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R.R Verma And Others v. Union Of India And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The present appeal arises out of a sequence of connected proceedings concerning the seniority and year of allotment of certain Indian Police Service officers.
- While a writ petition filed by one Ahluwalia was pending before the Himachal Pradesh High Court, several direct-recruit officers (including the present appellants and one R.R. Verma) instituted a separate writ petition in the Delhi High Court challenging a notice dated 29 June 1973 that sought their representations regarding the proposed year of allotment of Sahney, Dhaliwal and Ahluwalia.
- After the Himachal Pradesh High Court allowed Ahluwalia’s petition, the Central Government, by order dated 27 July 1979, relaxed the applicable service rules in favour of Sahney, Dhaliwal and Ahluwalia.
- Consequently, the Delhi High Court dismissed the direct recruits’ writ petition as infructuous but nevertheless granted them a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 of the Constitution.
- The appellants have now challenged the Central Government’s order dated 27 July 1979 before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Rule 3 of the All India Services (Conditions of Service — Residuary Matters) Rules, 1960 violates Article 14 of the Constitution by conferring unguided and arbitrary power of relaxation on the Central Government.
- Whether, on the facts of the case, the Central Government’s discretion to relax the rules was improperly exercised. (This issue had already been examined in Civil Appeal 2112 of 1979.)
- Whether the Central Government possesses the power to review or revise its earlier administrative orders in the absence of an express statutory provision conferring such power.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- Rule 3 is unconstitutional because it vests the Central Government with absolute and un-canalised discretion, offending the equality mandate of Article 14.
- Even if valid, the discretion to relax the rules was wrongly exercised in the present case, rendering the order of 27 July 1979 unsustainable.
- The Central Government lacked authority to review its earlier orders as no express power of review is contained in the relevant service rules.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents’ legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji (1971) 3 SCC 844; AIR 1970 SC 1273 |
A statutory authority exercising quasi-judicial power cannot review its own decision unless such power is expressly or implicitly conferred. | Distinguished; the Court held that the principle applies only to quasi-judicial decisions and not to purely administrative ones. |
| D.N. Roy v. State of Bihar (1971) 3 SCC 844; (1971) 2 SCR 522 |
Same principle concerning absence of inherent power of review in quasi-judicial functions. | Distinguished on the same ground; the Central Government’s decision under challenge was characterised as administrative. |
| State of Assam v. J.N. Roy Biswas (1976) 1 SCC 234; AIR 1975 SC 2277; (1976) 2 SCR 128 |
Need for statutory authority to review quasi-judicial orders. | Similarly distinguished; the Court reiterated that administrative policies may be altered without an express review provision, subject to judicial review for legality and fairness. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Issue 1 — Constitutionality of Rule 3: Although Rule 3 is couched in broad terms, the Court interpreted it as a “reserve power” intended to soften the “relentless rigour” of mechanical rule-application. The phrase “undue hardship” and the requirement that relaxation be “just and equitable” supply adequate guidance. The rule must be exercised in the public interest, with the twin objectives of maintaining integrity and efficiency in the All India Services. Because the exercise of relaxation is subject to judicial review, the provision does not confer unfettered or arbitrary power and therefore withstands scrutiny under Article 14.
Issue 2 — Exercise of Discretion: Relying on its detailed judgment in Civil Appeal 2112 of 1979, the Court reaffirmed that the present case was an appropriate instance for invoking the relaxation power. No separate analysis was undertaken in this opinion.
Issue 3 — Power to Review Administrative Orders: The Court distinguished the precedents cited by the appellants on the ground that those cases involved quasi-judicial determinations. It reasoned that extending the prohibition on review to purely administrative actions would unduly paralyse governmental functions. Governments must remain free to modify policies and administrative decisions, provided statutory requirements and principles of natural justice are respected. Any revised administrative decision remains open to judicial review, ensuring that affected parties can challenge illegality, irrationality or procedural unfairness.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Rule 3, confirmed that the relaxation granted to Sahney, Dhaliwal and Ahluwalia was proper, and recognised the Central Government’s competence to revisit its own administrative orders. The decision resolves the dispute between the parties but does not announce a new legal doctrine; it primarily clarifies that (i) Rule 3 is a constitutionally permissible safety-valve, and (ii) limitations on review powers that bind quasi-judicial bodies do not automatically constrain administrative policy-making.
O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.— The judgment in this appeal is really an appendix to the judgment pronounced by us in Civil Appeal 2112 of 1979. The relevant facts may be gathered from that judgment. The further events requiring to be mentioned are these: While the writ petition filed by Ahluwalia in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh was pending, some of the respondents to the writ petition and one R.R Verma all direct recruits, chose to file a writ petition in the Delhi High Court questioning the notice dated June 29, 1973, calling upon them to submit representations against the year of allotment proposed to be allotted to Sahney, Dhaliwal and Ahluwalia. After the writ petition of Ahluwalia was allowed, and after the Central Government passed the order dated July 27, 1979, pursuant to the direction issued by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, the Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the direct recruits as infructuous. The High Court, however, granted a certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court under Article 133 of the Constitution. Therefore, this appeal. The writ petition having been dismissed as infructuous we do not see how a certificate under Article 133 could have been granted. But, we do not want to dismiss the appeal on that preliminary ground. Shri R.K Garg, learned Counsel for the appellants challenged the order of the Central Government dated July 27, 1979 on three grounds: (1) Rule 3 of the All India Services (Conditions of Service — Residuary Matters) Rules, offended Article 14 of the Constitution and was ultra vires as it conferred arbitrary and uncanalised power upon the Central Government to grant relaxation whenever it pleased it to do so. (2) The discretion to relax the rules was wrongly exercised in the present case. (3) The Central Government was powerless to review its earlier orders as such a power of review was not expressly conferred by the rules.
2. The second question has already been considered by us in Civil Appeal No. 2112 of 1979 (supra) and we have held that this was a fit case for the exercise of the power of the Central Government to relax the rules.
3. The first question is about the constitutional validity of Rule 3 of the All India Services (Conditions of Service—Residuary Matters) Rules, 1960. Rule 3 is as follows:
“3. Power to relax rules and regulations in certain cases.—Where the Central Government is satisfied that the operation of—
(i) any rule made or deemed to have been made under the All India Services Act, 1951 (61 of 1951), or
(ii) any regulation made under any such rule,
regulating the conditions of service of persons appointed to an All India Service causes undue hardship in any particular case, it may, by order, dispense with or relax the requirements of that rule or regulation, as the case may be, to such extent and subject to such exceptions and conditions, as it may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner.”
The submission of Shri Garg was that the rule conferred upon the Central Government was an absolute and arbitrary discretion, a discretion left entirely to the satisfaction of the Government with no prescribed objective standards or guidelines. It is true that the rule is couched in a language suggestive of near-autocratic power reminiscent of “bad old days” of the Imperial Raj but, we have no doubt that the rule is not meant to vest the Central Government with power to pass any order they like with a view to promote the interests of a favoured civil servant. It is really meant to relax, in appropriate cases, the relentless rigour of a mechanical application of the rules, so that civil servants may not be subjected to undue and undeserved hardship. Sufficient guidance can be had from the very rule and from the scheme of the various statutory provisions dealing with the conditions of service of members of the All India Service.
4. Section 3 of the All India Services Act enables the Central Government in consultation with the Governments of the States concerned to make rules for the regulation of recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed to an All India Service. Pursuant to the power given by Section 3 of the All India Services Act the Central Government has made innumerable sets of rules, some common to all the All India Services and some applicable separately to each of the All India Services. The All India Services (Leave) Rules, the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, the All India Services (Travelling Allowances) Rules, and the All India Services (Conditions of Service—Residuary Matters) Rules are examples of rules made under Section 3 of the All India Services Act which are common to all the All India Services. The Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, the Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, the Indian Police Service (Probation) Rules, the Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules are examples of rules made under Section 3 of the All India Services Act applicable to a single All India Service, namely, the Indian Police Service. The rules, as may be seen, deal with countless matters which concern a civil servant, such as creation of cadre, fixation of cadre strength, recruitment, seniority, promotion, leave, allowances, conduct, discipline and appeal, and a host of such other matters. The golden thread, if we may so call it, which runs through the entire complex fabric of rules is the securing of honest and competent civil servants. Integrity and efficiency are the hallmarks of any civil service anywhere and they are what are contemplated and aimed at by the wide range of rules. The interest to be served is always the public interest and not individual interest. Public interest, in the matter of the conditions of service of civil servants, is best served by rules which are directed towards efficiency and integrity. Now, very wide as the range covered by the rules is, the rules can never be exhaustive. Unforeseen and complex situations often arise as will be obvious even from a bare perusal of the cases reported in the law journals arising out of “service controversies”. Very often it is found that an all too strict application of a rule works undue hardship on a civil servant, resulting in injustice and inequity, causing disappointment and frustration to the civil servant and finally leading to the defeat of the very objects aimed at by the rules, namely, efficiency and integrity of civil servants. Hence it is that the Central Government is vested with a reserve power under Rule 3, to deal with unforeseen and unpredictable situations, and to relieve the civil servants from the infliction of undue hardship and to do justice and equity. It does not mean that the Central Government is free to do what they like, regardless of right or wrong; nor does it mean that the courts are powerless to correct them. The Central Government is bound to exercise the power in the public interest with a view to secure civil servants of efficiency and integrity and when and only when undue hardship is caused by the application of the rules, the power to relax is to be exercised in a just and equitable manner but, again, only to the extent necessary for so dealing with the case. We do not have to add that the exercise of the power of relaxation like all other administrative action affecting rights of parties is subject to judicial review on grounds now well known. Viewed in this light we do not think that Rule 3 is unconstitutional on the ground that it vests an unfettered discretion in the Government.
5. The last point raised by Shri Garg was that the Central Government had no power to review its earlier orders as the rules do not vest the government with any such power. Shri Garg relied on certain decisions of this Court in support of his submission: Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji (1971) 3 SCC 844, AIR 1970 SC 1273; D.N Roy v. State of Bihar (1971) 3 SCC 844, (1971) 3 SCC 844, (1971) 2 SCR 522 and State of Assam v. J.N Roy Biswas (1976) 1 SCC 234, AIR 1975 SC 2277, (1976) 2 SCR 128. All the cases cited by Shri Garg are cases where the government was exercising quasi-judicial power vested in them by statute. We do not think that the principle that the power to review must be conferred by statute either specifically or by necessary implication is applicable to decisions purely of an administrative nature. To extend the principle to pure administrative decisions would indeed lead to untoward and startling results. Surely, any government must be free to alter its policy or its decision in administrative matters. If they are to carry on their daily administration they cannot be hidebound by the rules and restrictions of judicial procedure though of course they are bound to obey all statutory requirements and also observe the principles of natural justice where rights of parties may be affected. Here again, we emphasise that if administrative decisions are reviewed, the decisions taken after review are subject to judicial review on all grounds on which an administrative decision may be questioned in a court. We see no force in this submission of the learned Counsel. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
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