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Pushpaben And Another (Smt) v. Narandas V. Badiani And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
Respondent 1 advanced a loan of Rs 50,000 to the appellants. When the appellants failed to repay, the respondent initiated criminal proceedings for cheating under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. While the complaint was pending, the parties compromised on 22 July 1971: the appellants undertook before the Magistrate to repay the principal with 12% simple interest by 21 July 1972. On the strength of this undertaking, the Magistrate permitted composition of the offence and acquitted the appellants.
The appellants did not honour the undertaking. Respondent 1 therefore moved the Bombay High Court for contempt. The High Court held that the breach constituted wilful disobedience under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, convicted the appellants of civil contempt, and sentenced each to one month’s simple imprisonment. The present appeal is brought under Section 19 of the Act against that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellants’ failure to comply with the repayment undertaking amounted to wilful disobedience so as to constitute civil contempt under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
- Whether, under Section 12(3) of the Act, the High Court erred in imposing a sentence of imprisonment instead of a fine.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The non-payment, though a breach, did not amount to wilful disobedience of the undertaking and therefore should not attract contempt liability.
- Under Section 12(3) the normal penalty for civil contempt is a fine; imprisonment is reserved for exceptional cases. The High Court provided no special reasons warranting incarceration.
The opinion does not record any submissions by Respondent 1, who remained unrepresented at the appellate stage.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Wilful disobedience: The Court affirmed the High Court’s finding that the appellants had wilfully disobeyed the undertaking. The compromise and consequential acquittal were expressly conditioned on repayment; breach of that promise was, therefore, deliberate and constituted civil contempt.
Appropriate sentence under Section 12(3): The Court undertook a textual analysis of Section 12(3). It observed that:
- The statute makes a fine the default penalty for civil contempt.
- Imprisonment is permissible only where the court records “special reasons” demonstrating that a fine would not meet the ends of justice.
- The sentencer must apply its mind and articulate why incarceration, an exceptional measure, is indispensable.
Examining the record, the appellate Court found no such special reasons. In addition, Respondent 1 had chosen not to appear to press for a custodial sentence. Consequently, the case fell “squarely” within the first limb of Section 12(3), warranting only a fine.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Conviction for civil contempt affirmed; the sentence of one month’s simple imprisonment is set aside. Each appellant is directed to pay a fine of Rs 1,000, with a default sentence of 15 days’ simple imprisonment and four weeks to pay.
Implications: The decision underscores that, under Section 12(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, imprisonment for civil contempt is exceptional. Courts must record specific reasons showing why a fine is inadequate before depriving a contemnor of liberty. The ruling thus reinforces the statutory preference for monetary penalties in civil-contempt matters and serves as guidance for sentencing in future contempt proceedings.
S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.— This is an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Court Act (hereinafter called “the Act”) against an order of the High Court of Bombay convicting the appellants for a Civil Contempt and sentencing them to one month's simple imprisonment. The facts of the case have been fully detailed by the High Court and it is not necessary for us to repeat the same all over again. It appears that Respondent 1 had given a loan of Rs 50,000 to the appellants on certain conditions. Somehow or other, the loan could not be paid by the appellants as a result of which Respondent 1 filed a complaint under Section 420 IPC against the appellants. While the complaint was pending before the Court of the Magistrate, the parties entered into a compromise on July 22, 1971 under which the appellants undertook to pay the loan of Rs 50,000 with simple interest @ 12% per annum on or before July 21, 1972. An application was filed before the Court for allowing the parties to compound the case and acquit the accused. The Court after hearing the parties, passed the following order:
“The accused has given an undertaking to the court that he shall repay the sum of Rs 50,000 to the complainant on or before July 21, 1972 with interest as mentioned on the reverse. In view of the undertaking, I permit the compromise and acquit the accused.”
2. It is obvious, therefore, that the Court permitted the parties to compound the case only because of the undertaking given by appellants.
3. Thereafter, it appears, that the undertaking was violated and the amount of loan was not paid to the Respondent 1 at all. The respondent, therefore, moved the High Court for taking action for contempt of Court against the appellants as a result of which the present proceedings were taken against them. The High Court came to the conclusion that the appellants had committed a wilful disobedience of the undertaking given to the Court and were, therefore, guilty of civil contempt as defined in Section 2(b) of the Act. Hence, this appeal before us.
4. Mr V.S Desai appearing in support of the appeal has raised two short points before us. He has submitted that there is no doubt that the appellants had violated the undertaking but in the circumstances it cannot be said that the appellants had committed a wilful disobedience of the orders of the Court. So far as this point is concerned, we fully agree with the High Court. In the circumstances, the appellants undoubtedly committed wilful disobedience of the order of the Court by committing a serious breach of the undertaking given to the Court on the basis of which alone, the appellants, had been acquitted. For these reasons, the first contention put forward by Mr Desai, is overruled.
5. It is, then, contended that under Section 12(3), normally the sentence that should be given to an offender who is found guilty of civil contempt, is fine and not imprisonment, which should be given only where the Court is satisfied that ends of justice require the imposition of such a sentence. In our opinion, this contention of learned counsel for the appellants is well founded and must prevail. Sub-section (3) of Section 12 reads thus:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the Court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit.”
6. A close and careful interpretation of the extracted section leaves no room for doubt that the Legislature intended that a sentence of fine alone should be imposed in normal circumstances. The statute, however, confers special power on the Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment if it thinks that ends of justice so require. Thus before a Court passes the extreme sentence of imprisonment, it must give special reasons after a proper application of its mind that a sentence of imprisonment alone is called for in a particular situation. Thus, the sentence of imprisonment is an exception while sentence of fine is the rule.
7. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we do not find any special reason why the appellants should be sent to jail by sentencing them to imprisonment. Furthermore, Respondent 1 before us despite service, has not appeared to support the sentence given by the High Court. Having regard to these circumstances, therefore, we are satisfied that the present case, squarely falls in the first part of Section 12(3) and a sentence of fine alone should have been given by the High Court. We, therefore, allow this appeal to this extent that the sentence of imprisonment passed by the High Court is set aside and instead the appellants are sentenced to pay a fine of Rs 1000 each. In case of default, 15 days' simple imprisonment. Four weeks time to pay the fine.
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