Mathuralal v. Bhanwarlal And Another

O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.— On the report of the Station House Officer, Manak Chowk, Ratlam, that there was a dispute between Mathuralal and Bhanwarilal concerning a house situated in Kambalpatti Ghas Bazar, Ratlam, which was likely to cause a breach of the peace, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ratlam, passed a preliminary order under Section 145(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on March 1, 1978. On March 2, 1978, the learned Magistrate attached the subject of dispute under Section 146(1) Criminal Procedure Code considering the case to be one of emergency. Thereafter, when the learned Magistrate wanted to proceed with the enquiry under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, an objection was raised by Mathuralal that such an enquiry was incompetent once the subject of the dispute had been attached under Section 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The objection was overruled by the learned Magistrate. Successive Revisions taken before the Sessions Judge and the High Court having borne no fruit, Mathuralal has filed the present appeal by special leave of this Court. The High Court, we may mention here, thought that the matter was concluded against the appellant by the decision of this Court in Chandu Naik v. Sitaram B. Naik (1978) 2 SCR 353, (1978) 1 SCC 210, 1978 Cri LJ 356.

2. Shri Mukherjee, learned Counsel for the appellant urged that under Section 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973, an attachment of the subject of dispute could be effected in three situations: (i) if the Magistrate at any time after making the order under Section 145(1) considered the case to be one of emergency, or (ii) if he decided that none of the parties was then in such possession as was referred to in Section 145, or (iii) if he was unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute. The attachment so effected, regardless of the situation consequent upon which it was effected, was to subsist until a competent court determined the rights of parties with regard to the person entitled to possession. This, he urged, clearly indicated that after an attachment was effected it was the civil court and not the Magistrate that was to have further jurisdiction in the matter. He contrasted the provisions of Section 146(1) of the present Code with the provisions of Section 146(1) and the third proviso to Section 145(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 as amended by Act 26 of 1955. He drew our attention to the circumstance that the third proviso to Section 145(4) of the old Code empowered the Magistrate, if he considered the case one of emergency, to attach the subject of dispute pending his decision under that section, while Section 146(1) of the previous Code empowered the Magistrate to attach the subject of dispute if the Magistrate was of the opinion that none of the parties was then in possession or if the Magistrate was unable to decide as to which of them was in such possession and thereafter to refer to the civil court for decision the question whether any and which of the parties was in possession of the subject of dispute. Therefore, he said, under the previous Code, in the case of attachment because of emergency the Magistrate was himself competent to decide the question of possession and in the other two cases he was to refer the dispute to the civil court, whereas, under the present Code, in all the three situations the Magistrate was to leave the matter for adjudication by the civil court. Thus, the submission of Shri Mukherjee was that while under the previous Code it was permissible to attach the subject of dispute pending enquiry by the Magistrate as contemplated by Section 145, such attachment pending decision by the Magistrate was not permissible under the provisions of the present Code. According to him so soon as the Magistrate effected an attachment he had nothing further to do except await the decision or the directions of the cvil court.

3. Though at first biush there appeared to be force in the submissions of Shri Mukherjee, a closer scrutiny of the provisions of Sections 145 and 146 exposes their unsoundness. It may perhaps be desirable, at this stage to extract the provisions of Sections 145 and 146, to the extent that they are relevant, in the Code of 1898 before it was amended in 1955, in the Code of 1898 after it was amended in 1955, and in the Code of 1973:

1898 Code before it was amended in 1955 1898 Code after the amendment of 1955 1973 Code (a) (b) (c) 145(1) Whenever a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class is satisfied from a police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within the local limits of his jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, within a time to be fixed by such Magistrate, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. 145(1) Whenever a District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class is satisfied from a police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within the local limits of his jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, within a time to be fixed by such Magistrate, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute and further requiring them to put in such documents, or to adduce, by putting in affidavits, the evidence of such persons, as they rely upon in support of such claims. 145(1) Whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within his local jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing stating the grounds to his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. (2) . . . . . . . . (2) . . . . . . . . (2) . . . . . . . . (3) A copy of the order shall be served in manner provided by this Code for the service of a summons upon such person or persons as the Magistrate may direct, and at least one copy shall be published by being affixed to some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute. (3) A copy of the order shall be served in manner provided by this Code for the service of a summons upon such person or persons as the Magistrate may direct, and at least one copy shall be published by being affixed to some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute. (3) A copy of the order shall be served in the manner provided by this Code for the service of a summons upon such person or persons as the Magistrate may direct, and at least one copy shall be published by being affixed to some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute. (4) The Magistrate shall then, without reference to the merits or the claias of any of such parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, peruse the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them respectively, consider the effect of such evidence, take such further evidence (if any) as he thinks necessary, and, if possible, decide whether any and which of the parties was at the date of the order before mentioned in such possession of the said subject: (4) The Magistrate shall then, without reference to the merits or the claims of any of such parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, peruse the statements, documents and affidavits, if any, so put in, hear the parties and conclude the inquiry, as far as may be practicable, within a period of two months from the date of the appearance of the parties before him and, if possible, decide the question whether any and which of the parties was at the date of the order before mentioned in such possession of the said subject: (4) The Magistrate shall then, without reference to the merits or the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, peruse the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them, take such further evidence, if any, as he thinks necessary, and, if possible, decide whether any and which of the parties was, at the date of the order made by him under sub-section (1), in possession of the subject of dispute: Provided that . . . . . . . Provided that . . . . . . . Provided further that . . . . . . . Provided that . . . . . . . Provided also that if the Magistrate considers the case one of emergency, he may at any time attach the subject of dispute, pending his decision under this section. Provided also that, if the Magistrate considers the case one of emergency, he may at any time attach the subject of dispute, pending his decision under this section. (5) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party so required to attend, or any other person interested, from showing that no such dispute as aforesaid exists or has existed; and in such case the Magistrate shall cancel his said order, and all Further proceedings thereon shall be stayed, but, subject to such cancellation, the order of the Magistrate under sub-section (1) shall be final. (5) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party so required to attend, or any other person interested, from showing that no such dispute as aforesaid exists or has existed; and in such case the Magistrate shall cancel his said order, and all further proceedings thereon shall be stayed, but, subject to such cancellation, the order of the Magistrate under sub-section (1) shall be final. (5) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party so required to attend, or any other person interested, from showing that no such dispute as aforesaid exists or has existed; and in such case the Magistrate shall cancel his said order, and all further proceedings thereon shall be stayed, but, subject to such cancellation, the order of the Magistrate under sub-section (1) shall be final. (6) If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was or should under the first proviso to sub-section (4) be treated as being in such possession of the said subject, he shall issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefiom in due course of law, and forbidding all disturbance of such possession until such eviction, and when he proceeds under the first proviso to sub-section (4), may restore to possession the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed (6) If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was or should under the second proviso to sub-section (4) be treated as being in such possession of the said subject, he shall issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course of law, and forbidding all disturbance of such possession until such eviction and when he proceeds under the second proviso to sub-section (4), may restore to possession the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed. (6) (a) If a Magistrate decides that one of the parties was, or should under the proviso to sub-section (4) be treated as being, in such possession of the said subject, he shall issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course of law, and forbidding all disturbance of such possession until such eviction and when he proceeds under the proviso to sub-section (4), may restore to possession the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed. (b) . . . . . . . . . . (7) . . . . . . . . . . (7) . . . . . . . . . . (7) . . . . . . . . . . (8) . . . . . . . . . . (8) . . . . . . . . . . (8) . . . . . . . . . . (9) . . . . . . . . . . (9) . . . . . . . . . . (9) . . . . . . . . . . (10) . . . . . . . . . . (10) . . . . . . . . . . (10) . . . . . . . . . . 146(1) If the Magistrate decides that none of the parties was then in such possession, or is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute, he may attach it until a competent court has determined the rights of the parties thereto, or the person entitled to possession thereof: 146(1) If the Magistrate is of opinion that none of the parties was then in such possession, or is unable to decide as to which of them was then in such possession, of the subject of dispute, he may attach it, and draw up a statement of the facts of the case and forward the record of the proceeding to a civil court of competent jurisdiction to decide the question whether any and which of the parties was in possession of the subject of dispute at the date of the order as explained in sub-section (4) of Section 145; and he shall direct the parties to appear before the civil court on a date to be fixed by him: 146(1) If the Magistrate at any time after making the order under sub-section (1) of Section 145 considers the case to be one of emergency, or if he decides that none of the parties was then in such possession as is referred to in Section 145, or if he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute, he may attach the subject of dispute until a competent court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof: Provided that the District Magistrate or the Magistrate who has attached the subject of dispute may withdraw the attachment at any time, if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of a breach of the peace in regard to the subject of dispute. Provided that the District Magistrate or the Magistrate who has attached the subject of dispute may withdraw the attachment at any time, if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of a breach of the peace in regard to the subject of dispute. Provided that such Magistrate may withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute. (1A) . . . . . . . . . . (1B) . . . . . . . . . . (1C) . . . . . . . . . . (1D) . . . . . . . . . . (1E) . . . . . . . . . . (2) When the Magistrate attaches the subject of dispute, he may, if he thinks fit and if no receiver of the property, the subject of dispute, has been appointed by any civil court appoint a receiver thereof, who, subject to the control of the Magistrate, shall have all the powers of a receiver appointed under the Code of Civil Procedure: (2) When the Magistrate attaches the subject of dispute, he may, if he thinks fit and if no receiver of the property, the subject of dispute, has been appointed by any civil court appoint a receiver thereof, who, subject to the control of the Magistrate, shall have all the powers of a receiver appointed under the Code of Civil Procedure: (2) When the Magistrate attaches the subject of dispute, he may, if no receiver in relation to such subject of dispute has been appointed by any civil court, make such arrangements as he considers proper for looking after the property or if he thinks fit, appoint a receiver thereof, who shall have, subject to the control of the Magistrate, all the powers of a receiver appointed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908): Provided that, in the event of a receiver of the property, the subject of dispute, being subsequently appointed by any civil court, possession shall be made over to him by the receiver appointed by the Magistrate, who shall thereupon be discharged. Provided that, in the event of a receiver of the property, the subject of dispute, being subsequently appointed by any civil court, possession shall be made over to him by the receiver appointed by the Magistrate, who shall thereupon be discharged. Provided that in the event of a receiver being subsequently appointed in relation to the subject of dispute by any civil court, the Magistrate— (a) shall order the receiver appointed by him to hand over the possession of the subject of dispute to the receiver appointed by the civil court and shall thereafter discharge the receiver appointed by him; (b) may make such other incidental or consequential orders as may be just.

4. Quite obviously, Sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code together constitute a scheme for the resolution of a situation where there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace because of a dispute concerning any land or water or their boundaries. If Section 146 is torn out of its setting and read independently of Section 145, it is capable of being construed to mean that once an attachment is effected in any of the three situations mentioned therein, the dispute can only be resolved by a competent court and not by the Magistrate effecting the attachment. But Section 146 cannot be so separated from Section 145. It can only be read in the context of Section 145. Contextual construction must surely prevail over isolationist construction. Otherwise, it may mislead. That is one of the first principles of construction. Let us therefore look at Section 145 and consider Section 146 in that context. Section 145 contemplates, first, the satisfaction of the Magistrate that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or their boundaries, and, next, the issuance of an order, known to lawyers practising in the criminal courts as a preliminary order, stating the grounds of his satisfaction and requiring the parties concerned to attend his Court and to put in written statements of their respective claims as regards the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. A preliminary order is considered so basic to a proceeding under Section 145 that a failure to draw up a preliminary order has been held by several High Courts to vitiate all the subsequent proceedings. It is by making a preliminary order that the Magistrate assumes jurisdiction to proceed under Sections 145 and 146. In fact, the first of the situations in which an attachment may be effected under Section 146 of the 1973 Code has to be “at any time after making the order under sub-section (1) of Section 145” while the other two situations have, necessarily, to be at the final stage of the proceeding initiated by the preliminary order. Now, the preliminary order is required to enjoin the parties not only to appear before the Magistrate on a specified date but also to put in their written statements. Sub-section (3) of Section t45 prescribes the mode of service of the preliminary order on the parties. Sub-section (4) casts a duty on the Magistrate to peruse the written statements of the parties, to receive the evidence adduced by them, to take further evidence if necessary and, if possible, to decide which of the parties was in possession on the date of the preliminary order. If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was in possession he is to make a final order in the manner provided by sub-section (6). Provision for the two situations where the Magistrate is unable to decide which of the parties was in possession or where he is of the view that neither of them was in possession is made in Section 146 under which he may attach the subject of dispute until the determination of the rights of parties by a competent court. The scheme of Sections 145 and 146 is that the Magistrate, on being satisfied about the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, issues a preliminary order stating the grounds of his satisfaction and calling upon the parties to appear before him and submit their written statements. Then he proceeds to peruse the statements, to receive and to take evidence and to decide which of the parties was in possession on the date of the preliminary order. On the other hand if he is unable to decide who was in such possession or if he is of the view that none of the parties was in such possession he may say so. If he decides that one of the parties was in possession, he declares the possession of such party. In the other two situations he attaches the property. Thus a proceeding begun with a preliminary order must be followed up by an enquiry and end with the Magistrate deciding in one of three ways and making consequential orders. There is no half way house, there is no question of stopping in the middle and leaving the parties to go to the civil court. Proceeding may however be stopped at any time if one or other of the parties satisfies the Magistrate that there has never been or there is no longer any dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. If there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, the foundation for the jurisdiction of the Magistrate disappears. The Magistrate then cancels the preliminary order. This is provided by Section 145 sub-section (5). Except for the reason that there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace and as provided by Section 145(5), a proceeding initiated by a preliminary order under Section 145(1) must run its full course. Now, in a case of emergency, a Magistrate may attach the property, at any time after making the preliminary order. This is the first of the situations provided in Section 146(1) in which an attachment may be effected. There is no express stipulation in Section 146 that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate ends with the attachment. Nor is it implied. Far from it. The obligation to proceed with the enquiry as prescribed by Section 145 sub-section (4) is against any such implication. Suppose a Magistrate draws up a preliminary order under Section 145(1) and immediately follows it up with an attachment under Section 146(1), the whole exercise of stating the grounds of his satisfaction and calling upon the parties to appear before him and submit their written statements becomes futile if he is to have no further jurisdiction in the matter. And yet he cannot make an order of attachment under Section 146(1) on the ground of emergency without first making a preliminary order in the manner prescribed by Section 145(1). There is no reason why we should adopt a construction which will lead to such inevitable contradictions. We mentioned a little earlier that the only provision for stopping the proceeding and cancelling the preliminary order is to be found in Section 145(5) and it can only be on the ground that there is no longer any dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. An emergency is the basis of attachment under the first limb of Section 146(1) and if there is an emergency, none can say that there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace.

5. Let us examine if a comparative study of the provisions as they stood before 1955 and after 1955 under the old Code and as they now stand under the 1973 Code lead us to a conclusion other than that indicated in the preceding paragraph. From the comparative table of the provisions, it is seen that there were two principal changes made by the 1955 amendment. The first was that the preliminary order was also to require the parties to put in documents and the affidavits of such persons as they intended to rely upon in support of their claims. The Magistrate was to decide the case on a consideration of the written statements, the documents and the affidavits put in by the parties and after hearing them. The position earlier was that the parties had the right to adduce evidence and the Magistrate could take further evidence if he so desired. The second change was that in the two situations where he was unable to satisfy himself as to which of the parties was in possession or where he decided that none of the parties was in possession, after attaching the property, the Magistrate was himself to refer the dispute to the civil court instead of leaving it to the parties to go to the civil court. He was to obtain the finding of the civil court and thereafter conclude the proceeding under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code in conformity with the decision of the civil court. The revised procedure introduced by the 1955 amendment was not found to work satisfactorily and, therefore, it was, apparently, thought desirable to revert to the old procedure. The provisions of Sections 145 and 146 of the 1973 Code are substantially the same as the corresponding provisions before the 1955 amendment. The only noticeable change is that the second proviso to Section 145(4) (as it stood before the 1955 amendment) has now been transposed to Section 146 but without the words “pending his decision under this section” and with the words “at any time after making the order under Section 145(1)” superadded. The change, clearly, is in the interest of convenient draftsmanship. All situations in which an attachment may be made are now mentioned together in Section 146. The words “pending his decision under this section” have apparently been omitted as unnecessary since Section 145 provides how the proceeding initiated by a preliminary order must proceed and end and therefore an attachment made “at any time after making under Section 145(1)” can only continue until the termination of the proceeding. At the termination of the proceeding, if he finds one of the parties was in possession as stipulated, the Magistrate must make an order as provided in Section 145(6) and withdraw the attachment as provided in Section 146(1) since there can be no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace once an order in terms of Section 145(6) is made.

6. In our view, it is wrong to hold that the Magistrate's jurisdiction ends as soon as an attachment is made on the ground of emergency. A large number of cases decided by several High Courts some taking one view and the others a different view were read to us. We do not consider it necessary to refer to them except to acknowledge that we derived considerable assistance from the judgment of Lahiri, J., in Kshetra Mohan Sarkar v. Paran Chandra Mandal 1978 Cri LJ 936 (Gauhati HC), in arriving at our conclusion. We may also add that the question now at issue did not arise for consideration in Chandu Naik v. Sitaram B. Naik (1978) 2 SCR 353, (1978) 1 SCC 210, 1978 Cri LJ 356. What was decided there was that a proceeding under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code did not abate because of Section 8 of the Maharashtra Vacant Land (Prohibition of Unauthorised Occupation and Summary Eviction) Act, 1975. In the result the appeal is dismissed.