Ratan Lal Shinghal v. Smt Murti Devi .

Factual and Procedural Background

The matter arose from a dispute in which the petitioner (a tenant) sought relief in a special leave petition. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner's counsel raised a legal contention regarding the temporal operation of Act 13 of 1972, which provided an exemption for new buildings constructed during a 10-year period. The respondent’s counsel objected that this specific legal question had not been raised or considered by the courts below. The respondent also pointed to an understanding given to the High Court by the petitioner to surrender vacant possession, on the basis of which six months’ time had been obtained, but which period was instead used to approach the Supreme Court while declining to deliver possession.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether Act 13 of 1972 (providing exemption for newly constructed buildings during a 10-year period) applies retrospectively to buildings constructed before the amendment, or only prospectively to buildings constructed after the Act came into force.
2. Whether the petitioner should be permitted to raise this legal point for the first time in the Supreme Court when it was not raised or considered by the courts below, particularly in light of the petitioner’s prior undertaking/understanding to surrender possession.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

• Act 13 of 1972 should be treated as prospective in operation unless there is clear legislative intent to the contrary.
• Consequently, the exemption for “new buildings” cannot apply to buildings constructed prior to the amendment.

Respondent's Arguments

• The specific question of law was not raised and was not considered by the courts below; therefore, the Supreme Court should not extend indulgence to allow it to be raised at this stage.
• The petitioner had given an understanding to the High Court to surrender vacant possession and secured six months’ time on that basis, but then used that period to approach the Supreme Court and declined to give possession, which was described as close to a breach of the word given to the court.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court accepted, in principle, the petitioner's legal submission on statutory interpretation: ordinarily, legislation of this nature is prospective unless a clear contrary legislative intent appears. The Court stated its inclination to agree that Act 13 of 1972 is not retrospective and clarified that it applies only to buildings brought into existence de novo after the Act came into force. The Court also noted that the point was of frequent occurrence and could affect many tenants, especially given accommodation scarcity, and therefore made its view on the correctness of the contention explicit.

Despite finding the legal contention sound, the Court declined to allow the petitioner to raise the new question in the particular circumstances. The Court credited the respondent’s objection that the issue had not been raised or considered in the courts below. Additionally, the Court treated the petitioner’s conduct—having obtained time from the High Court on an understanding to surrender possession, and then using that time to pursue further litigation while not delivering possession—as a significant factor. The Court characterized this as perilously near a breach of the word given to the court, and held that, for these reasons, the petitioner had forfeited the right to persuade the Court to permit the raising of the new point.

Nevertheless, the Court fashioned a consensual arrangement: by consent of parties, it granted the petitioner additional time to vacate, conditioned on a written undertaking and continued payment equivalent to rent for use and occupation, with consequences including dismissal of the petition upon failure to undertake and potential contempt upon breach.

Holding and Implications

CONDITIONAL TIME GRANTED TO VACATE BY CONSENT; SLP TO STAND DISMISSED IF NO UNDERTAKING.

The petitioner was directed to be allowed one year to give vacant possession from the date of the order, provided that he files a written undertaking within two weeks. If he fails to file the undertaking, the special leave petition shall stand dismissed. If the undertaking is filed, the petitioner is allowed time to give vacant possession by August 21, 1980. Breach of the undertaking would expose the petitioner to contempt. Throughout the granted period, the petitioner must pay an amount equal to rent for use and occupation to the respondent by or before the 10th of each succeeding month.

Although the Court expressed a clear view that Act 13 of 1972 is prospective, the direct effect of the decision in this case was to deny indulgence to raise the new legal point due to the petitioner’s conduct and the fact that the issue was not raised below, while granting time to vacate on agreed terms. The opinion does not indicate that any new precedent was set beyond these case-specific directions.