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Mayongbam Radhamohan Singh v. Chief Commissioner (Administrator), Manipur And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Nov 1, 1976
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, born on 1 January 1911, entered the service of the erstwhile State of Manipur as a junior clerk in 1935 and ultimately became a permanent Puisne Judge of the Manipur State Chief Court on 5 October 1949. After the Government of India assumed administration of Manipur, he was appointed Subordinate Judge on 25 January 1950 (temporary) and, pursuant to the Manipur Courts Act, 1955, confirmed as Judge of the newly-established Subordinate Court on 1 March 1956. Because of adverse service reports, he was later reverted to the post of Subordinate Judge.

By notice dated 30 June 1966, issued under Government of India Decision No. 23 below Fundamental Rule 56, the appellant was required to retire with effect from 1 October 1966 after attaining the age of 55. His representation for retention in service was rejected. He thereupon filed a writ petition challenging the order. The Judicial Commissioner for Manipur dismissed that petition on 26 October 1968. The present appeal was filed before the Supreme Court by certificate against that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appointing authority possessed legal power under Fundamental Rule 56 (as amended) to compulsorily retire the appellant on three months’ notice after he had attained 55 years of age.
  2. Whether the use of an obsolete Government of India Decision No. 23, rather than the amended F.R. 56(j), rendered the retirement order void.
  3. Whether compulsory retirement in the circumstances amounted to “removal” attracting the protections of Article 311 of the Constitution.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The impugned order was null and void because F.R. 56 at the material time contained no reservation empowering the authority to retire him without reasons; Decision No. 23 had already been superseded.
  • Decision No. 23 was a mere executive instruction, not a rule framed under Article 309; therefore reliance on it could not justify compulsory retirement.
  • Compulsory retirement without reasons was, in substance, a “removal” within Article 311, thus attracting constitutional safeguards.
  • No indication existed that the authority formed the requisite opinion that retirement was in the public interest.

Respondent's (Government) Arguments

  • Under the President’s order dated 30 November 1962 and the Fundamental (Sixth Amendment) Rules, 1965—specifically F.R. 56(j)—the Chief Commissioner had an absolute right to retire an employee after 55 years of age if of the opinion that it was in the public interest.
  • The order was, in fact, made in public interest; absence of that recital in the notice did not invalidate the action.
  • So long as a valid source of power exists, an incorrect reference to an earlier instrument does not vitiate the exercise of power.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tara Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1975) 4 SCC 86 Compulsory retirement does not constitute punishment and carries no stigma. Relied upon to reject the appellant’s contention that retirement amounted to “removal” under Article 311.
L. Hazari Mal Kuthiala v. ITO, AIR 1961 SC 200;
Hukamchand Mills Ltd. v. State of M.P., AIR 1964 SC 1329
If a valid power exists, exercise under a mis-cited or non-existent provision is still valid. Supported the finding that the order remained valid even though it referred to superseded Decision No. 23.
R.L. Butail v. Union of India (1970) 2 SCC 876 Scope of F.R. 56(j) and conditions under which compulsory retirement may be ordered in public interest. Used to evaluate whether the authority properly applied its mind to the question of public interest.
Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha (1970) 1 SCC 458 Court’s limited role in reviewing bona fide exercise of power to retire an employee under F.R. 56(j). Cited for the proposition that the court should not test the correctness of the authority’s opinion once formed bona fide.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court began by reiterating that compulsory retirement is not a punitive measure and therefore does not attract Article 311 protections. It observed that both the superseded Decision No. 23 and the amended F.R. 56(j) deal identically with retirement after 55 years on three months’ notice, without the necessity of assigning reasons.

Invoking the principles in Hazari Mal and Hukamchand Mills, the Court held that a valid exercise of power is not invalidated merely because it is purported to derive from an incorrect or obsolete source, provided a lawful source—here, F.R. 56(j)—exists.

Affidavit evidence established that the Chief Commissioner formed the opinion that the appellant’s retirement was in the public interest. Following Col. J.N. Sinha, the Court declined to scrutinise the correctness of that opinion, limiting itself to verifying the bona fides of the decision. No material suggested mala fides or lack of application of mind.

Consequently, the Court found no merit in the appellant’s argument that absence of an express recital of “public interest” in the order was fatal; substantive evidence of such intent sufficed. Similarly, reliance on the superseded Decision No. 23 did not invalidate the order because the same power existed under F.R. 56(j).

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed. The order of compulsory retirement stands; no costs were awarded.

Implications: The judgment affirms that an authority’s bona fide decision to compulsorily retire a government servant under F.R. 56(j) remains valid even if the notice cites an outdated provision, so long as an equivalent, extant rule confers the power. The decision affects only the parties and re-emphasises existing principles rather than creating new precedent.

Show all summary ...

A.N Ray, C.J— This appeal is by certificate from the judgment dated October 26, 1968 of the Judicial Commissioner for Manipur.

2. The appellant by a writ petition challenged the order of Respondent 1 by which the appellant was compulsorily retired.

3. The Judicial Commissioner dismissed the writ petition of the appellant.

4. The appellant was born on January 1, 1911. He joined the erstwhile State of Manipur as a junior clerk in 1935. Though he was not a law graduate, he rose to become a permanent Puisne Judge in Manipur State Chief Court with effect from October 5, 1949. After the Government of India took over the administration of Manipur the appellant was appointed as a Subordinate Judge with effect from January 25, 1950 on a temporary basis. On the enactment of Manipur Courts Act, 1955 the court of Subordinate Judge was established on March 1, 1956. The appellant was appointed as the judge of that Subordinate Court from that date.

5. The appellant did not earn good reports from superior officers. He was reverted to the post of Subordinate Judge.

6. The appellant was served with a notice dated June 30, 1966 that he was required to retire from government service with effect from October 1, 1966 in pursuance of the directions of the President in para 6 of the Government of India Decision No. 23 noted below Fundamental Rule 56.

7. The above Decision No. 23 was contained in the memorandum of the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs dated November 30, 1962. The decision came into force on December 1, 1962. Under para 6 of the decision the appointing authority was empowered to require a government servant to retire after he had attained the age of 55 years on three months' notice without assigning any reason. This provision was really intended to retire an officer who had completed 30 years' qualifying service. The purpose of the provision was to weed out unsuitable employees after they attained the age of 55 years.

8. The Government Decision No. 23 below Fundamental Rule 56 which came into force on December 1, 1962 as aforesaid was substituted by new rule on July 21, 1965. The new rule provided that if the appropriate authority is of opinion that it is in public interest to do so, he has the absolute right to retire any government servant after he attained the age of 55 years with notice of not less than three months.

9. The appellant on receiving the notice for retirement prayed for his being retained in service after the age of 55 years in public interest. The representation of the appellant was rejected. It is in this background that the appellant filed the writ petition.

10. The principal contention of the appellant was that the impugned order of compulsory retirement was null and void ab initio because the Fundamental Rule 56 at the material time contained no reservation or any power in the appointing authority to retire him without any reason on three months' notice after the age of 55 years. Emphasis was placed by counsel on the fact that the impugned order was made expressly under the authority of Government of India Decision No. 23 below Fundamental Rule 56 and this decision was not subsisting at the time of the impugned notice. It was also contended that the government decision was not incorporated in Fundamental Rule 56 and therefore it amounted to a mere executive instruction and not a rule within the meaning of Article 309. The appellant also contended that in substance the compulsory retirement was removal under Article 311.

11. Compulsory retirement is not a punishment. There is no stigma in compulsory retirement. See Tara Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1975) 4 SCC 86, (1975) 3 SCR 1002.

12. It is also the view of this Court that if power can be traced to a valid power the fact that the power is purported to have been exercised under non-existing power does not invalidate the exercise of the power. See L. Hazari Mal Kuthiala v. Income Tax Officer, Special Circle, Ambala Cantt AIR 1961 SC 200, (1961) 1 SCR 892 and Hukamchand Mills Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1964 SC 1329, (1964) 6 SCR 857.

13. The government case is that the Chief Commissioner by reason of the order of the President contained in Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs Memorandum No. 33/18/62-ESTS(A) dated November 30, 1962, followed by Fundamental (Sixth Amendment) Rules, 1965, had the power to retire the government servant without assigning any reason if he was of opinion that it was in the public interest to do so.

14. The relevant Fundamental Rule 56(j) is as follows:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Rule, the appropriate authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so, have the absolute right to retire any Government servant after he has attained the age of 55 years by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing.”

15. The affidavit evidence is that the order of compulsory retirement was made in public interest. The absence of recital in the order of compulsory retirement that it is made in public interest is not fatal as long as power to make compulsory retirement in public interest is there and the power in fact is shown in the facts and circumstances of the case to have been exercised in public interest.

16. In R.L Butail v. Union of India (1970) 2 SCC 876, (1971) 2 SCR 55 this Court considered Fundamental Rule 56(j) and the circumstances under which compulsory retirement can be made in public interest. It is true that in Butail case, the notice in terms of Fundamental Rule 56(j) was served, namely that the order of compulsory retirement was made in public interest.

17. A comparison between Paragraph 6 of Decision No. 23 below Fundamental Rule 56 and Fundamental Rule 56(j) of amended F.R 56 shows that the two deal with the identical matter of compulsory retirement. The common features are that the government servant may be asked to retire after the age of 55 years. Second, such retirement is ordered to be made by giving the government servant a notice of three months. Third, the power to retire is an absolute right without assigning any reason. Fourth, under the amended Fundamental Rule 56(j) the power is exercised only if the appropriate authority is of opinion that it is in public interest to do so.

18. The government affidavit is that the Chief Commissioner made the order because he was of opinion that it was in public interest to do so. Whether the order is correct or not is not to be gone into by the court. See Union of India v. Col. J.N Sinha (1970) 1 SCC 458, (1971) 1 SCR 791.

19. In the present case, counsel for the appellant contended that it did not appear in the order that there was any application of mind that the order was being made in public interest. In Butail case it was said that the plea that the appropriate authority had not applied its mind failed there in view of the clear averments made in that regard in the affidavit and no reason was adequately shown to discard those statements as untrue or otherwise unbelievable. In the present case, the affidavit evidence establishes that the Commissioner exercised his powers because he was of the opinion that it was in public interest to make the order of compulsory retirement. The order in the present case is made bona fide and nothing is in the record to show that the affidavit is unbelievable.

20. For the foregoing reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.