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Union Of India And Others v. Sripati Ranjan Biswas And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent, a confirmed Customs Appraiser with approximately eleven years of service, was suspended on 4 December 1961 and served with a charge-sheet alleging: (1) illegal gratification, (2) possession of assets disproportionate to known income, and (3) purchase of land without prior sanction. A departmental enquiry found him guilty of charges (2) and (3) but exonerated him of charge (1). After receiving a second show-cause notice (17 December 1962) proposing dismissal, the respondent invoked Article 226 of the Constitution. The Calcutta High Court quashed charge (3) and directed reconsideration of penalty solely on charge (2).
On 3 February 1964 the Collector of Customs dismissed the respondent. The respondent appealed to the President of India under Rule 23(2)(b) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. Following consultation with the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), the President rejected the appeal.
The respondent again approached the High Court on 25 November 1966. A learned Single Judge set aside the appellate order on 29 August 1967 for failure to consider whether dismissal was excessive, and allowed the appeal to be heard afresh. The Minister of Finance, acting “on behalf of the President,” heard the respondent on 28 March 1969. By order dated 25 April 1969 (communicated 9 May 1969), the President confirmed the dismissal.
A third writ petition followed. Although a Single Judge dismissed it, a Division Bench quashed the 9 May 1969 order, holding that the Minister lacked authority to decide an appeal addressed to the President. The Union of India obtained special-leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, leading to the present judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under Rule 23(2)(b) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, the President’s appellate power can be exercised through the Minister in charge, or whether personal consideration by the President is indispensable.
- Consequently, whether the order dated 9 May 1969 confirming the respondent’s dismissal is constitutionally valid or suffers from an impermissible delegation of quasi-judicial power.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent's Arguments
- The appellate function under Rule 23(2)(b) is quasi-judicial; therefore, it must be performed personally by the President and cannot be delegated to a Minister.
- The procedure followed—hearing by the Minister and communication by an Under-Secretary—vitiates the order, rendering it void.
Union of India's Arguments
- Reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974 2 SCC 831), which holds that appointment and dismissal of government servants are executive functions performed in the President’s name on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
- The Minister’s decision, made in accordance with the Rules of Business, constitutes the President’s decision; hence no question of unlawful delegation arises.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831 | The President/Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers; executive functions such as appointment and dismissal may be exercised through Ministers under Articles 77(3) & 166(3) without personal satisfaction. | The Court treated the present matter as indistinguishable from Samsher Singh, holding that disposal of the respondent’s appeal by the Minister constituted the President’s decision and was therefore valid. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court observed that the case squarely fell within the ratio of Samsher Singh. Appointment and dismissal of civil servants are executive, not personal, functions of the President. Consequently:
- The constitutional framework envisages a “constitutional President” acting on ministerial advice; references to the President in statutory rules must be read in that light.
- The fact that an appellate hearing entails assessment of evidence or quasi-judicial considerations does not alter the executive character of the ultimate act of confirming or setting aside a penalty.
- Under Articles 77(3) and 166(3) and the Rules of Business framed thereunder, a decision of a Minister is the decision of the President; no delegation, in the legal sense, is involved.
- Accordingly, the Minister’s hearing of the appeal and the communication of the decision in the President’s name satisfied Rule 23(2)(b); there was no constitutional infirmity.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Supreme Court allowed the Union of India’s appeal, set aside the Division Bench’s judgment, and upheld the dismissal order of 9 May 1969. No order as to costs was made.
Implications: The decision re-affirms that executive functions relating to the service conditions of government employees— including appellate powers under disciplinary rules—may be exercised in the President’s name by the appropriate Minister under the constitutional scheme. It clarifies that such action does not constitute an unlawful delegation, thereby limiting challenges premised on the requirement of the President’s personal consideration.
P.K Goswami, J.— This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta of December 13, 1973 reversing the judgment of the learned Single Judge who had earlier found no infirmity in the impugned order of dismissal of the first respondent (hereinafter to be described as “the respondent”).
2. The respondent was a confirmed appraiser with about eleven years' service in the Customs Department in Class II of gazetted officers. On December 4, 1961, he was suspended and a charge-sheet was served upon him. The charges related to firstly taking ilegal gratification, secondly, possession of assets disproportionate to his disclosed income and thirdly, purchase of a plot of land without sanction of the appropriate authority. The respondent was found guilty in the court of a departmental enquiry of the second and third charges and was exonerated with regard to the first charge. A second notice was served upon him on December 17, 1962, affording an opportunity to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. Thereupon the respondent preferred an application under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court challenging the show-cause notice and obtained a rule. This rule was disposed of by the High Court quashing the third charge and the Collector of Customs was directed to reconsider the appropriate penalty to be imposed on the surviving second charge. On February 3, 1964, the Collector of Customs passed an order dismissing the respondent basing on the second charge. The respondent preferred an appeal to the President of India under Rule 23(2)(b) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 (briefly “the Rules”). After consulting the Union Public Service Commission under Rule 30(2) of the Rules, the President of India rejected the respondent's appeal.
3. On November 25, 1966, the respondent filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court challenging the validity of the dismissal order as well as the appellate order of the President. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition on August 29, 1967, holding that the Appellate Authority decided the appeal without considering whether the drastic punishment of dismissal was excessive or not in violation of the provisions of Rule 30(2)(c). The learned Judge, however, gave liberty to proceed with the appeal afresh. Thereafter the Minister in the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, heard the appeal on March 28, 1969. Ultimately the respondent's appeal to the President of India was rejected on April 25, 1969 and the Under Secretary to the Government of India in the Finance Ministry communicated the order in the name of the President on May 9, 1969. The communication was in the following terms:
“I am directed to refer to your letter dated 2.4.1968 and 5.6.1969, containing your further submission in reply to the notice issued to you vide this Ministry's No. F-49/1/67-Ad. II dated 23.2.1968, and to say that the President has carefully considered the further submissions made by you in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission. The arguments advanced by you at the time of the hearing granted to you by Shri P.C Sethi, Minister in the Ministry of Finance, on behalf of the President on 28.3.1969 have also been carefully considered by him. Upon consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case the President has decided that the penalty of dismissal from service imposed on you by the Disciplinary Authority (viz.) the Collector of Customs, Calcutta is not excessive or severe and that your appeal should be rejected. The President hereby orders accordingly. A copy of the UPSCs Letter No.F.3/56/68-SI dated 26.10.1968 and a copy of the order passed by the Minister on behalf of the President are enclosed herewith.“
4. The respondent in a third round of litigation challenged the above order in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge dismissed the same but in appeal against that judgment the Division Bench set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and quashed the aforesaid order of May 9, 1969. Hence this appeal by the Union of India.
5. The High Court held that the powers and duties which the President is required to exercise as an Appellate Authority under Rule 23(2)(b) of the Rules are not constitutional duties imposed upon the President under the Constitution. According to the High Court the functions and duties of the President as an Appellate Authority under the said Rules are not part of business of the Government of India nor are they part of the President's duties under the Constitution. The High Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that the Minister had no right to deal with the appeal which had been preferred to the President of India under the said Rules.
6. The above question is squarely covered by a recent decision of this Court in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) 2 SCC 831. Even so, Mr A.K Sen appearing on behalf of the respondent submits that there is still an area which has not been covered by the said decision. Mr Sen submits that hearing of an appeal under a statutory rule, as in this case, is a quasi-judicial act and, therefore, it cannot be delegated by the President to the Minister.
7. It is, however, clear that in Samsher Singh case (1974) 2 SCC 831 the question related to the termination of service of a Subordinate Judge under Rule 9 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and that of another officer in the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) under Rule 7(3) in Part D of the Punjab Civil Services (Judicial Branch) Rules, 1951 as amended from time to time. It is not disputed that the above two Rules under which the termination took place are statutory Rules.
8. The question which is raised in this appeal relates to the domain of appointment or dismissal of a government servant. Such a question falls within the ambit of a purely executive function of the President in the case of the Union Government and of the Governor in the case of a State. In the present case, such a function being ultimately an executive function of the President, the fact that the final order is preceded or accompanied by a quasi-judicial enquiry held by the Minister does not affect the character of the exercise of that function by the President. There is, therefore, nothing in principle which can be distinguished in this appeal from the ratio of the decision in Samsher Singh case (1974) 2 SCC 831. The legal position is brought out very clearly in para 57 of the report in Samsher Singh in the following extracts: [: SCC (L&S) p. 568]
“Appointment or dismissal or removal of persons belonging to the Judicial Service of the State is not a personal ‘function but is an executive function of the Governor exercised in accordance with the Rules in that behalf under the Constitution.”
Again in para 48 the Court observed: [: SCC (L&S) p. 566]
“The President as well as the Governor is the constitutional or formal head. The President as well as the Governor exercises his powers and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers, save in spheres where the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to exercise his functions in his discretion. Wherever the Constitution requires the satisfaction of the President or the Governor for the exercise by the President or the Governor of any power or function, the satisfaction required by the Constitution is not the personal satisfaction of the President or Governor but the satisfaction of the President or Governor in the constitutional sense in the cabinet system of Government, that is, satisfaction of his Council of Ministers on whose aid and advice the President or the Governor-Generally exercises all his powers and functions. The decision of any Minister or officer under rules of business made under any of these two Articles 77(3) and 166(3) is the decision of the President or the Governor respectively. These articles did not provide for any delegation. Therefore, the decision of a Minister or officer under the Rules of Business is the decision of the President or the Governor.”
We are, therefore, unable to see how the present case of the respondent can get out of the Rule laid down in Samsher Singh case.
9. In the history of the entire background of the constitutional development of our country, when the Constitution conclusively contemplates a constitutional President it is not permissible nor is it even intended to invest upon the President a different role of a ruling monarch. Any reference to the President under any rule made under the Constitution must needs be to the President as the constitutional head, as envisaged in the Constitution acting with the aid and advice of the council of ministers.
10. Disposal of the appeal by the Minister under Rule 23(2)(b) of the Rules is, therefore, a proper and legal disposal of the appeal to the President who has acted on the advice of the Minister in confirming the impugned order of dismissal. There is no question of delegation involved in such a matter. We find no constitutional infirmity in the impugned order of May 9, 1969.
11. In the result the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside. We will, however, make no order as to costs.
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