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Union Of India v. Prem Kumar Jain And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Apr 28, 1976
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals, brought before the Supreme Court of India by certificate, challenged a judgment of the Delhi High Court dated 25 September 1969. In the impugned judgment, the High Court had allowed Civil Writ Petition No. 405 of 1968 and connected petitions Nos. 478-487 of 1968, thereby:

  • Quashing Central Government notifications GSR 42-49, published on 13 January 1968, which created a joint cadre of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) for all Union Territories and implemented consequential amendments to the Service rules.
  • Invalidating the scheme that extended the pre-existing Delhi-Himachal IAS cadre to all Union Territories and absorbed officers from the Indian Frontier Administrative Service and other Union Territory services.
  • Holding that the very formation of the Delhi-Himachal Pradesh IAS cadre was ultra vires the Constitution.

The Union of India appealed, contending that the High Court’s reasoning rested on an erroneous view of constitutional provisions governing adaptation of laws and the definition of “State.”

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Union Territory is a “State” for purposes of Article 312 of the Constitution and Section 3 of the All India Services Act, 1951, in the context of creating and regulating an All India Service cadre.
  2. Whether the Central Government’s creation of a joint IAS cadre for Union Territories, and its recruitment thereto under Rule 4(5) of the Indian Administrative Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954, contravened Article 312, the All India Services Act, 1951, or the IAS Cadre and Recruitment Rules.
  3. Whether the Presidential Adaptation of Laws (No. 1) Order, 1956—issued under Article 372-A—validly amended Section 3(58) of the General Clauses Act so that “State” includes “Union Territory” for constitutional interpretation.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners before the High Court (Respondents in Supreme Court)

  • The joint IAS cadre was unconstitutional because Article 312 contemplates a service “common to the Union and the States,” and Union Territories are not “States.”
  • Consequently, recruitment to that cadre violated Section 3 of the All India Services Act and the IAS Cadre Rules, which require consultation with State Governments—impossible where Union Territories are concerned.

Union of India (Appellant)

The opinion does not contain a detailed, separate exposition of the Union of India’s submissions; its stance is reflected primarily through the Court’s reasoning in support of the impugned notifications.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Management of Advance Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shri Gurudasmal
(1970) 1 SCC 633; (1970) 3 SCR 881
Article 372-A confers a fresh power on the President to adapt laws, equal and analogous to the earlier power under Article 372(2). Relied upon to hold that the Adaptation of Laws (No. 1) Order, 1956, validly amended the definition of “State” in the General Clauses Act, such that a Union Territory is included within that term.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court characterised the appeal as turning on “a short point of law” and proceeded through the following analytical steps:

  1. Article 312(2) Deeming Provision. The IAS already exists by constitutional fiat; Parliament need not recreate it under Article 312(1). Therefore, the focus shifts to whether statutory rules regulating an existing All India Service are valid.
  2. Scope of Presidential Adaptation Power. While Article 372(2) granted a three-year power (now spent) to adapt laws, Article 372-A—inserted by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956—conferred an analogous, fresh power on the President specifically to reconcile existing laws with the amended Constitution.
  3. Effect of the 1956 Adaptation Order. Pursuant to Article 372-A, the President issued the Adaptation of Laws (No. 1) Order, 1956, substituting Section 3(58) of the General Clauses Act so that “State” includes “Union Territory.” Because Article 367(1) makes the General Clauses Act applicable to constitutional interpretation, this adaptation is binding and “cannot be questioned in any court of law.”
  4. Rebuttal of High Court View. The High Court had treated the 1956 adaptation as inapplicable, reasoning that only adaptations under Article 372(2) could be used to construe the Constitution. The Supreme Court rejected this, emphasising Parliament’s deliberate insertion of Article 372-A to maintain constitutional workability after the Seventh Amendment.
  5. Validity of Cadre Creation and Recruitment. Once Union Territories are deemed “States” for Article 312 purposes, the joint IAS cadre is indeed “common to the Union and the States.” The Cadre and Recruitment Rules—made after consultation in accordance with Section 3(1) of the All India Services Act—are therefore intra vires. The High Court’s additional finding of contravention of Section 3 and Rule 5 regarding direct appointments lacked any foundation in the pleadings and was not properly examined.

Holding and Implications

Appeals ALLOWED; High Court judgment set aside; all writ petitions dismissed; no order as to costs.

Immediate Effect: The Central Government notifications (GSR 42-49) and the scheme establishing a joint IAS cadre for Union Territories stand validated, together with the earlier Delhi-Himachal Pradesh cadre.

Broader Implications: The decision authoritatively confirms that, for constitutional and All India Services purposes, the term “State” includes “Union Territory” by virtue of the 1956 adaptation under Article 372-A. While the ruling primarily resolves the cadre controversy, it also clarifies the continued vitality of the President’s adaptation orders in interpreting the Constitution.

Show all summary ...

P.N Shinghal, J.— These appeals by certificate are directed against the judgment of the Delhi High Court dated September 25, 1969, allowing Civil Writ Petition No. 405 of 1968 and connected petitions Nos. 478 to 487 of 1968. The High Court has quashed the orders of the Central Government notified in GSR 42 to 49, published in Gazette of India, Extraordinary, dated January 13, 1968, as well as the scheme for the formation of a joint cadre of the Indian Administrative Service, hereinafter referred to as the Service, for the Union territories, and has held that the formation of the Delhi-Himachal cadre of the service was also ultra vires the Constitution. As we shall show, the decision has turned on a short point of law, and it will be enough to refer to those facts which bear on it.

2. A new cadre of the service was constituted for the Union territories of Delhi and Himachal Pradesh, and recruitment to that cadre was made directly, without complying with the requirement of Rule 4(1) of the Indian Administrative Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954, hereinafter referred to as the Recruitment. Rules, which prescribed the normal method of recruitment to the service. The Rules were amended on December 21, 1967, by providing for a joint cadre in relation to the Union territories and the North East Frontier Agency, and the Central Government formulated the aforesaid scheme to extend the Delhi-Himachal Pradesh cadre to all Union territories by absorbing the oflicers of that cadre and by appointing to it officers of the Indian Frontier Administrative Service and all other Union territories at its initial constitution. The joint cadre for all the Union territories was brought into existence from January 1, 1968, by GSR 42 under Rule 3(1) of the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, hereinafter referred to as the Cadre Rules, published (along with certain consequential changes in the other Rules of the service) in Gazette of India, Extraordinary, dated January 13, 1968. The petitioners in the. High Court challenged the creation of the new joint cadre for all the Union territories, and the appointment of some of the respondents thereto. It was urged in the High Court that the constitution of the new joint cadre was illegal as it was contrary to the provisions of Article 312 of the Constitution and the All India Services Act, 1951, as it was not common to the Union and the State inasmuch as a Union territory was not a State, and the recruitment of the respondents concerned to the joint cadre was contrary to the provisions of Section 3 of the All India Services Act, 1951, and the Cadre Rules.

3. The High Court examined the question whether the Union territories were States, and reached the conclusion that this was not so. It therefore held that Rule 4(5) of the Recruitment Rules was ultra vires the Constitution and the All India Services Act, for the cadre in question could not be said to be common to the Union and the States. The High Court also observed that as the Central Government was itself the State Government for purposes of a Union territory, the Central Government could not consult itself within the meaning of Section 3 of the All India Services Act and the Recruitment and the Cadre Rules. It therefore quashed the orders and the scheme mentioned above.

4. It appears, however, that it was not brought to the notice of the High Court that, insofar as the service was concerned, it was not necessary for Parliament to make a law providing for its creation as a service common to the Union and the States, under clause (1) of Article 312 of the Constitution, because clause (2) of that article expressly provided as follows:

“312. (2) The services known at the commencement of this Constitution as the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service shall be deemed to be services created by Parliament under this article.”
The service did not therefore have to be created under the provisions of clause (1) of Article 312 of the Constitution or Section 2-A of the All India Services Act. Section 3(1) of that Act however made provision for the making of Rules for the regulation of recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to an All India Service “after consultation with the Governments of the States concerned”. It was under that provision that the Cadre Rules were made by the Central Government, and the question which engaged the attention of the High Court was whether the Union territories could be said to be States for purposes of such consultation. In that connection the High Court examined the question whether the Union territories could be said to be States merely because Rule 2(c) of the Cadre Rules defined a “State” to mean a State specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution and including a Union territory, and answered it in the negative.

5. The expression “State” has not been defined in the Constitution, but it has been defined as follows in Section 3(58) of the General clauses Act (Act 10 of 1897):

“ ‘State’—
(a) as respects any period before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, shall mean a Part A State, a Part B State or a Part C State; and
(b) as respects any period after such commencement, shall mean a State specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution and shall include a Union Territory.
This was however not the original definition, for it was substituted by the Adaptation of Laws (No. 1) Order, 1956. Before that order, the expression “State” meant “a Part A State, a Part B State or a Part C State”. That definition was, in its turn, brought in by adaptation under Article 372 of the Constitution by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, for the purpose of bringing the provisions of any law in force in the territory of India in accord with the provisions of the Constitution. The original definition has thus been adapted twice to suit the requirements of the Constitution.

6. Clause (1) of Article 367, which deals with “interpretation” of the Constitution, provides as follows:

“367. (1) Unless the context otherwise requires, the General clauses Act, 1897, shall, subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made therein under Article 372 apply for the interpretation of this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the legislature of the Dominion of India.”
A cross-reference to Article 372(2) shows that while the purpose of the adaptation was to bring the provisions of any law in force in the country “into accord with” the provisions of the Constitution, clause (3) thereof expressly stated, inter alia, as follows:
(3) Nothing in clause (2) shall be deemed —
(a) to empower the President to make any adaptation or modification of any law after the expiration of three years from the commencement of this Constitution.
The power of adaptation or modification was therefore spent after the expiry of three years, and the High Court has taken the view that as it were only the adaptations made in the General clauses Act under Article 372(2) which applied to the interpretation of the Constitution in view of Article 367(1), the adaptations made later, by Article 372-A, were not so applicable.

7. A comparison of the provisions of Articles 372 and 372-A shows, however, that while the purpose of both the articles was to bring the provisions of any law in force in India “into accord” with the provisions of the Constitution, Article 372 was a general provision enabling the making of adaptations and modifications in such laws by an order of the President, whereas Article 372-A was a special provision which was made specifically for purposes of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, inasmuch as clause (1) thereof provided as follows:

“372-A. (1) For the purposes of bringing the provisions of any law in force in India or in any part thereof, immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, into accord with the provisions of this Constitution as amended by that Act, the President may by order made before the 1st day of November, 1957, make such adaptations and modifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and provide that the law shall, as from such date as may be specified in the order, have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made, and any such adaptation or modification shall not be questioned in any court of law”.

(emphasis added)

It is obvious therefore that as the power of the President to make any adaptation or modification of any law under clause (2) of Article 372 was spent after three years, Parliament felt the necessity of giving such a power to the President once again for the purpose of bringing the provisions of any law in force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, into accord with the provisions of the Constitution as amended by that Act. That was therefore a necessary power as it was meant to make the amended Constitution workable. For instance, Section 3(58) of the General clauses Act, 1897, as it stood before the coming into force of the Seventh Amendment Act, defined a “State” to mean “a Part A State, a Part B State or a Part C State”. As has been stated, that definition had itself been substituted by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, to make it workable and it served the purpose, for the country had those three types of States at that time. But an important change was made by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, which abolished the distinction of Part A, Part B and Part C States and provided, inter alia, that the territory of the country shall comprise the territories of the States and the Union territories specified in the First Schedule. The definition of the expression “State” as it stood before November 1, 1956, became unsuitable and misleading on the coming into force of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, from November 1, 1956, and it will, for obvious reasons, be futile to contend that it should have continued to be applicable for all time to come and remained “the final definition of ‘State’” merely because the period of three years provided by clause (3)(a) of Article 372 of the Constitution expired and was not extended by an amendment of that clause, or because Article 367(1) was not amended by the Seventh Amendment Act “to say that adaptations made in the General clauses Act otherwise than those made under Article 372(2) would be applicable to the interpretation of the Constitution”. The High Court also erred in thinking that such “abstention seems to be deliberate”. On the other hand, it is quite clear from the fact that Parliament inserted Article 372-A by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, that it was aware that the power of adaptation under Article 372(2) had come to an end, and was alive to the necessity of giving a similar power of adapting the laws once again to the President for the purposes of bringing the provisions of any law in force in the country immediately before the commencement of that Act “into accord” with the provisions of the Constitution. It is therefore futile to contend that the definition of the expression “State' which was applicable up to November 1, 1956, remained the final definition for all time to come. That view is incorrect, for it overlooks or ignores the anxiety of the Parliament to remove any such misapprehension by inserting Article 372-A. It was a special provision, and it was meant to serve the purpose of making the Seventh Amendment Act workable. As has been held by this Court in Management of Advance Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shri Gurudasmal (1970) 1 SCC 633, (1970) 3 SCR 881, Article 372-A gave a fresh power to the President which was equal and analogous to the power under Article 372(2).

8. It follows therefore that, as and from November 1, 1956, when the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, came into force, the President had the power to adapt the laws for the purpose of bringing the provisions of any law in force in India into accord with the provisions of the Constitution. It was under that power that the President issued the Adaptation of Laws (No. 1) Order, 1956, which, as has been shown, substituted a new clause (58) in Section 3 of the General clauses Act providing, inter alia, that the expression “State” shall, as respects any period after the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, mean “a State specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution and shall include a Union Territory”. It cannot be said with any justification that there was anything repugnant in the subject or context to make that definition inapplicable. By virtue of Article 372A(1) of the Constitution, it was that definition of the expression “State” which had effect from the first day of November, 1956, and the Constitution expressly provided that it could “not be questioned in any court of law”. The High Court therefore went wrong in taking a contrary view and in holding that “Union territories are not ‘States’ for purposes of Article 312(1) of the Constitution and the preamble to the Act of 1951”. That was why the High Court erred in holding that the definition of “State” in the Cadre Rules was ultra vires the All India Services Act, 1951 and the Constitution, and that the Union territories cadre of the service was “not common to the Union and the States” within the meaning of Article 312(1) of the Constitution, and that the Central Government could not make the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954 in consultation with the State Governments as there were no such governments in the Union territories.

9. The High Court has held further that Section 3 of the All India Services Act, 1951 and Rule 5 of the Cadre Rules have been contravened by the “direct appointment of Respondents 2 to 37 to the Union Territories Cadre and by their being not recruited first to the I.A.S”. But no such ground appears to have been taken in the writ petition. Moreover, the validity of Rule 4(5) of the Recruitment Rules, which contained a non-obstante clause providing for recruitment to the joint cadre of the Union territories on its initial constitution by such method as the Central Government may prescribe, after consultation with the Union Public Service Commission, was not examined by the High Court.

10. For the reasons mentioned above, the appeals are allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court dated September 25, 1969 is set aside and the writ petitions are dismissed. There will however be no orders as to the costs.