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Prem Ex-Servicemen Co-Op. Tenant Farming Society Ltd. And Others v. State Of Haryana And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
A batch of five civil appeals (by special leave) and eight writ petitions under Article 32 were filed by Ex-Servicemen Cooperative (Tenants) Farming Societies. The challenge was directed against identical orders dated 25 April 1972 issued by the Collector, Kaithal. The Collector had directed that approximately 230 acres of land—assumed to have been leased to members of the appellant societies in 1952 under the East Punjab Utilization of Lands Act, 1949 (“the Act”) for twenty years—be restored to the “rightful owners” on the ground that the leases had expired.
The appellants/petitioners sought relief from the Supreme Court contending that they could not be dispossessed except in accordance with law and that the Collector lacked jurisdiction. A preliminary objection by the State questioning the maintainability of the civil appeals under Article 136 was also raised but subsequently overruled by the Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Collector, Kaithal, possessed jurisdiction under the East Punjab Utilization of Lands Act, 1949 to order eviction when the very existence, validity and source of the alleged leases were disputed.
- Whether the appellants/petitioners could be dispossessed without adjudication of title or due process, thereby infringing their fundamental right to property and procedure under Articles 32 and 300-A of the Constitution.
- Whether civil appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution were maintainable against the impugned orders of the Collector.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ / Petitioners’ Arguments
- No Pattas or lease deeds were ever executed under Section 5 of the Act; hence the Act’s eviction provisions were inapplicable.
- The land may have been allotted under other enactments (e.g., Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912; East Punjab Displaced Persons Resettlement Act, 1949; East Punjab Reclamation of Land Act, 1941; Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953), making the Collector’s reliance on the Act misplaced.
- Some of the disputed land now vests in Gram Sabhas/Panchayats, rendering any order in favour of private individuals untenable.
- Dispossession without prior adjudication of rights violates their fundamental rights; therefore, writ relief under Article 32 is appropriate.
Respondent State’s Arguments
- Admissions by representatives of the Cooperative Societies indicated that Pattas were granted in 1952 for the maximum 20-year period permissible under the Act, which expired in 1972.
- On expiry of the term, possession had to revert to the original owners, justifying the Collector’s order.
- Reliance was placed on this Court’s earlier decision in Dasaudha Singh and Haryana Co-op. Multipurpose Society v. Collector of Kaithal, where eviction under the Act had been upheld.
- The civil appeals were allegedly not maintainable under Article 136 as the orders impugned were passed by a revenue authority, not by a court or tribunal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dasaudha Singh v. State of Haryana | Upheld Collector’s power under the Act to evict where an undisputed lease under Section 5 existed. | Distinguished: in the present case no lease deeds were produced and the applicability of the Act itself was disputed. |
| Haryana Co-op. Multipurpose Society v. Collector of Kaithal, (1973) 2 SCC 393; AIR 1973 SC 710 | Confirmed that, upon expiry of an admitted lease, possession reverts to the owner. | Distinguished for the same reason—the existence and terms of the lease were undisputed in that case, unlike here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Maintainability. The Court overruled the State’s preliminary objection under Article 136 because no authority was cited barring such appeals, and parallel writ petitions under Article 32 were also before the Court.
2. Absence of Documentary Evidence. No Pattas or lease deeds were produced before the Collector or the Court. This factual vacuum fundamentally differentiated the case from the precedents relied upon by the State.
3. Jurisdictional Inquiry. The Act’s eviction provisions apply only when it is “clear or there is no dispute” that the occupant is a lessee under Section 5. Given the serious contest over the source of allotment—ranging across several possible statutes—the Collector was obliged first to satisfy himself as to his jurisdiction.
4. Panchayat/Gram Sabha Claims. An affidavit filed by the State suggested that substantial portions of the land now vest in local bodies, undermining the premise that private owners were entitled to immediate restoration.
5. Need for Prior Determination. The Court enumerated five specific questions the Collector must answer—relating to the origin of possession, compensation paid, current ownership, Panchayat claims, and whether any legal provision empowered him to proceed—before taking any coercive step under the Act.
6. Consequences of Failure. Because the Collector acted without resolving these threshold issues, his orders were ultra vires and liable to be quashed.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The civil appeals and writ petitions are allowed; the Collector’s orders of 25 April 1972 directing dispossession are quashed, and no further proceedings under the East Punjab Utilization of Lands Act, 1949 may be taken against the appellants/petitioners unless and until it is first determined that the land in their possession is governed by that Act. Parties shall bear their own costs.
Implications: The ruling reinforces that administrative authorities must establish both jurisdiction and factual predicates—such as the existence of valid leases—before invoking statutory eviction powers. While the judgment turns on its specific facts, it underscores the necessity of due process where title and possession are contested; no broader doctrinal precedent was explicitly announced.
M.H Beg, J.— There is a batch of five Civil Appeals by Special leave and another of eight Writ Petitions by ex-Servicemen Cooperative (Tenants) Farming Societies before us raising common questions of fact and law so that they can be disposed of by a single judgment.
2. The Civil Appeals are filed against the orders of the Collector, Kaithal, dated April 25, 1972, directing that an area of 230 acres of land assumed to have been leased to the members of the appellant Societies under the East Punjab Utilization of Lands Act, 1949, (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), in 1952, for 20 years, should be handed over to the rightful owners by the Pattedars as the period of their leases has expired. A preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution against the orders of the Collector is not substantiated by citing any authority of this Court. Moreover, there are also Writ Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution questioning the power of the Collector to deprive the petitioners of their alleged fundamental right to hold land in their possession until dispossessed in accordance with law. We, therefore, overrule this technical objection.
3. Apparently, the Collector's orders were made on the assumption that the High Court of Punjab and Haryana had already decided that Pattas were given to the members of the tenants Societies under the Act and that the ownership of certain persons over the lands leased to the members of the appellant Societies was established and was subsisting at the time of the order. We have not been shown any judgment of any court where these questions have been canvassed and determined. All that the learned Counsel for the Respondent State could submit is that, from certain statements made on behalf of Cooperative Societies, it should be inferred that Pattas were given in 1952 under the Act to the members of these Societies because they expired 20 years afterwards in 1972 which was the maximum period for which leases could be granted under Section 5 of the Act. It may be that the members of the Cooperative Societies had made some admissions the nature and effect of which require examination. It is well settled that the effect of an alleged admission depends upon the circumstances in which it was made. We are unable to go into these questions until they have been fully and properly investigated by an authority empowered to consider them.
4. It appears that no leases were produced by anybody before the Collector or anywhere else. This distinguishes the present case from the case of Dasaudha Singh v. State of Haryana; and Haryana Co-op. Multipurpose Society v. Collector of Kaithal (1973) 2 SCC 393, AIR 1973 SC 710 relied upon on behalf of the Respondent State, where there was no disputed question about the enactment under which the admitted leases were given. The peculiar feature of each case before us whether under appeal or on a Writ Petition, is that there is no Patta or lease forthcoming. It is denied by the appellants and by the petitioners in each case that either the land was given to them under the East Punjab Land Utilization Act or that the alleged owners to whom the land was directed to be handed over have any right or title left at all even if they had any at any time.
5. Moreover, an affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State of Haryana showing that a good deal of land in dispute vests in the Gram Sabhas or Panchayats. If this is so, it is difficult for us to understand how an order could be made for the handing over of the possession of this land to the assumed private owners who are named in the order.
6. After having been taken through the provisions of the Act, we find that the provisions for eviction could only apply to cases where it is clear or there is no dispute that the person to be evicted was a lessee under Section 5 of the Act. In the instant case, the learned counsel for the alleged lessees points out that there were a number of enactments under which the land could be given. They were said to be: Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912; the East Punjab Displaced Persons Resettlement Act, 1949; East Punjab Reclamation of Land Act, 1941; and, the Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. Certain rules were also said to have been made in 1897 for utilization of waste land in Punjab. It was not clear under which provision the land was allotted to the alleged lessees. Hence, at the very threshhold, the power of the Collector to proceed under the Act is challenged. It is true that the Act does not give power to the Collector to adjudicate on questions of right and title where these properly and really arise. Nevertheless, the Collector, when proceeding to take steps under the Act, must determine the source and extent of his power and jurisdiction, where these are questioned, so as to decide whether the Act relied upon by a party before him could be applied at all. This is a question on which there are conflicting assertions and pieces of evidence which seem difficult to reconcile with each other. Hence, we think that these are fit cases in which the Collector may himself go into the following questions before passing any further orders:
1. Was the possession of any of the lands in dispute taken by the State Government under the Utilization of Lands Act and Pattas duly executed under Section 5 of the Act in favour of the alleged lessees?
2. Were any proceedings for awarding compensation under Section 4 of the Act taken in respect of the land alleged to have been leased, and, if so, on what basis were the persons dispossessed compensated? In other words, are there grounds to believe that the persons to whom the lands were directed to be handed over were no longer owners?
3. If no legally valid leases were executed in favour of the alleged lessees, what could be their legal status and rights by reason of long possession?
4. What was the nature of the claims to any land put forward by the Gaon Panchayats?
5. Is this a case in which the Collector can interfere or pass any order under any provision of law or should the matter be left to be decided between the alleged lessees, the alleged private owners, and the Panchayats by such other legal proceedings as may be open to them for the purpose of getting their claims adjudicated upon?
7. The result is that we allow the appeals and Writ Petitions before us and quash the orders of the Collector directing dispossession of the appellants and the petitioners from the lands occupied by them, and we order that no further proceedings under the Act be taken against the alleged lessees so long as it is not decided that the lands in their possession are still governed by the provisions of the Act relied upon. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs.
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