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Suresh Mahato v. Distt. Magistrate

Supreme Court Of India
Dec 20, 1974
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was detained under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 by an order of the District Magistrate, Burdwan dated 12 January 1972. The State Government approved the order on 22 January 1972. The petitioner was arrested on 18 February 1972 and was served with the grounds of detention immediately upon arrest. He filed a representation on 14 March 1972, which the State Government rejected on 24 March 1972.

Meanwhile, the State Government placed the case before the Advisory Board on 15 March 1972, forwarding the petitioner's representation as well. The Advisory Board, after considering the materials and the representation, opined on 24 April 1972 that there was sufficient cause for detention. Consequently, the State Government confirmed the detention on 17 May 1972. The petitioner has remained in custody since then and now challenges the detention order through the present writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the failure to show, on the face of the State's affidavit, the exact date on which the petitioner's representation reached the Advisory Board vitiated the detention.
  2. Whether a delay of approximately one month between the detention order and the petitioner's arrest rendered the District Magistrate’s subjective satisfaction about the need for detention non-genuine.
  3. Whether non-disclosure to the District Magistrate of two criminal cases registered against the petitioner, alleging the same incidents cited in the grounds of detention, invalidated the detention order.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The State’s affidavit was silent on when the representation was sent to, and received by, the Advisory Board; failure to forward it in time would fatally flaw the detention.
  • An unexplained delay of about one month between the order and arrest suggested the District Magistrate lacked real and genuine satisfaction regarding the need for preventive detention.
  • The fact that criminal cases (Salanpur P.S. Case Nos. 3 and 7) were registered concerning the same incidents was not placed before the District Magistrate; such suppression of a material circumstance invalidated the order.

State's Arguments

  • The Advisory Board’s own report shows it had the petitioner's representation before it and considered it, thereby curing any alleged procedural deficiency.
  • A one-month gap is not so unreasonable as to negate the District Magistrate’s subjective satisfaction, distinguishing the present case from precedents involving much longer delays.
  • There is no evidence that the pendency of criminal cases was not brought to the District Magistrate’s attention; moreover, the cases had been dropped because witnesses were unwilling to depose, making the information immaterial if they had already been terminated.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sk. Serajul v. State of West Bengal, W.P. No. 2000 of 1973 Unreasonable delay between a detention order and the arrest of the detenu may cast doubt on the genuineness of the detaining authority’s satisfaction. Court distinguished the precedent, holding that a delay of about one month was not “so unreasonable” as to vitiate satisfaction.
Sk. Nizamuddin v. State of West Bengal (1975) 3 SCC 395 (a) Same principle on delay as above; (b) Pendency of a criminal case against the proposed detenu is a material circumstance that must be placed before the detaining authority. (a) Applied to assess the one-month delay and found it insufficient to invalidate the order; (b) Cited to underline that nondisclosure of pending cases could vitiate detention, but found no proof of such nondisclosure in the present record.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

First Issue – Forwarding of Representation: Although the affidavit did not specify the forwarding date, the actual Advisory Board report produced in court showed the representation was before the Board when it rendered its opinion on 24 April 1972. Hence, no procedural breach occurred.

Second Issue – Delay in Arrest: Relying on Sk. Serajul and Sk. Nizamuddin, the Court reiterated that an “unreasonable” delay could undermine satisfaction. However, it regarded a roughly one-month interval as not sufficiently unreasonable to raise such doubt, thereby sustaining the District Magistrate’s subjective satisfaction.

Third Issue – Non-disclosure of Criminal Cases: The Court accepted that the pendency of criminal cases is a material fact but observed there was no evidence on record that this fact was withheld from the District Magistrate. Additionally, if the cases had already been dropped and the petitioner discharged before the detention order, the information would not be material. Consequently, the challenge failed.

Holding and Implications

Petition Dismissed; Rule Discharged.

The detention order stands confirmed, and the petitioner remains in custody. The judgment applies established principles but creates no new precedent beyond reaffirming the thresholds for delay and material disclosure in preventive detention matters.

Show all summary ...

P.N Bhagwati, J.— This petition is directed against an order of detention made by the District Magistrate, Burdwan under sub-section (1) read with sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. The order of detention was made on January 12, 1972 on the ground that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. The District Magistrate forthwith reported the fact of the making of the order of detention to the State Government and the order of detention was approved by the State Government on January 22, 1972. Pursuant to the order of detention the petitioner was arrested on February 18, 1972 and immediately on arrest, the grounds of detention were served on him. The petitioner made a representation against the order of detention on March 14, 1972 but this representation was rejected by the State Government on March 24, 1972. In the mean time the State Government placed the case of the petitioner before the Advisory Board on March 15, 1972 and the representation of the petitioner was also forwarded by the State Government to the Advisory Board. The Advisory Board, after considering the case of the petitioner and taking into account the representation made by him, gave its report on April 24, 1972 stating that in its opinion there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner. The order of detention was thereupon confirmed by the State Government by an order dated May 17, 1972. The petitioner has been in jail since then.

2. The first contention urged on behalf of the petitioner was that though it was stated by the District Magistrate in his affidavit in reply that the representation of the petitioner was forwarded to the Advisory Board, there was nothing in the affidavit in reply to show as to when it was so forwarded and whether the Advisory Board received it before it submitted its report to the State Government on April 24, 1972. The omission to forward the representation to the Advisory Board before the Advisory Board gave its opinion constituted, according to the petitioner, a serious infirmity which vitiated the detention of the petitioner. Now, it is true that we do not find any statement in the affidavit in reply that the representation of the petitioner was forwarded to the Advisory Board before April 24, 1972 when the Advisory Board submitted its report, but Mr Chatterjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, produced before us the report of the Advisory Board and this report clearly showed that the Advisory Board had before it the representation of the petitioner and it was after considering the representation of the petitioner that the Advisory Board gave its opinion. This contention must, therefore, be rejected.

3. The petitioner then contended that though the order of detention was made on January 12, 1972, the petitioner was not arrested until February 18, 1972 and this time lag of about one month between the date of the order of detention and the date of the petitioner's arrest showed that the District Magistrate was not really and genuinely satisfied as regards the necessity for detention of the petitioner, for otherwise he would have tried to secure the arrest of the petitioner promptly and not left him free to carry on his nefarious activities. This contention was sought to be supported by two recent decisions of this Court, one in Sk. Serajul v. State of W.B WP No. 2000 of 1973 and the other Sk. Nizamuddin v. State of W.B (1975) 3 SCC 395. Now, there can be no doubt — and the law on this point must be regarded as well-settled by these two decisions — that if there is unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention and the date of arrest of the detenu, such delay, unless satisfactorily explained, would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate and it would be a legitimate inference to draw that the District Magistrate was not really and genuinely satisfied as regards the necessity for detaining the petitioner. But we do not think that a delay of about one month can be regarded as so unreasonable as to support such an inference negativing the genuineness of the satisfaction of the District Magistrate. This contention also cannot, therefore, be accepted.

4. The last contention urged on behalf of the petitioner was that the order of detention was vitiated as the fact that two criminal cases were registered against the petitioner in respect of the two incidents set out in the grounds of detention was not disclosed to the District Magistrate before he made the order of detention. The grounds of detention referred to two incidents of theft. One was an incident of theft of three iron telephone posts which took place on August 24, 1971 and the other was an incident of theft of overhead electric copper wire which took place on September 5, 1971. Salanpur P.S Case No. 3 was registered in respect of the first incident, while Salanpur P.S Case No. 7 was registered in respect of the second incident. The name of the petitioner did not figure in the first information report in regard to either of these two incidents but his participation was revealed in the course of investigation. No charge-sheet could, however, be filed against the petitioner though there was sufficient evidence against him, because the witnesses were not prepared to come forward to give evidence against him for fear of danger to their lives. The criminal cases had, therefore, to be dropped and the petitioner had to be discharged. It was in these circumstances that the District Magistrate made the order of detention on January 12, 1972 directing detention of the petitioner. Now, we do not know as to when the criminal cases were dropped and the petitioner was discharged — whether it was before the making of the order of detention or thereafter. If the criminal cases were dropped and the petitioner was discharged before the making of the order of detention, then obviously it was not a material fact which ought to have been placed before the District Magistrate. On the other hand, if the criminal cases were pending, it was certainly a material fact which ought to have been brought to the notice of the District Magistrate, because as pointed out by this Court in Sk. Niwmuddin v. State of West Bengal [: SCC (Cri) p. 23]

“the fact that a criminal case is pending against the person who is sought to be proceeded against by way of preventive detention is a very material circumstance which ought to be placed before the District Magistrate.”
But there is nothing on record before us to show that this fact of pendency of criminal cases against the appellant was not brought to the attention of the District Magistrate before he made the order of detention. This contention must also, therefore, fail and be rejected.

5. These were the only three contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner and since there is no substance in them, the petition fails and the rule is discharged.