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Amarjit Kaur v. Pritam Singh And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Defendant 4 owned the suit property and sold it to Defendants 1–3 by a sale deed dated 29 July 1965, registered on 14 October 1965. The appellant, who is Defendant 4’s daughter, filed a suit for pre-emption through her guardian. The trial court decreed the suit in her favour, and the first appellate court dismissed the vendees’ appeal on 17 July 1971.
A second appeal was then filed in the High Court. During its pendency, the Punjab Pre-emption (Repeal) Act, 1973 (Act 11 of 1973) came into force on 9 April 1973. Relying on Section 3 of that Act, the High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the pre-emption suit. The plaintiff’s application for leave to file a Letters Patent Appeal was also dismissed. The present appeals challenge the High Court’s decree.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, after the commencement of the Punjab Pre-emption (Repeal) Act, 1973, an appellate court that confirms a pre-emption decree is itself “passing a decree in any suit for pre-emption” within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Lachweshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri, 1940 FCR 84 | An appeal is in the nature of a rehearing; the appellate court possesses the same powers as the court of original jurisdiction and passes its own decree. | Used to show that if the High Court affirmed the trial decree it would itself be “passing a decree” in the suit, thus attracting the statutory bar in Section 3. |
| Kristnama Chariar v. Mangammal, ILR (1903) 26 Mad 91 | Explained that an appellate hearing is a rehearing and the court may mould relief based on events occurring after the original decree. | Cited to reinforce that an appellate decree is a fresh decree, hence the High Court could not confirm a pre-emption decree after the Repeal Act came into force. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court adopted the principle that an appeal constitutes a rehearing of the entire matter. Referring to previous authority, it noted that an appellate court, when confirming a lower-court decree, passes its own decree. Section 3 of the Punjab Pre-emption (Repeal) Act, 1973 categorically prohibits any court from passing a decree in a suit for pre-emption after the Act’s commencement. Therefore, if the High Court had dismissed the appeal (thereby affirming the trial court’s decree), it would itself have contravened Section 3 by effectively passing a pre-emption decree. To avoid violating the statute, the only permissible course was to allow the appeal and dismiss the suit, which is what the High Court did. The Supreme Court agreed with this approach and found no error in the High Court’s application of Section 3.
Holding and Implications
The appeals are dismissed. No order is made as to costs.
Direct Effect: The plaintiff’s suit for pre-emption stands dismissed, and the High Court’s decree is affirmed.
Broader Implication: The decision confirms that, under Section 3 of the Punjab Pre-emption (Repeal) Act, 1973, appellate courts cannot confirm or grant decrees for pre-emption after the Act’s commencement, because such confirmation would itself constitute passing a prohibited decree. No new precedent beyond this statutory interpretation was set.
K.K Mathew, J.— In these appeals, a common question of law arises for consideration and this judgment will dispose of all the appeals.
2. We will take up for consideration Civil Appeal No. 941(N) of 1973. The appellant challenges the correctness of a decree passed by the High Court dismissing a suit for pre-emption. The plaint property belonged to Defendant 4. He sold the same to Defendants 1 to 3 by a sale deed dated July 29, 1965 and registered on October 14, 1965. The appellant who is the daughter of Defendant 4, claiming that she has a right to pre-empt, instituted the suit through her guardian. The trial court decreed the suit. Against the decree, an appeal was preferred by the vendees. That appeal was dismissed on July 17, 1971. An appeal was preferred to the High Court against this decree. The Punjab Pre-emption (Repeal) Act, 1973 (Act 11 of 1973) received the assent of the Governor of Punjab on April 6, 1973 and was published in the Punjab Gazette on April 9, 1973. The High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit holding that the provision of Section 3 of the above Act should govern the decision. The plaintiff-appellant then applied for leave to file letters patent appeal. That was dismissed.
3. Section 3 of the Punjab Pre-emption (Repeal) Act, 1973, provides:
“Bar to pass decree in suit for pre-emption.—On and from the date of commencement of the Punjab Pre-emption (Repeal) Act, 1973, no court shall pass a decree in any suit for pre-emption.”
The section, in effect, says that no court shall decree a suit for pre-emption after the coming into force of the Act. The question is, whether the appellate court, when it passes a decree, confirming the decree for pre-emption passed by the trial court or the lower appellate court, is passing a decree for pre-emption.
4. In Lachweshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri 1940 FCR 84 it was held that once the decree passed by a court had been appealed against, the matter became sub-judice again and thereafter the appellate court has seisin of the whole case, though for certain purposes, e.g, execution, the decree was regarded as final and the courts below retained jurisdiction. The Court further said that it has been a principle of legislation in British India at least from 1861 that a court of appeal shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by the Civil Procedure Code on courts of original jurisdiction, that even before the enactment of that Code, the position was explained by Bhashyam Iyengar, J. in Kristnama Chariar v. Mangammal ILR (1903) 26 Mad 91 in language which makes it clear that the hearing of an appeal is under the processual law of this country in the nature of a re-hearing, and that it is on the theory of an appeal being in the nature of a re-hearing that the courts in this country have in numerous cases recognized that in moulding the relief to be granted in a case on appeal, the court of appeal is entitled to take into account even facts and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against.
5. As an appeal is a re-hearing, it would follow that if the High Court were to dismiss the appeal, it would be passing a decree in a suit for pre-emption. Therefore, the only course open to the High Court was to allow the appeal and that is what the High Court has done. In other words, if the High Court were to confirm the decree allowing the suit for pre-emption, it would be passing a decree in a suit for pre-emption, for, when the appellate court confirms a decree, it passes a decree of its own, and therefore, the High Court was right in allowing the appeal.
6. We, therefore, dismiss the appeals but, in the circumstances, make no order as to costs.
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