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State Of Gujarat v. Maheshkumar Dhirajlal Thakkar .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent served as a Tracer in the Office of the Sub-Divisional Soil Conservation Officer, Bhavnagar, from December 12, 1965 to February 6, 1968. While on earned leave, he joined the Western Railway as an Apprentice Electrical Signal Maintainer for training at Ajmer, simultaneously drawing stipend from the Railway and salary from the Soil Conservation Office for part of the overlapping period (December 16, 1967 to February 6, 1968). Upon completing the training he resigned from his Tracer post with effect from February 6, 1968.
He was prosecuted before the Special Sub-Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Ahmedabad (Rural) under Section 168 of the Indian Penal Code for allegedly engaging in “trade” while holding a public office. The Magistrate convicted him and imposed a fine of Rs 60, which conviction was affirmed by the Sessions Judge. On revision, the Gujarat High Court set aside the conviction and acquitted him on July 27, 1973. The State of Gujarat appealed, bringing the matter before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondent’s engagement as an apprentice with the Railway Administration constituted engaging in “trade” within the meaning of Section 168 of the Indian Penal Code.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court focused exclusively on the statutory term “trade” in Section 168 IPC.
- Definition of “trade”: In its narrow, popular sense it signifies exchange of goods or services for profit; in its broadest sense it includes any business carried on with the intent to earn profit. The meaning must be gathered from the context.
- Nature of the apprenticeship: The respondent entered into an agreement with the Railway solely for training, not for conducting a business or profession. Clause 17 of the apprenticeship agreement expressly stated that the Railway was not bound to employ him after training, underscoring the non-commercial character of the arrangement.
- Receipt of stipend: The Court held that the mere payment of a stipend during training did not transform the apprenticeship into a trade or employment yielding profit.
- Application to Section 168: Because the respondent was neither carrying on a trade nor earning profit in a commercial sense, his conduct fell outside the mischief of Section 168 IPC.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED; ACQUITTAL AFFIRMED.
The Supreme Court upheld the Gujarat High Court’s decision, concluding that apprenticeship for training purposes does not amount to “trade” under Section 168 IPC. The direct consequence is that the respondent’s conviction is set aside and the fine is quashed. The judgment clarifies that public servants undergoing bona fide training programs, even if stipendiary, do not contravene Section 168, but it sets no broader precedent beyond this interpretive clarification.
R.S Sarkaria, J.— The accused-respondent was serving as a Tracer in the Office of the Sub-Divisional Soil Conservation Officer, Bhavnagar from December 12, 1965 to February 6, 1968. While still in service as a Tracer, he applied on January 19, 1969 to the Railway Authorities, Bhavnagar for receiving training as an Apprentice Electrical Signal Maintainer. His application was accepted by the Divisional Assistant Signal and Telecommunication Engineer. The accused obtained earned leave from the Sub-Divisional Soil Conservation Officer for the period from February 13, 1967 to February 15, 1968 and joined as apprentice for receiving training at Ajmer. On completion of the training, the accused obtained leave from the Western Railway from February 5, 1968 and resumed duty in the Office of the Soil Conservation Officer, Bhavnagar and resigned from that service with effect from February 6, 1968. He obtained pay and allowances from the Soil Conservation Office for the period, December 16, 1967 to February 6, 1968, and also drew the stipend admissible to trainee apprentices from the Railway for the said period.
2. On these facts, the respondent was prosecuted under Section 168, Indian Penal Code, before the Special Sub-Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Ahmedabad (Rural) and was convicted under the said section and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs 60. The Sessions Judge dismissed his appeal.
3. On revision, the Gujarat High Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the respondent by a judgment, dated July 27, 1973. Hence, this appeal by the State of Gujarat.
4. The only question that falls to be considered in this appeal is whether the engagement of the respondent as the Railway Service apprentice, amounted to engaging in “trade” within the contemplation of Section 168 of the Indian Penal Code? The High Court has answered this question in the negative, and we think rightly. The word “trade” in its narrow popular sense means “exchange of goods for goods or for money with the object of making profits”. In its widest sense, it includes any business carried on with a view to earn profit (see Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 32, para 487). Further, the word takes its meaning from the context.
5. The respondent entered into an agreement with the Railway Administration not for the purpose of engaging in trade, business or profession, but for the sole purpose of receiving training, so that on completion of the training, he could be employed by the Railway Administration. The mere fact that he was paid a stipend during the training period as an apprentice, did not make him an employee of the Railway Administration. Indeed, clause 17 of the agreement (Ex. 69) stated in clear terms that the Railway Administration did not bind itself to employ him on the completion of the training. In its narrow sense, the act of the accused-respondent did not amount to engaging in “trade”. Even if the wider interpretation were to be put on the word “trade” in Section 168, Penal Code, the engagement of the respondent as an apprentice-trainee would not bring him within the purview of the expression “trade”. The fact remains that during the period of his apprenticeship, the respondent was not carrying on any “trade” as a means of livelihood within the meaning of Section 168, Indian Penal Code.
6. We have, therefore, no hesitation in upholding the judgment of the High Court and in dismissing this appeal.
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