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Government Of India And Another v. C.A Balakrishnan And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Respondents 1 and 2 joined the Food and Supplies Department, Government of India, as tally clerks on February 26, 1949, and February 28, 1949, respectively. Respondent 2 advanced more rapidly, becoming Junior Godown Keeper on January 11, 1952, Senior Godown Keeper on June 2, 1954, and Superintendent on November 1, 1957. Respondent 1 was promoted later to the same intermediary posts—Junior Godown Keeper on November 19, 1954, and Senior Godown Keeper on August 24, 1957—and was not promoted to Superintendent until July 10, 1962.
After Respondent 2’s promotion in 1957, Respondent 1 made representations claiming promotion and seniority over Respondent 2. On April 9, 1962, the Central Government revised the seniority lists in the lower cadres in Respondent 1’s favour but rejected his claim to seniority in the cadre of Superintendent, treating that post as a “selection post.” A seniority list issued on January 1, 1963, still showed Respondent 1 junior to Respondent 2.
Respondent 1 filed a writ petition in the High Court on November 26, 1968. The High Court held that, on November 1, 1957, the post of Superintendent was governed by the principle of seniority-cum-fitness, not selection, and directed the Government of India to reconsider Respondent 1’s promotion as of that date. The Union of India appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on November 1, 1957, the post of Godown-Dock Superintendent was a “selection post” or one to which promotions were to be made on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness.
- Consequently, whether the High Court was correct in directing the Government of India to review Respondent 1’s claim to seniority over Respondent 2 in the Superintendent cadre as of November 1, 1957.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments (Union of India and Others)
- The Superintendent post was already a selection post in 1957.
- Respondent 1’s case was duly considered in November 1957 alongside other eligible candidates.
- Respondent 2 was chosen because he was found superior in “merit and ability.”
Respondent 1’s Arguments
- He was senior to Respondent 2 in the feeder posts.
- His claim for promotion to Superintendent was never considered on the proper criterion of seniority-cum-fitness prevailing in 1957.
- Therefore, his seniority in the Superintendent cadre should be restored over Respondent 2.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Mysore v. Syed Mahmood (1968) 3 SCR 363 | Promotion must be evaluated under the rules applicable at the time the vacancy arose. | The Supreme Court held that this decision “fully supports” the High Court’s direction to assess Respondent 1’s promotion on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness as it existed on November 1, 1957. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court’s factual finding that, in November 1957, promotions to Superintendent were governed by the seniority-cum-fitness principle. It noted that cadre and recruitment rules introducing selection by merit came into force only in September 1960. No evidence was produced before the Supreme Court to displace this conclusion.
Because Respondent 1’s candidature had not been evaluated under the correct criterion in 1957, the High Court’s directive to reconsider his promotion—dating it back to November 1, 1957 if found fit—was legally sound. The Court relied on its earlier judgment in State of Mysore v. Syed Mahmood to reinforce the proposition that rights to promotion must be judged by the rules existing when the vacancy occurred.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s order and directed the appellants to pay the costs of Respondent 1.
Implications: The decision sustains Respondent 1’s right to have his promotion reconsidered as of November 1, 1957, with all consequential benefits if found fit. The ruling applies established principles and does not create a new precedent beyond reinforcing that promotional criteria cannot be altered retrospectively.
K.K Mathew, J.— In this appeal, by special leave, the question for consideration is whether the High Court was right in directing the Government of India to consider the claim of Respondent 1 to seniority over Respondent 2 in the cadre of Godown-Dock Superintendent (hereinafter referred to as “superintendent”) in the Food and Supplies Department, Government of India.
2. Respondents 1 and 2 were appointed as tally clerks on February 26, 1949 and February 28, 1949 respectively. Respondent 2 was promoted to the post of Junior Godown Keeper on January 11, 1952, and that of Senior Godown Keeper on June 2, 1954. Respondent 1 was promoted as Junior Godown Keeper on November 19, 1954 and as Senior Godown Keeper on August 24, 1957. Respondent 2 was promoted as Superintendent on November 1, 1957. Respondent 1 thereupon made representation to Government as regards his superior claim for being promoted to the post on the basis of his seniority. On April 9, 1962 the Central Government passed an order refixing the seniority of Respondent 1 over Respondent 2 both in the cadre of Junior Godown Keepers and in that of Senior Godown Keepers. The Government, however, rejected the claim of Respondent 1 for fixing of his seniority above Respondent 2 in the cadre of Superintendents for the reason that the post of Superintendent was a selection post even in 1957 and that Respondent 2 was appointed to the post on the basis of his superior merit and ability. Respondent 1 was promoted as Superintendent on July 10, 1962. In the Seniority List of Dock/ Godown Superintendents prepared on January 1, 1963 Respondent 1 was shown as junior to Respondent 2. Respondent 1 thereupon filed a writ petition before the High Court on November 26, 1968 praying for a direction to the Government for the restoration of his seniority over Respondent 2 in the cadre of Superintendent. The High Court allowed the writ petition and this appeal, by special leave, is against that decision.
3. The case of Respondent 1 before the High Court was that he was senior to Respondent 2 and that his case was not considered when Respondent 2 was appointed to the post of Superintendent. The High Court was of the view that on November 1, 1957 when Respondent 2 was promoted to the post of Superintendent, the post was not a selection post but a post to which promotions were made on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness and that the case of Respondent 1 should have been considered on that basis and not on the basis that it was a selection post. The Court, therefore, issued a writ directing the Government to consider the case of Respondent 1 for promotion to the post of Superintendent as on November 1, 1957 when Respondent 2 was promoted and according to the rules then in force and that, if he is found fit for promotion as on that date, “the promotion already given to him to that position be dated back to November 1, 1957 and he be granted all consequential benefits and if he is not found fit for promotion as on that date, he will not be entitled to any relief.”
4. It was argued on behalf of the appellants that the post of Superintendent was a selection post in 1957, that the case of Respondent 1 was considered in November 1957, along with that of Respondent 2 and others and it was because Respondent 2 was found to be superior to Respondent 1 in merit and ability that he was chosen and appointed to the post.
5. We see no reason to differ from the view of the High Court that in November 1957, when Respondent 2 was promoted to the post, it was not a selection post. According to the High Court, the cadre and recruitment rules providing that promotions to the post of Superintendent should be by selection and not on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness came into force only in September 1960. The materials have been placed before us to hold that the High Court was wrong in taking this view. Therefore, we think that the High Court was right in its conclusion that the case of Respondent 1 was not considered in November 1957, on the basis that the post of Superintendent was a post to which promotion was to be made on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness. The ruling of this Court in State of Mysore v. Syed Mahmood (1968) 3 SCR 363 fully supports the direction given by the High Court in this case.
6. We dismiss the appeal. When admitting the special leave petition, it was ordered that the appellants will pay the costs of the respondents in any event. We, therefore, direct the appellants to pay the costs of Respondent 1.
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