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State Of Maharashtra And Others v. Man Singh Suraj Singh Padvi And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Feb 14, 1978
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Factual and Procedural Background

The first respondent was the tribal chief and proprietor of the Kathi Estate—one of six “Mehwassi estates” in the West Khandesh District of Maharashtra, designated as a “scheduled area” under Article 244 and the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution. By virtue of earlier colonial-era and state legislation, the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 and the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (“Tenancy Act”) applied to these estates. Amendments to the Tenancy Act in 1956 (Bombay Act 13 of 1956) converted the respondent’s tenants into deemed purchasers as of 1 April 1957, thereby stripping the respondent of proprietary rights and limiting the compensation he could receive.

On 24 February 1962, the Governor of Maharashtra issued two legislative measures:

  • A notification under Paragraph 5(1) of the Fifth Schedule applying the 1956 amendment to Mehwassi estates but simultaneously adding Section 88-D to exclude the deemed-purchase provisions (Sections 32-32R) retroactively.
  • The West Khandesh Mehwassi Estate (Proprietary Rights Abolition etc.) Regulation, 1961 under Paragraph 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule (with Presidential assent), which abolished the respondent’s proprietary rights and granted occupancy rights to inferior holders and tenants, reducing the compensation payable to the respondent.

The respondent petitioned the Bombay High Court, which struck down both measures as violative of Article 19(1)(f). The State appealed to the Supreme Court. While the appeal was pending, the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976 inserted the 1961 Regulation into the Ninth Schedule, giving it immunity under Article 31-B.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the inclusion of the 1961 Regulation in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976 cured any alleged violation of fundamental rights and rendered the Regulation constitutionally valid.
  2. Consequently, whether the related notification dated 24 February 1962 could still be challenged as infringing Article 19(1)(f).

Arguments of the Parties

State (Appellant)

  • Contended that, after its insertion into the Ninth Schedule, the 1961 Regulation enjoyed complete immunity from fundamental-rights challenges under Article 31-B, operating retrospectively from the date of its promulgation.
  • Maintained that the notification of 24 February 1962 was beneficial to the respondent and therefore not open to attack once the Regulation’s validity was upheld.

First Respondent

  • Originally argued before the High Court that both measures infringed his property rights under Article 19(1)(f).
  • In the Supreme Court, did not dispute that if the Regulation were constitutionally valid, the notification could not independently be invalidated.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jagannath v. Authorised Officer, Land Reforms (1972) 1 SCR 1055; (1971) 2 SCC 893 Inclusion of a statute in the Ninth Schedule under Article 31-B cures prior constitutional defects with retrospective effect. Relied upon to hold that insertion of the 1961 Regulation into the Ninth Schedule validated it ab initio, regardless of earlier infringement of Article 19(1)(f).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court focused on the legal effect of the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976:

  • Article 31-B expressly provides that an Act listed in the Ninth Schedule “shall be deemed to be valid” and immune from challenge for violating fundamental rights, with retrospective operation.
  • Therefore, any constitutional infirmity in the 1961 Regulation based on Article 19(1)(f) was cured from the date of its original promulgation.
  • Once the Regulation stood validated, the notification of 24 February 1962—far from depriving the respondent of rights—restored his position as occupant and could not be impugned on constitutional grounds.
  • The High Court’s decision, rendered before the Fortieth Amendment, was thus rendered unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside; the notification dated 24 February 1962 and the West Khandesh Mehwassi Estate (Proprietary Rights Abolition etc.) Regulation, 1961 declared constitutionally valid.

Implications: The decision reaffirms the curative and retrospective power of Article 31-B and the Ninth Schedule. For the parties, the respondent’s challenge fails and the legislative measures remain operative. No broader precedent was set beyond the reaffirmation of established Ninth Schedule jurisprudence. The Court made no order as to costs but suggested that the Central Government “sympathetically consider” refunding any wealth-tax or income-tax collected from the respondent after the Regulation’s commencement.

Show all summary ...

P.N Bhagwati, J.— This appeal by certificate is directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court invalidating a notification dated February 24, 1962 issued by the Governor of Maharashtra in exercise of the power conferred under sub-para (1) of Para 5 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution and the West Khandesh Mehwassi Estate (Proprietary Rights Abolition etc.) Regulation, 1961 issued by the Governor of Maharashtra under sub-para (2) of para 5 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution after obtaining the assent of the President. These two legislative measures were struck down by the High Court on the ground that they violated the fundamental right of the first respondent under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The question whether there was any infringement of the fundamental right of the first respondent under Article 19(1)(f) as a result of these two legislative measures would have raised a highly debatable issue, but it is unnecessary to consider it in this appeal since, subsequent to the judgment of the High Court, the West Khandesh Mehwassi Estate (Proprietary Rights Abolition etc.) Regulation, 1961 has been included as Item 155 in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976. We shall briefly state the facts insofar as necessary for understanding how the question of validity of the notification dated February 24, 1962 and the West Khandesh Mehwassi Estate (Proprietary Rights Abolition etc.) Regulation, 1961 arose for consideration before the Court.

2. There were at all material times six estates of Tribal Chiefs called Mehwassi estates in West Khandesh District. These Mehwassi estates were “scheduled area” under Article 244 read with the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution and were “partially excluded area” under Section 91 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and the first respondent was the owner of one such estate called Kathi Estate which comprised 99 villages in the State of Maharashtra. The Governor of Bombay, in exercise of the power conferred by sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 92 of the Government of India Act, 1935, made a Regulation called the West Khandesh Mehwassi Estates Regulation, 1949 which applied to the Mehwassi Estates including the Kathi Estate belonging to the first respondent. The Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 was made applicable to the Mehwassi Estates subject to certain modifications by Section 3 of this Regulation and the effect of Section 4 was to make applicable to the Mehwassi Estates all other Acts passed by the Central or the State legislature which were in force in other parts of West Khandesh District, which included inter alia the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the Tenancy Act”). The result of the application of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 to the Mehwassi Estates was that the first respondent, who was the holder of the Kathi Estate, became an occupant of the agricultural lands forming part of that Estate and the persons who were cultivating these lands under him became his tenants and by reason of the applicability of the Tenancy Act, 1948, that Act governed the relationship between the first respondent and the tenants. The Tenancy Act, 1948 was amended by Bombay Act 13 of 1956 which came into force on August 1, 1956 and in exercise of the power conferred under Section 32-H(2), the Government of Bombay issued an order on March 31, 1957 fixing the maximum purchase price payable by ordinary i.e non-permanent tenants for the deemed purchase of the lands cultivated by them inter alia in the villages forming part of the Mehwassi Estates. The combined effect of Sections 32 to 32-R of the Tenancy Act and the order dated March 31, 1957 was that the tenants of the first respondent became the deemed purchasers of the lands held by them on April 1, 1957 and the first respondent ceased to be the owner and became entitled to receive from his permanent tenants a purchase price equal to six times the rent of the lands and from his ordinary tenants, a purchase price between twenty to eighty times the assessment.

3. Thereafter on February 24, 1962 the Governor of Maharashtra issued a notification under sub-para (1) of para 5 to the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution and by this notification, the Governor was pleased to direct that Bombay Act 13 of 1956, which amended the Tenancy Act, 1948, shall apply to Mehwassi Estates, and also added Section 88-D in the Tenancy Act, 1948 which provided that, save as otherwise provided in any other enactment for the time being in force, nothing in Sections 32 to 32-R shall apply to any Mehwassi land and these directions were given retrospective effect from August 1, 1956. The effect of this notification was to restore the relationship which existed between the first respondent and his tenants immediately prior to April 1, 1957, so that the tenants did not become deemed purchasers of the lands held by them and the first respondent did not cease to be the owner of such lands. The Governor of Bombay issued on the same day i.e February 24, 1962, the West Khandesh Mehwassi Estate (Proprietary Rights Abolition etc.) Regulation, 1961 in exercise of the power conferred under sub-para (2) of para 5 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution after obtaining assent of the President. This Regulation conferred occupancy rights on inferior holders and tenants and abolished the proprietary rights of the holders of the Mehwassi Estates. The result was that the tenants of the first respondent became occupants of the lands held by them and the first respondent was deprived of all his rights and he ceased to be entitled to receive anything from his inferior holders, the purchase price receivable by him from his permanent tenants was reduced from six times the rent to three times the assessment and from his other tenants, he became entitled to receive only purchase price at six times the assessment instead of twenty to eighty times the assessment. The first respondent was seriously affected by the notification dated February 24, 1962 and the West Khandesh Mehwassi Estate (Proprietary Rights Abolition etc.) Regulation, 1961 and he, therefore, filed a petition in the High Court challenging the constitutional validity of these two legislative measures. The High Court, as we have already pointed out, struck down these two pieces of legislation on the ground that they violated the fundamental right of the first respondent under Article 19(1)(f) and they were not protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution. This view taken by the High Court is assailed in the present appeal filed by the State after obtaining certificate from the High Court.

4. Now, it appears that subsequent to the judgment of the High Court and whilst the appeal was pending in this Court, the Ninth Schedule was amended by the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976 by the inclusion of the West Khandesh Mehwassi Estate (Proprietary Rights Abolition etc.) Regulation, 1961. The effect of the inclusion was that the West Khandesh Mehwassi Estate (Proprietary Rights Abolition etc.) Regulation, 1961 was immunised from challenge on the ground that it was inconsistent with or took away or abridged any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and hence its constitutional validity could no longer be assailed on the ground that it violated Article 19(1)(f). Article 31-B and the Ninth Schedule cured the defect, if any, in the West Khandesh Mehwassi Estate (Proprietary Rights Abolition etc.) Regulation, 1961 as regards any unconstitutionality alleged on the ground of infringement of fundamental rights and by the express words of Article 31-B, such curing of the defect took place with retrospective operation from the date on which this Regulation was enacted by the Governor. This Regulation, even if inoperative or void at the time when it was issued by the Governor on account of infringement of Article 19(1)(f)of the Constitution, assumed full force and vigour from the date of its enactment by reason of its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule, (vide Jagannath v. Authorised Officer, Land Reforms (1972) 1 SCR 1055, (1971) 2 SCC 893) and it must accordingly be held to be constitutionally valid. Now, it was not disputed on behalf of the first respondent that if the West Khandesh Mehwassi Estate (Proprietary Rights Abolition etc.) Regulation, 1961 is free from any constitutional blemish, the notification dated February 24, 1962 cannot, standing by itself, be successfully assailed as invalid, for, far from taking away any rights of the first respondent, it restored his original rights as occupant. It was a legislative measure to his advantage and not to his detriment. The challenge to the constitutional validity of the notification dated February 24, 1962 must also, therefore, be rejected.

5. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and declare the notification dated February 24, 1962 and the West Khandesh Mehwassi Estate (Proprietary Rights Abolition etc.) Regulation, 1961 to be constitutionally valid. There will be no order as to costs.

6. We are told by learned Counsel appearing on behalf of first respondent that the lands forming part of his estate have been included in his assessment of wealth tax and also the income has been assessed to income tax. We do not know how far this is true. But, in case it is so, the Central Government may sympathetically consider whether any such tax recovered from the first respondent from and after the date of coming into force of the West Khandesh Mehwassi Estate (Proprietary Rights Abolition etc.) Regulation, 1961 may in all fairness be refunded to him.