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Mani Subrat Jain And Others v. State Of Haryana And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The Punjab and Haryana High Court issued an advertisement (19 February 1972) inviting applications from eligible members of the Bar to fill two vacancies in the quota for direct recruits to the Haryana Superior Judicial Service. After interviewing nine candidates on 18 October 1972, the High Court recommended the appellants’ names to the State Government for appointment as District/Additional District & Sessions Judges. Twenty-seven months later the Government rejected the recommendation, citing, inter alia, that the High Court had not sought prior governmental approval before advertising the posts. The appellants filed writ petitions seeking (i) a mandamus compelling the State (Respondent 1) and Chief Minister (Respondent 2) to appoint them, and (ii) quashing of the rejection orders. The High Court dismissed the petitions for want of locus standi. The present appeals to the Supreme Court were filed by special leave.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellants possessed a legally enforceable right to appointment that could sustain a writ of mandamus under Article 226.
- Whether, under Article 233 of the Constitution, the Governor is bound to accept recommendations of the High Court for appointment of District Judges, or alternatively obliged to give reasons for non-acceptance.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The constitutional scheme in Article 233 requires the Governor to accept recommendations of the High Court for appointment of District Judges.
- In the alternative, if the Governor rejects the recommendation, reasons must be furnished to the High Court and to the affected candidates.
- Reliance was placed on Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court; and A. Panduranga Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha (1974) 3 SCC 220 | Requirement of a judicially enforceable right to seek mandamus; locus standi principles. | Quoted to affirm that absence of a legal right bars issuance of mandamus. |
| Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed (1976) 1 SCC 671 | Concept of “aggrieved person” and standing in writ jurisdiction. | Used to reinforce that appellants, lacking a legal right to appointment, have no standing. |
| Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1966 SC 1987 | Interpretation of Article 233 and the consultative role of the High Court. | Cited to show that consultation does not bind the Governor to accept the High Court’s advice. |
| Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court (1969) 3 SCC 36 | Scope of Governor’s discretion under Article 233. | Relied upon to confirm that final appointing authority rests with the Governor after consultation. |
| A. Panduranga Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1975) 4 SCC 709 | Observation that Government may communicate reasons for differing from the High Court. | Distinguished as fact-specific; Court held the Constitution does not impose a mandatory duty to record or disclose reasons. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. The Court reiterated the settled law that a writ of mandamus issues only to enforce a legal right (Halsbury; Subash Chander Marwaha; Jasbhai Motibhai Desai). Because the appellants' names were only recommended—not appointed—they had no vested right to the posts.
2. Article 233 vests the power of initial appointment of District Judges in the Governor, subject to consultation with the High Court. Consultation does not make the High Court’s recommendation binding; the Governor retains discretion to accept or reject the names (Chandra Mohan; Chandramouleshwar Prasad).
3. The observation in Panduranga Rao that Government may state reasons for non-acceptance was deemed contextual and not laying down a universal obligation.
4. The Government’s objection—namely that the High Court advertised the posts without prior governmental concurrence—constituted a sufficient basis for refusal. Once the High Court agreed to invite fresh applications, it implicitly accepted the rejection of its earlier recommendations. Therefore, no enforceable right remained in favour of the appellants.
5. The Supreme Court also disapproved the High Court's subsequent stance of advocating for the appellants’ “candidature,” emphasising that a constitutional court should not assume a partisan role.
Holding and Implications
Appeals Dismissed. No order as to costs.
Immediate Effect: The appellants are not entitled to appointment as Additional District & Sessions Judges, and the State’s rejection of the High Court’s earlier recommendation stands affirmed.
Broader Implications: The judgment reinforces that (i) consultation under Article 233 does not fetter the Governor’s discretion, and (ii) candidates recommended by a High Court acquire no enforceable right to appointment absent formal acceptance. No new precedent was created; the Court applied existing constitutional principles on locus standi and the appointment process for District Judges.
A.N Ray, C.J— These appeals are by special leave against the judgment dated March 25, 1975 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the writ petitions.
2. The appellants in the writ petitions asked for a mandamus directing Respondents 1 and 2 to appoint the appellants to the posts of Additional District and Sessions Judges. The appellants also asked for a mandamus or an appropriate writ quashing the orders of Respondents 1 and 2 whereby the High Court was informed that the Government was not prepared to appoint the appellants to the posts of Additional District and Sessions Judges.
3. Respondent 1 is the State of Haryana. Respondent 2 is the Chief Minister of Haryana. Respondent 3 is the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
4. The High Court dismissed the petitions on the ground that the appellants had no locus standi to file the petitions. The reason given by the High Court is that the appellants were not appointed and they had no right to be appointed. They had also no right to know why they were not appointed.
5. The High Court by letter dated February 19, 1972 invited applications from eligible members of the Bar to fill up two vacancies in the quota of direct recruits from the Bar in the Haryana Superior Judicial Service. The High Court called for interview 9 candidates on October 18, 1972.
6. The High Court thereafter recommended to the Haryana Government the names of the appellants for appointment as District/Additional District and Sessions Judges.
7. After 27 months the Government rejected the recommendation of the High Court. Thereupon the appellants filed writ petitions challenging the order of rejection and asked for mandamus for appointment.
8. There is a letter dated September 8, 1972 from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Haryana to the Registrar of the High Court. In that letter the Government took exception to the inviting of applications from members of the Bar without the High Court having first obtained the approval of the Government for that purpose. The letter also stated that in the past two occasions the High Court obtained the approval of the State Government before inviting applications.
9. The High Court rightly dismissed the petitions. It is elementary though it is to be restated that no one can ask for a mandamus without a legal right. There must be a judicially enforceable right as well as a legally protected right before one suffering a legal grievance can ask for a mandamus. A person can be said to be aggrieved only when a person is denied a legal right by someone who has a legal duty to do something or to abstain from doing something. (See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. I, para 122; State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha (1974) 3 SCC 220, (1974) 1 SCR 165; Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed (1976) 1 SCC 671, (1976) 3 SCR 58 and Ferris : Extraordinary Legal Remedies, para 198.)
10. The initial appointment of District Judges under Article 233 is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Government after consultation with the High Court. The Governor is not bound to act on the advice of the High Court. The High Court recommends the names of persons for appointment. If the names are recommended by the High Court it is not obligatory on the Governor to accept the recommendation.
11. Counsel for the appellants relied on the decisions of this Court in Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1966 SC 1987, (1967) 1 SCR 77, (1967) 1 LLJ 412; Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court (1969) 3 SCC 36, (1970) 2 SCR 666 and A. Panduranga Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1975) 4 SCC 709, (1976) 1 SCR 620 in support of two contentions. First, the Governor should accept the recommendations made by the High Court. Second, if the Governor will not accept the recommendations, he should give reasons for not accepting the recommendations. None of the decisions supports the contention.
12. In these three cases the scope and content of Article 233 was examined. This Court has held that the Constitution contemplates consultation of the Governor with the High Court inasmuch as the High Court is in a position to express views on the judicial work of persons who are recommended for appointment to the posts of District Judges. The High Court knows the merits and demerits of persons who will be promoted from the service to the post. The High Court interviews persons who will be appointed by direct recruitment. The High Court in those circumstances will select candidates for promotion and direct recruitment and send their names to the Government.
13. This Court has also held that the consultation of the Governor with the High Court does not mean that the Governor must accept whatever advice or recommendation is given by the High Court. Article 233 requires that the Governor should obtain from the High Court its views on the merits and demerits of persons selected for promotion and direct recruitment.
14. In regard to persons who are appointed by promotion or direct recruitment this Court has held that it is not open to the Government to choose a candidate for appointment by direct recruitment or by promotion unless and until his name is recommended by the High Court.
15. In Panduranga Rao case there is an observation that the Government could tell the High Court its reasons for not accepting the recommendations of the High Court in regard to certain persons. The observation in Panduranga Rao case was made in the facts and circumstances of that case and in particular the controversial correspondence.
16. In the present case the Government pointed out that the High Court had not written to the Government about the proposed appointments before issuing advertisements therefor. In any event, after the Government communicated to the High Court that the recommendations were not accepted, a new situation developed. The Government asked the High Court to issue advertisements and to invite applications for appointment to the posts. The High Court accepted that position and acted upon it. The High Court issued the advertisements.
17. The attitude of the High Court has been peculiar. When the High Court decided to ask for fresh applications the High Court also accepted the position that the original recommendations which had been made by the High Court were not accepted by the State Government and yet the High Court supported before this Court the appellants' case by pleading for the “candidature” of the appellants. The High Court should not take a partisan view by supporting the candidature of any person. We were a little surprised that the High Court supported the appellants. This is not proper particularly when the High Court dismissed the writ petitions of the appellants.
18. For the foregoing reasons the appeals are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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