. A-31) dated 11 December 1967 sent through military authorities seeking correction of revenue records to reflect their tenancy.
    • A recital in the 1967 sale deed stating that the vendors had been in possession for the preceding two years.
    • The plaint’s prayer for “possession by way of pre-emption,” which they interpreted as an admission that Respondent 1 lacked actual possession.

Respondent 1's Arguments

  • Relied on revenue records—Jamabandi for 1959-60 (Ex. P-1) and consecutive Khasra-girdawaris (Exs. P-2 to P-7)—showing his continuous tenancy up to and including 1968.
  • Pleaded in paragraph 4 of the plaint that he had “been continuously cultivating the aforesaid land … even up till now,” affirming ongoing possession.
  • Contended that entries in statutory revenue records carry a presumption of truth and were unshaken by contrary evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court affirmed the concurrent factual findings that Respondent 1 was the tenant in possession at the relevant time. Its reasoning proceeded as follows:

  • Reliability of Revenue Records: The Jamabandi (1959-60) and subsequent Khasra-girdawari entries consistently recorded Respondent 1 as tenant. Under Section 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, these entries enjoy a statutory presumption of truth, which the appellants failed to rebut.
  • Burden of Proof: Invoking Section 109 of the Indian Evidence Act, the Court held that once a landlord-tenant relationship is shown, the burden shifts to the party asserting its cessation. The appellants provided no credible evidence to discharge this burden.
  • Evaluation of Appellants’ Documents:
    • The application (Ext. A-31) and the sale-deed recital were deemed self-serving statements made after the agreement to sell, apparently designed to forestall pre-emption claims.
    • The absence of any reference to delivery of possession in the earlier agreement to sell (24 April 1967) and the lack of contemporaneous revenue entries recording the appellants’ alleged tenancy undermined their position.
    • The phrasing in the plaint’s prayer clause was interpreted as a conventional request in pre-emption suits, not as evidence of dispossession.
  • Concurrence with Lower Courts: Noting that the issue was one of fact, the Supreme Court nevertheless reviewed the material and found no reason to disturb the concurrent findings.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the decree granting Respondent 1 possession by way of pre-emption and confirmed the awards of the trial and appellate courts.

Implications: The decision is confined to the factual matrix of competing tenancy claims and does not establish new legal precedent. The direct consequence is that Respondent 1 retains possession, and all mesne profits deposited below are to be returned to him forthwith.

Show all summary ...

A.D KOSHAL, J.— This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment dated July 27, 1980 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana affirming the decrees passed by the trial court and the first appellate court in a suit for possession by way of pre-emption of the land in dispute in favour of plaintiff-Respondent 1 on the ground that he was a tenant of the disputed land when it was sold to the appellants by Respondents 2 to 4 through a registered sale deed dated September 29, 1967.

2. The suit was resisted by the appellants with the counter-claim that they, and not Respondent 1, were in possession of the land on the relevant date as tenants inasmuch as it had been leased out to them by their vendor Kanti Prasad two years prior to the sale i.e in the year 1965. The decrees passed by the courts below proceed on the basis of evidence to the effect that the name of Respondent 1 was recorded as a tenant in the Jamabandi for the year 1959-60 (Ext. P-1) and consistently thereafter till the year 1968 (Khasra-girdawaris Exs. P-2 to P-7). Apart from the oral evidence there is no material on the record which may indicate the falsity of any of the entries in the revenue records and we are of the opinion that the lower courts were fully justified in relying on them.

3. Learned counsel for the appellants relies upon three documents in support of his contention that the Khasra-girdawaris should not be believed. First in point of time is an application (Ext. A-31) which was sent to the concerned Deputy Commissioner through the Military Authorities by one of the appellants who was an army hand. That application is dated December 11, 1967 and states that the land in dispute was taken by him on lease from Kanti Prasad in the year 1965 and prays that the Khasra-girdawaris should be corrected accordingly. The second is the sale deed itself in which appears a recital to the effect that on the date of the sale the vendors had been in possession of the land covered by it for the preceding two years. The third is the plaint itself which seeks “possession by way of pre-emption”. None of these documents is of any help to the case of the appellants. The recital in the plaint is easily explained. It is no more than the usual prayer made in suits for pre-emption and may well be interpreted to mean that possession be granted to the plaintiff by the decree in his capacity of a pre-emptor (and not that of a mere tenant). It cannot be implied therefrom that the plaintiff was out of actual possession. In fact the case made out in the plaint was specifically founded on the plea that the plaintiff had been in possession of the land in dispute as a tenant right up to the date of the institution of the suit. Para 4 of the plaint reads: “The plaintiff has been continuously cultivating the aforesaid land mentioned in para 1 of the plaint, for a long time as non-occupancy tenant and I, the plaintiff, have been cultivating the same even uptil now. The vendees are outsiders, therefore, I, the plaintiff have the preferential right of pre-emption.”

4. This plea clearly negatives the contention based on the recital contained in the prayer clause of the plaint.

5. The averments appearing in the sale deed and application Ext. A-31 (which was made about 2 1/2 months later) to the effect that the appellants had been in possession of the land as tenants since 1965 appears to have been falsely made in an attempt to defeat prospective pre-emptors. Had it been a correct statement of fact, there is no reason why it should not have found a place in the agreement of sale which is dated April 24, 1967 but in which no mention of delivery of possession of the land to the appellants is made. Nor is any cogent explanation forthcoming for the fact that no attempt was made by any of the appellants to have their possession over the land as tenants made the subject-matter of an entry in the relevant records at any time before the sale deed was registered.

6. No suspicion can attach to the entries in the Jamabandi for the year 1959-60, nor have the contents of that document been assailed before us. A presumption of truth attaches to those entries in view of the provisions of Section 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act. That presumption is no doubt rebuttable but no attempt has been made to displace it. Further, once that presumption is raised, still another comes to the aid of Respondent 1 by reason of the rule contained in Section 109 of the Indian Evidence Act, namely, that when two persons have been shown to stand to each other in the relationship of landlord and tenant, the burden of proving that such relationship has ceased, is on the party who so asserts. It may therefore be legitimately presumed that the plaintiff continued to possess the land as a tenant till the institution of the suit.

7. Even though the question of possession of the plaintiff as a tenant is a question of fact which is concluded by concurrent findings arrived at by the courts below, we confirm these findings after consideration of the relevant material.

8. The decree passed in favour of Respondent 1 is not challenged on any other ground. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. All mesne profits deposited by Respondent 1 in the courts below shall be paid back to him forthwith.