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Sushil Kumar Sen v. State Of Bihar .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant owned approximately 3.30 acres of land that was compulsorily acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation at Rs 14 per katha, totalling Rs 6,775.22 including trees and improvements. Dissatisfied, the appellant sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act. On 18 August 1961 the Additional District Judge, Purnea enhanced compensation to Rs 200 per katha.
On 22 August 1961 the respondent-State filed a review application under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, claiming discovery of new evidence regarding market value. The Additional District Judge allowed the review and, on 26 September 1961, reduced the rate to Rs 75 per katha.
The State then filed Appeal No. 81 of 1962 before the Patna High Court. Although the memorandum referred to both the decrees of 18 August and 26 September 1961, the grounds and court-fee indicated that the challenge was only to the decree of 26 September 1961. The appellant lodged a cross-appeal questioning the maintainability of the review itself.
By judgment dated 16 February 1968, the High Court held that the review had been wrongly entertained but nevertheless dismissed both the State’s appeal and the appellant’s cross-appeal, thereby leaving in place the reduced compensation of Rs 75 per katha. On certificate, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- What is the legal effect of a decree passed on review under Order 47 CPC, and does it wholly supersede the original decree?
- Could the State maintain an appeal against the original decree of 18 August 1961 after obtaining and acting upon the reviewed decree of 26 September 1961?
- Did the High Court err in dismissing the appellant’s cross-appeal once it concluded that the review was improperly entertained?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The review application was not maintainable; consequently, the original decree dated 18 August 1961 should stand restored.
- In absence of any appeal by the State against the original decree, that decree had attained finality once the review was set aside.
Respondent-State's Arguments
- Sought review on the ground of discovery of new and important evidence pertaining to market value, unavailable despite due diligence.
- Challenged the enhanced compensation awarded by the Additional District Judge.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Nibaran Chandra Sikdar v. Abdul Hakim, AIR 1928 Cal 418 | Allowing a review vacates the original decree; the decree passed on review is a fresh decree that supersedes the former. | Used to establish that once the review was allowed on 26 September 1961, the decree of 18 August 1961 ceased to exist; therefore, the State could appeal only against the reviewed decree. |
| Kanhaiya Lal v. Baldeo Prasad, ILR (1906) 28 All 240 | ||
| Brijbasi Lal v. Salig Ram, ILR (1912) 34 All 282 | ||
| Pyari Mohan Kundu v. Kalu Khan, ILR (1917) 44 Cal 1011 |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. The Court reaffirmed the settled law that a decree resulting from a successful review application replaces and nullifies the original decree. This proposition was supported by four earlier decisions cited in the judgment.
2. Since the respondent did not appeal against the 18 August 1961 decree and instead obtained a reviewed decree dated 26 September 1961, only that latter decree was in existence when Appeal No. 81 of 1962 was filed.
3. When the High Court concluded that the review had been wrongly allowed, logical consequence required that the reviewed decree fall and the original decree revive. Given that no appeal had ever been filed against the original decree, it had already become final and binding.
4. Therefore, the High Court erred in: (a) entertaining the respondent’s appeal on merits after holding the review improper, and (b) dismissing the appellant’s cross-appeal. Proper application of procedural law demanded dismissal of the State’s appeal and allowance of the cross-appeal.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed – High Court judgment and decree set aside; the decree of 18 August 1961 awarding compensation at Rs 200 per katha is restored.
Implications: The appellant receives the higher compensation originally awarded. No new legal precedent was set beyond reaffirming the rule that a decree on review supersedes the original decree and that procedural lapses in appealing can be fatal. The Court made no order as to costs.
K.K Mathew, J.— (for himself and Ray, C.J)— The appellant was the owner of 3.30 acres — roughly equal to 7 bighas, 17 kathas and 14 dhurs — of land. The land was acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The Land Acquisition Officer by his award dated October 12, 1957, gave compensation at the rate of Rs 14 per katha for the land. The total compensation including the value of trees and other improvements came to Rs 6775.22 p. The appellant was dissatisfied with the award. He filed an application before the Land Acquisition Collector for referring the matter to the District Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act claiming compensation for the lands at the rate of Rs 500 per katha. The case was referred and the Additional District Judge, Purnea by his judgment dated August 18, 1961 found that the appellant was entitled to compensation for the land acquired at the rate of Rs 200 per katha and also made certain other modifications in the amount of compensation under the other heads. On August 22, 1961, the respondent, the State of Bihar, filed an application for review, under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, of the judgment dated August 18, 1961 on the basis of discovery of new and important evidence as regards the market value of the land which was not available to it in spite of the exercise of due diligence. The learned Additional District Judge allowed the application for review and passed fresh judgment on September 26, 1961 reducing the compensation for land from Rs 200 to Rs 75 per katha. Thereafter the respondent filed Appeal No. 81 of 1962 in the High Court of Patna. The memorandum of appeal stated that the appeal was being preferred against the decrees dated August 18, 1961 September 26, 1961, but the grounds taken in the memorandum of appeal as well as the court fee paid would show that the appeal was only against the decree dated September 26, 1961 awarding compensation at the rate of Rs 75 per katha and not against the decree dated August 18, 1961 awarding compensation at the rate of Rs 200 per katha. The appellant filed a cross-appeal challenging the maintainability of the review petition filed by the respondent before the Additional District Judge as also the order passed thereon by him allowing the petition and vacating the decree dated August 18, 1961. The appeal and the cross-appeal were disposed of by the judgment of the High Court dated February 16, 1968. The High Court found that the Additional District Judge went wrong in entertaining the review and vacating the judgment and decree dated August 18, 1961 but, nevertheless, it considered the appeal filed by the respondent on merits and dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal thereby maintaining the compensation awarded for the land at the rate of Rs 75 per katha by the judgment and decree dated September 26, 1961 of the Additional District Judge. This appeal, on the basis of a certificate, is directed against the decree of the High Court.
2. It is well settled that the effect of allowing an application for review of a decree is to vacate the decree passed. The decree that is subsequently passed on review, whether it modifies, reverses or confirms the decree originally passed, is a new decree superseding the original one (see Nibaran Chandra Sikdar v. Abdul Hakim AIR 1928 Cal 418, Kanhaiya Lal v. Baldeo Prasad ILR (1906) 28 All 240, Brijbasi Lal v. Salig Ram ILR (1912) 34 All 282 and Pyari Mohan Kundu v. Kalu Khan ILR (1917) 44 Cal 1011).
3. The respondent did not file any appeal from the decree dated August 18, 1961 awarding compensation for the land acquired at the rate of Rs 200 per katha. On the other hand, it sought for a review of that decree and succeeded in getting the decree vacated. When it filed Appeal No. 81 of 1962, before the High Court, it could not have filed an appeal against the decree dated August 18, 1961 passed by the Additional District Judge as at that time that decree had already been superseded by the decree dated September 26, 1961 passed after review. So the appeal filed by the respondent before the High Court could only be an appeal against the decree passed after review. When the High Court came to the conclusion that the Additional District Judge went wrong in allowing the review, it should have allowed the cross-appeal. Since no appeal was preferred by the respondent against the decree passed on August 18, 1961 awarding compensation for the land at the rate of Rs 200 per katha, that decree became final. The respondent made no attempt to file an appeal against that decree when the High Court found that the review was wrongly allowed on the basis that the decree revived and came into life again.
4. The High Court should have allowed the cross-appeal; and dismissed the appeal, which was, and could only be against the decree passed on September 26, 1961, after the review. We therefore set aside the judgment and decree passed by the High Court and allow the appeal. The effect of this judgment would be to restore the decree passed by the Additional District Judge on August 18, 1961. We make no order as to costs.
V.R Krishna Iyer, J.— (concurring)— I concur regretfully with the result reached by the infallible logic of the law set out by my learned Brother Mathew, J. The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a Judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer.
6. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in Judges to act ex debito justiciae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. In the present case, almost every step a reasonable litigant could take was taken by the State to challenge the extraordinary increase in the rate of compensation awarded by the civil court. And, by hindsight, one finds that the very success, in the review application, and at the appellate stage has proved a disaster to the party. Maybe, Government might have successfully attacked the increase awarded in appeal, producing the additional evidence there. But maybes have no place in the merciless consequence of vital procedural flaws. Parliament, I hope, will consider the wisdom of making the Judge the ultimate guardian of justice by a comprehensive, though guardedly worded, provision where the hindrance to rightful relief relates to infirmities, even serious, sounding in procedural law. Justice is the goal of jurisprudence — processual, as much as substantive. While this appeal has to be allowed, for reasons set out impeccably by my learned brother, I must sound a pessimistic note that it is too puritanical for a legal system to sacrifice the end product of equity and good conscience at the altar of processual punctiliousness and it is not too radical to avert a breakdown of obvious justice by bending sharply, if need be, the prescriptions of procedure. The wages of procedural sin should never be the death of rights.
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