- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Dasrathlal Chandulal Joshi v. State Of Gujarat .
Supreme Court of India – S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The Sadachar Samiti printed official receipts to collect money for the Bansakathe Famine Relief Committee. Accused 1, Manubhai Chhaganbhai Patel, allegedly forged a series of those receipts (beginning with No. 5000) and collected donations from several people (PWs 1 to 8). The appellant, Dasrathlal Chandulal Joshi (Accused 2), merely accompanied Accused 1 while the latter solicited donations; there was no evidence that he shared in any proceeds or knew of the forgery.
The trial court acquitted both accused, holding that no evidence linked the appellant to the forgery or to any fraudulent intent. On 19 January 1973 the Gujarat High Court reversed that acquittal and convicted both men under Sections 420/34 and 471/34 of the Indian Penal Code (cheating and using forged documents with common intention). Special leave to appeal was sought in the Supreme Court; it was refused to Accused 1 but granted to the present appellant.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the evidence on record established, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant knew the receipts were forged and shared a common intention with Accused 1 to cheat donors, thereby attracting liability under Sections 420/34 and 471/34 IPC.
- Whether the Gujarat High Court was justified in overturning the trial court’s acquittal of the appellant on the basis of the circumstances relied upon.
Arguments of the Parties
State/Prosecution
- Relied on three circumstances: (a) the appellant’s constant presence with Accused 1 while collecting donations; (b) the proven fact that receipts issued by Accused 1 were forged; and (c) discrepancies between amounts written in a “Red Book” and those shown on the forged receipts, to which the appellant raised no objection.
- Contended that these facts collectively implied the appellant’s knowledge of, and participation in, the fraudulent scheme.
- Conceded, however, that apart from the appellant’s physical presence there was no direct evidence of any overt act showing his endorsement of Accused 1’s conduct.
Appellant
- Emphasised that he was a stranger picked up by Accused 1 from a hotel on the day of the collections and had no prior connection with the printing or forging of receipts.
- Argued that no witness testified to his making any representation or statement supporting Accused 1, nor did anyone show he handled or even saw the forged receipts and Red Book.
- Submitted that mere companionship, without proof of knowledge or intent, cannot sustain a conviction under Sections 420/34 or 471/34 IPC.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court carefully reviewed the trial court’s finding that “there is also no evidence to show that Accused 2 had knowledge regarding the activity of Accused 1” and noted that the High Court supplied no convincing reason to disturb that finding.
The Court held that conviction under Sections 420/34 and 471/34 requires proof of two essential elements: (1) prior knowledge that the receipts were forged, and (2) a shared fraudulent intention with Accused 1 when the receipts were used to obtain donations. None of the three circumstances relied upon by the High Court satisfied these requirements:
- Mere accompaniment of the principal offender, without an overt act evidencing knowledge or intent, is insufficient.
- The forged nature of the receipts, though proven against Accused 1, does not automatically implicate a silent companion.
- Discrepancies between the Red Book and the forged receipts could not be imputed to the appellant absent evidence that he ever examined or compared the two.
Because the prosecution produced “not an iota of evidence” establishing knowledge or common intention, the High Court’s reversal of the acquittal was legally unsustainable. The Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s assessment that reasonable doubt persisted regarding the appellant’s guilt.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; Convictions and Sentences Set Aside; Appellant Acquitted.
Consequently, the appellant’s bail bonds stand discharged, and the trial court’s original acquittal is restored. The decision directly affects only the parties to this case and does not announce any new legal principle; it reaffirms the long-standing rule that mere presence, without proof of knowledge or shared intent, cannot ground criminal liability under Sections 420/34 and 471/34 IPC.
S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.— This is an appeal by special leave directed against the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat dated January 19, 1973, by which the High Court reversed the order of the trial court acquitting two accused persons Manubhai Chhaganbhai Patel and Dasrathlal Chandulal Joshi and convicted them under Sections 420/34 and 471/34. The petition for special leave filed by Petitioner 1 Manubhai Chhaganlal Patel, was dismissed by this Court and leave was granted only to the appellant Dasrathlal Chandulal Joshi. A detailed narrative of the prosecution case is to be found in the judgment of the High Court and that of the trial court and it is not necessary for us to repeat the same all over again. In order to understand the charge against the appellant certain admitted facts may be mentioned: It appears that Sadachar Samiti had printed a number of receipts which were given to different authorised persons for collection of funds on behalf of the Committee in aid of a famine relief fund organised by the Bansakathe Famine Relief Committee. This fund was meant to give relief to the famine-stricken people of Bansakathe district. It was alleged by the prosecution that Accused 1 forged a number of receipts starting from Series No. 5000 and passed the same as genuine and collected donation from various persons of whom PWs 1 to 8 have been examined as prosecution witnesses. There is absolutely no allegation that either when the receipts were printed by Accused 1 or at any other time the appellant was taken into confidence and had any knowledge that the receipts had been actually forged by the accused, nor is there any evidence that the appellant got any money or derived any profits from the amounts realised by Accused 1. The only limited role played by the appellant was that he accompanied Accused 1 wherever he went for collecting donations. The trial court after considering the evidence came to a clear finding that there was no evidence to show that the appellant had any knowledge regarding the activity of Accused 1. In this connection the trial court observed as follows:
“I may further state that it was stated by all the witnesses that it was Accused 1 and Accused 2 did not speak anything at all. There is also no evidence to show that Accused 2 had knowledge regarding the activity of Accused 1. I would have therefore, even if I had come to the conclusion that Accused 1 had issued the receipts in question to the witnesses, given benefit of doubt to Accused 2 and acquitted him of the charge levelled against him.”
2. We have gone through the judgment of the High Court and we find that it has not given any convincing reason for displacing this finding of the learned Sessions Judge which led to the acquittal of the appellant. The High Court seems to have relied on three circumstances in order to convict the appellant, first that the appellant accompanied Accused 1 wherever he went for collecting donations; second, that Accused 1 had granted receipts which were forged; and, thirdly, that there were certain entries in the Red Book which were contrary to the contents of the receipt granted by Accused 1 and the appellant did not object to the same. These circumstances by themselves were not sufficient to bring home the charge against the appellant. It was the duty of the prosecution, before the appellant could be convicted under Sections 420/34 or 471/34 to prove that the appellant knew from before that the receipts used by Accused 1 were forged. Secondly, it must also be proved that Accused 1 had shared the fraudulent intention with Accused 1 in passing as genuine forged receipts and obtaining donations from various persons on false pretexts. There is, however, not an iota of evidence on the record to prove these facts. To begin with, the appellant was an outsider and a stranger and was picked up by Accused 1 from a hotel and asked to accompany him. No witness says that at the time when Accused 1 made certain representations while collecting the money the appellant endorsed his stand or made any statement to indicate that he was aware that the receipts were not genuine and still supported the activities of Accused 1. Under these circumstances, therefore, it will be difficult for the prosecution to substantiate the charge against the appellant merely on the ground that the appellant accompanied Accused 1 wherever he went to collect donations. Mr Sharma appearing for the State frankly conceded that apart from the evidence that the appellant had accompanied Accused 1 there was no evidence of any overt act to show that the appellant endorsed the stand of Accused 1. It was further argued by Mr Sharma that in some cross-entries there was a discrepancy between the amount mentioned in the Red Book and the receipt and, therefore, the appellant must be presumed to know that this discrepancy was there. We are, however, unable to accept this argument in the absence of any evidence to show that the appellant had been shown the Red Book previously and had compared it with the receipts so as to have clear knowledge of the discrepancy and still he kept quiet when Accused 1 was collecting donations from various persons. We have gone through the evidence of PWs 1 to 8 and we are unable to find that they in any way show that the appellant was a party to the forgery committed by Accused 1. For these reasons we are satitfied that there is no legal evidence against the appellant and the High Court was wrong in law in reversing the acquittal of the appellant. We fully agree with the finding and the reasoning of the trial court, a portion of which has been extracted above by which the trial court acquitted the appellant. For these reasons, therefore, the appeal is allowed, the convictions and sentences passed on the appellant are set aside and he is acquitted of the charges framed against him. The appellant will now be discharged from his bail bonds.
Alert