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K. Lakshmana Rao v. Public Prosecutor, State Of Andhra Pradesh And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The complainant, Saraswati Devi, a Health Visitor posted in Nalgonda, alleged that on 30 December 1971 she was taken by Muralidhar Rao (Accused 1) and Lakshmana Rao (Accused 2, the present appellant) to Lakshmana Rao’s house under the pretext of discussing her transfer order. Inside a room, Muralidhar Rao allegedly misbehaved with her while Lakshmana Rao “supported” those acts. An FIR was lodged the same night.
The trial Magistrate convicted both accused under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced each to pay a fine of Rs 100. On appeal, the Sessions Judge acquitted them. The State challenged that acquittal before the High Court, which reversed the Sessions Judge, reconvicted the present appellant under Section 354 IPC, and imposed the same fine of Rs 100. The appellant then obtained special leave and filed the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the prosecution evidence, particularly the discrepancies between the FIR and the complainant’s testimony at trial, was sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 354 IPC.
- Whether the High Court was justified in overturning the acquittal recorded by the Sessions Judge when an equally plausible view of the evidence favoured the accused.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The entire prosecution case was an afterthought developed only after police involvement; the FIR contains no allegation that could constitute an offence under Section 354 IPC against the appellant.
- Significant new allegations—kissing, attempting to undress, placing the complainant on a cot, and other indecent advances—were introduced for the first time during the complainant’s testimony and were absent from the FIR, rendering the testimony unreliable.
- The circumstances described, such as leaving the door unbolted while the complainant’s brother waited outside, make the alleged conduct inherently improbable.
- Given these inconsistencies, the view taken by the Sessions Judge (acquittal) was reasonable; therefore, under settled law the High Court should not have interfered with that finding of fact.
State’s Arguments
This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court closely compared the FIR with the evidence presented at trial. It found that:
- The FIR contained only a general statement that the appellant “supported” Muralidhar Rao’s conduct; it did not narrate any overt act by the appellant amounting to assault or use of criminal force.
- The complainant’s trial testimony introduced several new allegations (kissing, attempts to undress, pushing her onto a cot, biting the appellant) that were never hinted at in the FIR. These embellishments cast serious doubt on her credibility.
- The scenario described—where accused supposedly intended sexual assault but left the door unsecured despite the complainant’s brother being immediately outside—made the allegations inherently improbable.
- The High Court’s rationale that the complainant might have omitted explicit details in the FIR due to modesty was rejected; the Court noted she was “a fully mature and educated lady” who had filed a deliberate written report.
- Applying the settled principle that when two views are possible on evidence the appellate court should not disturb an order of acquittal, the Supreme Court held that the Sessions Judge’s view was reasonably open on the record.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; Conviction Set Aside; Appellant Acquitted.
Direct Effect: The fine imposed on Lakshmana Rao is discharged and the judgment of the High Court is reversed, restoring the Sessions Judge’s acquittal.
Broader Implications: The decision reinforces the principle that appellate courts should not overturn acquittals when the trial court’s view is reasonably sustainable on the evidence, particularly where material improvements appear between the FIR and court testimony. No new precedent was set but the judgment underscores the evidentiary weight afforded to first information reports in assessing subsequent testimonial credibility.
S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.— In this appeal by special leave the appellant has been convicted by the trial Magistrate under Section 354 IPC and sentenced to a fine of Rs 100. On an appeal to the Sessions Judge the appellant was acquitted. The State thereafter filed an appeal before the High Court against the order of the acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge. The High Court in appeal reversed the judgment of the Sessions Judge and set aside the order of acquittal and convicted the appellant under Section 354 IPC and sentenced him to a fine of Rs 100 and hence this appeal by special leave.
2. Mr Kohli in support of the appeal has raised a short point before us. He has submitted that the entire prosecution case appears to be a complete afterthought and cooked up after the police came into the picture. He has drawn our attention to the first information report which was lodged by the informant which may be extracted to show the nature of allegations made by the informant against the appellant:
“I, the petitioner working as Health Visitor at D.M and H.O office, Nalgonda, for the last 5 years. In our office there is one L.D.C named Muralidhar Rao. Recently I got transfer order to Huzurnagar. I requested to D.M & H.O to stop my transfer order for some time as my younger brother's studies are not disturbed. My request was granted by the D.M & H.O
On the very day i.e on December 30, 1971 at about 8.30 p.m the said Muralidhar Rao accompanied by one LIC Officer, named Lakshmana Rao came to my residence by the jeep. Muralidhar Rao entered my room and asked me to come in the jeep to the house of LIC Officer Lakshmana Rao, as they want to talk for the cause of my transfer orders. I said that I would come next day morning. But Muralidhar Rao asked me to follow them immediately, otherwise they will go to D.M & H.O and see that my transfer orders are complied with. Doing nothing I followed them with my younger brother Radhya Krishna, in their jeep. The No. of the jeep is A.D.X 6904. They took me to the house of Lakshmana Rao. Muralidhar Rao asked me to enter in the room for discussion above cited. My brother was not allowed inside the room. When I entered in the room Lakshmana Rao kept the doors closed and not bolted. Then Muralidhar Rao grew wild and caught hold of my hand, and asked me that I am making propaganda against him, that he is the cause for my transfer, I said that his allegation is not correct. Again he said ‘I know you are blaming me, I shall take the vengeance’. I requested him to leave me, but he misbehaved with me and challenged that he would spoil me. He caught hold of me with his two hands and forced me. I started crying. Listening to my alarm my brother entered in the room by pushing the doors. On seeing my brother Muralidhar Rao left me. By the acts of Muralidhar Rao, I came to understand that if my brother was not present there, he would have harmed me by doing some wrongful act against my body. Lakshmana Rao is found to have supported the wrong acts of Muralidhar Rao.
Muralidhar Rao challenged me while myself and my brother were coming out of the house that he would see that who will protect me, and that he will take the vengeance against me.”
3. Analysing this complaint it would appear that the main allegations made by the informant Saraswati Devi were as follows:
4. That Accused 1 and 2 came to her house on December 30, 1971 and on the pretext of getting her transfer orders cancelled Accused 1 took her to the house of Accused 2 in a jeep. When they reached the house of Accused 2 the informant was taken into the room of the house but the brother was asked to remain outside. The room in which the informant was taken, however, was neither locked nor bolted from inside. Thereafter, Accused 1 Muralidhar Rao grew wild and caught hold of the hand of the informant and said that as she had been making propaganda against him, he would wreak vengeance. She, however, requested Accused 1 to spare her but he misbehaved and said that he would spoil her. She then goes on to state that while these talks were going on, her brother who had accompanied her to the house of the appellant, entered into the room and on seeing him, Accused 1 Muralidhar Rao left her. No allegation at all was made so far as the appellant Lakshmana Rao was concerned excepting a bare statement that he was found to have supported the wrong acts of Muralidhar Rao. Considering the statements given by the informant at its face value it is extremely doubtful if any offence under Section 354 was made out against Accused 1 much less against the appellant. When the case came up before the trial court, a completely new case was made out by the informant and all sorts of allegations were made in her evidence when Saraswati Devi was examined by the Court. The integral part of the complaint was given a complete go-by and certain overt acts which were neither mentioned nor indicated in the first information report were brought out for the first time in the evidence. In the evidence, the complainant for the first time mentioned the facts that the first accused kissed her and the second accused caught hold of her and both of them tried to put her on the cot, tried to undress her and also attempted to unbutton her blouse. She further stated that she kicked the first accused and gave a tooth-bite to the second accused. None of these facts had been mentioned in the first information report which was lodged at the police station which constituted her first statement. Furthermore, it appears that even though the appellant had made indecent advances towards the informant and had gone to the extent of attempting to rape her but they failed to take the precaution of bolting the door from inside knowing full well that her brother was sitting outside the room. These allegations being an afterthought appear to us to be inherently improbable. The High Court seems to have brushed aside the conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions Judge on the ground that as the complainant was a woman, she might have felt shy to make allegation against accused involving her honour. This reason does not appeal to us. Indeed, if the complainant was so much concerned with her honour, she would have rested content by making a complaint to her superior officers instead of taking the matter to the Court. It, however, appears that the complainant was a fully mature and educated lady and had filed a written report previously prepared with due deliberation before the police. If she had decided to take the matter to the Court by moving the criminal machinery of law, she had to give the facts necessary to constitute offences lodged against the accused, otherwise she took the risk of the case failing in the court if improvements and orientations were made after the FIR was lodged, which may throw serious doubt on the truth of the prosecution story. At any rate, having considered the judgment of the Sessions Judge and of the High Court and the evidence of the complainant we are satisfied that the view taken by the Sessions Judge was, undoubtedly, one which could be taken on the evidence and even if the High Court may not have agreed with that view and was prepared to take another view, that however was no ground to reverse the judgment of the acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, as has been held by this Court in several cases. Taking an overall picture of the fundamental aspects of the prosecution case, we are unable to uphold the judgment of the High Court. The result is that the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the charges framed against him.
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