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Manshan (Smt) And Others v. Tej Ram And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Nritya Chaudhary, governed by the general Punjab custom, was the last male holder of certain agricultural land, an abadi, and a house. On 9 August 1946 he executed a gift of all this property in favour of his two daughters, Manshan (Appellant 1) and Janki (whose heirs are the remaining appellants).
On 17 December 1947 Bhagat Ram—father of Respondents 1-3 and a collateral of Chaudhary—filed a suit seeking a declaration that the property was ancestral and that the 1946 gift could not endure beyond Chaudhary’s lifetime. By a compromise decree dated 7 March 1950, 27/39ths of the land was declared to go to the “next reversioner,” while 12/39ths and the residential property were excluded from the decree.
The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force on 17 June 1956. Chaudhary died intestate on 18 October 1957. Bhagat Ram’s heirs then instituted the present suit, relying on the 1950 declaratory decree to claim the 27/39ths share. The trial court and first appellate court held for the daughters, but the High Court, in second appeal, reversed and ruled for the plaintiffs. The daughters obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, upon Chaudhary’s death in 1957, succession to his property was governed by the customary law of Punjab or by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
- Whether the 1950 declaratory compromise decree entitled Bhagat Ram’s heirs to inherit the 27/39ths share, notwithstanding the statutory changes introduced by the Hindu Succession Act.
- Whether Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act applied where the deceased had no testamentary power over ancestral property under the custom.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments (Daughters and their Heirs)
- Sections 4 and 8 of the Hindu Succession Act superseded the Punjab custom, making daughters the preferential heirs when Chaudhary died.
- The 1950 declaratory decree merely identified the “next reversioner” at the time of death; it did not vest any present title in Bhagat Ram or his heirs.
Respondents’ Arguments (Heirs of Bhagat Ram)
- Invoked Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act to contend that the daughters had only a limited estate, not absolute ownership.
- Argued that because Chaudhary could not bequeath ancestral property, he did not die “intestate” within the meaning of Section 8, so the daughters could not inherit under that section.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Giasi Ram v. Ramji Lal, (1969) 1 SCC 813; (1969) 3 SCR 944 | A declaratory decree against an alienation only determines that the alienee’s interest endures for the alienor’s lifetime; upon the alienor’s death, the estate reverts to whoever is entitled at that time under the law in force. | The Court treated the present appeal as “squarely covered” by Giasi Ram, holding that the 1950 compromise decree did not prevent new statutory heirs (the daughters) from inheriting after the Act came into force. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Justice N. L. Untwalia rejected the High Court’s reliance on Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, stating that the section was irrelevant because the daughters were not claiming through a limited estate but as heirs under the statute.
By reading Sections 4 and 8 together, the Court held that the Hindu Succession Act abrogated the customary rule that excluded daughters from inheriting ancestral property. Accordingly, on Chaudhary’s death in 1957, his daughters became the preferential heirs.
The Court emphasized that the declaratory decree of 1950 merely established that the impugned gift would last only for Chaudhary’s lifetime; it did not confer an indefeasible title on Bhagat Ram or his heirs. The “next reversioner” had to be identified with reference to the law in force at the moment of succession, and under the Act the daughters filled that role.
The High Court’s interpretation of “dying intestate” in Section 8 was found erroneous. The section applies whenever a Hindu dies without a valid will, regardless of any customary incapacity to dispose of ancestral property. Therefore, Chaudhary’s death triggered statutory succession under Section 8 in favour of his daughters.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; Judgment and Decree of the High Court Set Aside; Plaintiffs' Suit Dismissed with Costs Throughout.
The decision restores the trial court’s ruling in favour of the daughters, confirming their absolute title to the disputed 27/39ths share. It reinforces the principle that once the Hindu Succession Act came into force, customary laws denying inheritance rights to daughters were superseded. No new precedent is created, but the judgment reaffirms and applies the ratio of Giasi Ram to similar factual settings.
N.L Untwalia, J.— In our opinion this appeal is covered by the ratio of the decision in Giasi Ram v. Ramji Lal (1969) 1 SCC 813, (1969) 3 SCR 944 which case was cited before the High Court but since the full report of the judgment was not available to it, it could not correctly apply the principle and decided the case against the appellants by taking an erroneous view of the law. Hence this appeal by special leave.
2. One Nritya Chaudhary indisputably governed by the general Punjab custom was the last male holder of certain agricultural land, abadi and a house. On August 9, 1946 he gifted his property to his two daughters, Manshan and Janki. Manshan is Appellant 1 and the heirs of Janki are the other appellants in this appeal. On December 17, 1947 a suit was filed by one Bhagat Ram, father of Respondents 1 to 3, a collateral of Chaudhary for a declaration that the properties were ancestral in the hands of Chaudhary and the gift made by him in favour of his daughters could not enure beyond his lifetime. A declaratory decree to that effect was sought for. On March 7, 1950 a compromise decree was made in that suit declaring that 27/39th share of the land in dispute would go to the next reversioner of Chaudhary and the remaining 12/39th share of the land, the abadi and the house were left out of the declaratory decree. In respect of the latter property the suit was dismissed by compromise. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, hereinafter called “the Act”, came into force on and from June 17, 1956. Chaudhary died on October 18, 1957. Bhagat Ram's heirs thereafter filed the present suit giving rise to this appeal for claiming the land of Chaudhary in respect of which a declaratory decree had been made in favour of Bhagat Ram. The stand taken on behalf of the appellants was that after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act the daughters in supersession of the custom prevalent in Punjab became the preferential heirs of Chaudhary and hence on his death they became entitled to the property in question. They succeeded before the trial court as also before the first appellate court. They however lost in the High Court. The High Court allowed the second appeal and it is not quite clear from the judgment of the Division Bench as to on what basis the appeal was allowed.
3. The argument put forward on behalf of the respondents in the High Court with reference to Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act was wholly misplaced. There was no question of applying either sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the said Act. Here the simple question which had to be answered was as to who was the heir of Chaudhary under the Hindu Succession Act on the date of his death. The property will revert to him or her. Reading Sections 4 and 8 of the Act together it is clear to us that on the date of death of Chaudhary, in supersession of the prevalent custom, his daughters became the preferential heirs and were entitled to inherit his property. Chaudhary might have remained a life owner according to the custom. But the portion of the custom which prevented the daughters from inheriting got superseded by the provisions of the Act and hence Bhagat Ram's heirs were no longer entitled to succeed to the property of Chaudhary in the year 1957. The effect of the declaratory decree passed in the year 1950, it is plain, was merely to declare that whosoever would be the next reversioner to the estate of Chaudhary at the time of his death would get the property in respect of which the declaratory decree was made and not necessarily the person in whose favour the declaratory decree was passed.
4. The High Court also seems to have been influenced by the expression “dying intestate” occurring in Section 8 of the Act, and appears to have taken the view that since Chaudhary had no power to bequeath his ancestral property by a will, Section 8 would not apply and the daughters would not be entitled to claim the property as his reversioners under Section 8. In our opinion this is an entirely erroneous view of the law. Section 8 would apply where a male Hindu dies intestate either not having made any will or having made an invalid will. It squarely covered the case of the respondents.
5. In Giasi Ram case (1969) 1 SCC 813, (1969) 3 SCR 944, it was pointed out at p. 947:
“The effect of the declaratory decree in Suit No. 75 of 1920, was merely to declare that by the sale interest conveyed in favour of the alienee was to enure during the lifetime of the alienor. The conclusion is therefore inevitable that the property alienated reverted to the estate of Jwala at the point of his death and all persons who would, but for the alienation, have taken the estate will be entitled to inherit the same. If Jwala had died before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, was enacted the three sons would have taken the estate to the exclusion of the widow and the two daughters. After the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act the estate devolved, by virtue of Sections 2 and 4(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, upon the three sons, the widow and the two daughters. We are unable to agree with the High Court that because in the year 1920, the wife and the daughters of Jwala were incompetent to challenge the alienation of ancestral property by Jwala, they could not, after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, inherit his estate when succession opened after that Act came into force.”
As we have said above the present appeal is squarely covered by the view of this Court expressed in the passage extracted above.
6. In the result the appeal is allowed with costs; the judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and the suit of the plaintiff-respondents is dismissed with costs throughout.
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