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Sulleh Singh And Others v. Sohan Lal And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The vendors sold agricultural land to the present appellants (vendees) for ₹43,000 on 26 August 1965 by a registered sale deed. The respondents, claiming to be tenants of different portions of that land, instituted a suit for possession by pre-emption, asserting a superior right to purchase and alleging that the true sale price was only ₹30,000. The trial court dismissed the suit for misjoinder because four separate tenants had joined in one action. On first appeal the matter was remanded for retrial.
After remand two plaintiffs withdrew. The trial court then (i) granted respondent-plaintiff Sohan Lal a decree for possession of specified Killas on condition that he deposit ₹6,300 (less 1/5 already deposited) by 1 April 1969, and (ii) granted respondent-plaintiff Nathi a similar conditional decree for another portion upon deposit of ₹5,670 by the same date.
The plaintiffs appealed, seeking broader relief. On 29 July 1969 the Additional District Judge:
- added Killa No. 24 of Rectangle 37 to Sohan Lal’s decree,
- fixed a fresh deposit of ₹9,100 payable by Sohan Lal on or before 20 August 1969, and
- otherwise maintained Nathi’s decree.
The vendees then appealed to the Punjab & Haryana High Court contending, inter alia, that neither plaintiff had deposited the sums required by the trial court within the stipulated time and that Sohan Lal was not a tenant of Killa No. 24. By judgment dated 2 May 1973 the High Court:
- allowed the appeal against Nathi and dismissed his suit, but
- dismissed the appeal against Sohan Lal, reasoning that he needed only to comply with the appellate decree fixing 20 August 1969 as the last date for deposit.
The present appeal to the Supreme Court is by special leave against that High Court decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under Order XX Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure, failure of a pre-emptor to deposit the purchase money within the time fixed by the trial court automatically dismisses the suit, notwithstanding a pending appeal.
- Whether an appellate court possesses jurisdiction to extend the time for such deposit in the absence of any stay of the trial court’s decree.
- Whether respondent-plaintiff Sohan Lal was entitled to pre-empt Killa No. 24 of Rectangle 37.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Neither Sohan Lal nor Nathi deposited the decretal amounts by 1 April 1969 as ordered by the trial court; hence, under Order XX Rule 14, the suit automatically stood dismissed.
- The lower appellate court lacked power to enlarge the time for deposit to 20 August 1969; such extension was without jurisdiction.
- Sohan Lal was not a tenant of Killa No. 24 and therefore had no pre-emption right over that portion.
Respondents' Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Naguba Appa v. Namdev, AIR 1954 SC 50 | Directions in a pre-emption decree under Order XX Rule 14 are mandatory; non-payment within the fixed time dismisses the suit. Pending appeal does not suspend the obligation unless the decree is varied or stayed. | Relied upon to hold that the plaintiffs’ failure to deposit by 1 April 1969 mandated dismissal and that an appellate court cannot extend the period absent a stay of the decree. |
| Dattaraya s/o Keshav Tawalay v. Shaikh Mahboob Shaik Ali, AIR 1970 SC 750; (1969) 2 SCR 514 | In a pre-emption decree, obligations of parties are reciprocal; where a defendant obtains a stay against delivering possession, the plaintiff’s obligation to deposit may correspondingly stand suspended. | Distinguished: no stay had been granted to the plaintiffs in the present case, so the rationale for suspension of deposit did not apply. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court underscored that Order XX Rule 14 makes the trial court’s direction for deposit of the purchase price a mandatory condition precedent to the continuation of a pre-emption suit. Citing Naguba Appa, the Court explained that the mere pendency of an appeal does not alter or suspend that obligation unless:
- the appellate court varies the decree before the time for deposit expires, or
- a stay order relieves the plaintiff of the duty to deposit.
In the present case:
- The lower appellate court granted no stay; thus the plaintiffs remained bound by the trial court’s order to deposit by 1 April 1969.
- The attempt of the Additional District Judge to extend the date to 20 August 1969 was ultra vires, because the suit had already stood dismissed by operation of law once the original time lapsed.
- Consequently, the High Court erred in upholding Sohan Lal’s decree and distinguishing his case from that of Nathi.
Regarding the substantive entitlement to Killa No. 24, the Court found it unnecessary to examine tenant status because the suit itself could not survive the procedural default.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; the pre-emption suit of both plaintiffs (Sohan Lal and Nathi) is dismissed. The appellants are awarded costs.
Implications: The judgment reinforces the strict, mandatory nature of Order XX Rule 14 CPC—non-compliance with the time-bound deposit requirement extinguishes a pre-emptor’s suit, and appellate courts lack jurisdiction to extend time in the absence of a stay. No new legal doctrine is created; the decision consolidates existing precedent and clarifies the limits of appellate discretion in pre-emption matters.
A.N Ray, C.J— This appeal is by special leave from the judgment dated May 2, 1973 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
2. The appellants are vendees of the land in suit. The vendors sold the land to the appellants for Rs 43,000 on August 26, 1965. The transaction was by registered deed of sale.
3. The respondents filed this suit for possession by pre-emption of the land in payment of Rs 30,000 on allegations that the respondents were on the date of sale tenants of the land under the vendors. The respondents alleged that their right of pre-emption was superior to that of the vendees. They also alleged that the sale took place for Rs 30,000 only and the remaining amount was fictitiously mentioned in the deed of sale. The suit was dismissed on the ground that one suit on behalf of the four plaintiffs, who were tenants of different parts of the land, was not maintainable.
4. On appeal the suit was remanded for retrial.
5. At the trial on remand, two plaintiffs withdrew from the suit. The trial court directed the remaining two plaintiff-Respondents Sohan Lal and Nathi to deposit Rs 6300 and Rs 5670 respectively on or before April 1, 1969 less 1/5th of the pre-emption amount already deposited by them. The trial court gave the respondent Sohan Lal a decree for possession by pre-emption in respect of Killa Nos. 14/1, 17 and 18/1 of Rectangle 37. The plaintiff-Respondents aggrieved by the order filed an appeal alleging that the respondent Sohan Lal was a tenant of Killa No. 24 under the vendors and the decree should have been passed in their favour for the whole of the land and that decree should have been passed in favour of Sohan Lal in respect of Killa No. 24 of Rectangle 37. The other ground in the appeal was that the decree should have been passed in favour of the plaintiff-Respondents for whole of the land.
6. The Additional District Judge on July 29, 1969 passed a decree for possession by pre-emption in favour of respondent Sohan Lal on payment of Rs 9,100 and he was directed to deposit this amount in Court on or before August 20, 1969. The Additional District Judge passed a decree for possession by pre-emption in favour of respondent Sohan Lal of Killa No. 24 of Rectangle 37. The decree in favour of respondent Nathi was maintained without change.
7. Thereafter, the appellants preferred an appeal in the High Court alleging that the decision that plaintiff-Respondent Sohan Lal was also a tenant of Killa No. 24 was incorrect and should be set aside and the decree of the trial court should be restored. The appellants also prayed that the decree in favour of the two plaintiff-Respondents Sohan Lal and Nathi were liable to be set aside.
8. The appellants contended before the High Court that respondents Sohan Lal and Nathi did not deposit the decretal amount by April 1, 1969 as directed by the trial court and, therefore, the suit was liable to be dismissed under the provisions contained in Order 20 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
9. The other contention of the appellants before the High Court was that the plaintiff-Respondent Sohan Lal should not have been granted pre-emption rights in respect of Killa No. 24.
10. The High Court on May 2, 1973 accepted the appeal of the appellants against the plaintiff Nathi and dismissed the appeal against the plaintiff-Respondent Sohan Lal. The High Court said that since the lower appellate court granted Sohan Lal decree for one more killa and directed that the amount would be Rs 9100, the respondent was to comply with the appellate decree and not the decree of the trial court.
11. The appellants contended that neither Sohan Lal nor Nathi deposited the amount in accordance with the decree of the trial court on or before April 1, 1969 and the suit should have been dismissed on that ground alone and the appeal should have been allowed. The appellants contended that the lower appellate court had no power and jurisdiction to give further time to Sohan Lal to deposit the pre-emption amount by an extended date.
12. This Court in Naguba Appa v. Namdev AIR 1954 SC 50 held that the directions given by the trial court are mandatory under the provisions contained in Order 20 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Court in Naguba Appa case said that
“mere filing of an appeal does not suspend the decree of the trial court and unless that decree is altered in any manner by the Court of appeal, the pre-emptor is bound to comply with that direction.”
13. In Dattaraya s/o Keshav Tawalay v. Shaikh Mahboob Shaik Ali AIR 1970 SC 750, (1969) 2 SCR 514 this Court said that a decree in terms of Order 20 Rule 14, imposes obligations on both sides and they are so conditioned that performance by one is conditional on performance by the other. To illustrate, if the defendants by obtaining the stay order from the High Court relieve themselves of the obligation to deliver possession of the properties the plaintiff-decree-holder must also be deemed thereby to be relieved of the necessity of depositing the money so long as the stay order continues.
14. In the present case, the lower appellate court did not grant any stay to the plaintiff-Respondents. In view of the fact that the plaintiff-Respondents did not deposit the amount as directed by the trial court on or before April 1, 1969, it became mandatory on the lower appellate court by reason of the ruling of this Court in Naguba Appa case to dismiss the suit. The observations of this Court in Naguba Appa case that the pre-emptor is bound to comply with the directions of the trial Judge unless that decree is altered in any manner by a Court of appeal do not mean that where the deposit is not made in accordance with the directions of the trial court, the appellate court can extend the time for payment. Thereafter, the lower appellate court was in error in extending the time for payment till August 20, 1969.
15. In Naguba Appa case the pre-emption money was not deposited within the time fixed in the decree. The pre-emptor made an application to the Court for making the deposit without disclosing that the time fixed by the decree had elapsed. The application was allowed. The defendant, when apprised of the situation, made an application to the Court to the effect that the plaintiffs suit stood dismissed on account of his failure in making the deposit in time. The trial Judge held that the pre-emption money not having been paid within the time fixed in the decree the suit stood dismissed. On appeal the decision was set aside. On second appeal it was restored and it was held that the suit stood dismissed under Order 20 Rule 14 Civil Procedure Code. An appeal was preferred against the judgment of the High Court. This Court held that the High Court was right in holding that the pre-emptor's suit stood dismissed by reason of his default in not depositing the pre-emption price within the time fixed in the trial court's decree.
16. The contention of the appellants that the lower appellate court was wrong in extending the time for payment is correct because the failure of the plaintiffs-respondents to deposit the amount in terms of the trial court's decree would result in pre-emptors' suit standing dismissed by reason of their default in not depositing the pre-emption price. The contention of the appellants that the High Court was wrong in not setting aside the order of extension of time passed by the lower appellate court is correct. It is only if the plaintiff-Respondents had paid the decretal amount within the time granted by the trial court or if the plaintiff-Respondents had obtained another order from the lower appellate court granting any order of stay that the lower appellate court might have considered the passing of appropriate order in favour of pre-emptors. The High Court should have allowed the appellants' appeal and not made any distinction in dismissing plaintiff-Respondent Nathi's suit and allowing plaintiff-Respondent Sohan Lal any extension of time to make the payment. Further, it appears that the plaintiff-Respondent Sohan Lal did not pay the amount.
17. For these reasons the appeal is accepted. Suit of the plaintiff-Respondents is dismissed. The appellants are entitled to costs.
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