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Soonda Ram And Another v. Shri Rameshwarlal And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiffs–respondents filed a suit for eviction of the defendant–appellants from shop premises in Chomu after terminating their tenancy by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Eviction was sought on the ground of the plaintiffs’ bona fide personal need for the premises.
The trial court (Munsif) accepted some of the plaintiffs’ contentions but dismissed the suit after holding that bona fide personal necessity was not proved. On appeal, the District Judge of Jaipur reversed that finding and decreed eviction. The defendants then filed a second appeal in the Rajasthan High Court. A learned single judge initially dismissed the appeal on the assumption that the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 did not extend to Chomu. When it was later discovered—via notification issued during the pendency of the trial—that the Act did apply, the High Court reviewed its order and reheard the matter; a different single judge again dismissed the appeal on 7 February 1974.
Special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was subsequently granted. An earlier request by the respondents to revoke that leave was declined; the Court instead fixed the substantive appeal for early hearing. The present judgment disposes of the defendants’ appeal against the High Court’s dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court erred in affirming the District Judge’s finding that the plaintiffs required the premises bona fide for their personal use in the absence of detailed pleadings and despite alleged insufficiency of opportunity for the defendants to rebut evidence.
- Whether the High Court should have permitted the defendants to adduce additional evidence at the second-appellate stage under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- Whether, in light of the above contentions, the matter warranted a remand to a lower court for fresh consideration.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The High Court confirmed the District Judge’s decision without expressly recording a finding of bona fide personal necessity.
- Pleadings in the plaint were too skeletal to justify the admission of extensive evidence on necessity.
- The defendants lacked sufficient opportunity to challenge the plaintiffs’ evidence on need.
- The High Court should have exercised its discretion to take additional evidence under Section 151 CPC; failure to do so prejudiced the appellants.
- The case should be remanded to allow both sides to lead further evidence.
Respondents’ Arguments
- Sought revocation of the special leave previously granted by the Supreme Court (request earlier declined by the Court).
- Supported the concurrent findings of the District Judge and the High Court on bona fide personal necessity.
- Opposed any remand or admission of additional evidence at the second-appellate stage.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court examined the judgments of both the District Judge and the High Court and concluded that each had explicitly and adequately recorded findings of bona fide personal necessity based on the evidence on record. The Court observed that:
- The appellants did produce evidence aimed at showing that the respondents owned additional shops and therefore lacked genuine need, but that evidence was “too meagre,” a fact effectively conceded before the District Judge.
- Any defect in the plaintiffs’ pleadings was not of a magnitude that would justify ignoring the evidence actually led on the question of necessity.
- No request to adduce further evidence had been made in the first appellate court; the High Court therefore committed no error in refusing the application for additional evidence at the second-appellate stage.
Given these findings, the Court found no justification for a remand and considered the appellants’ submissions “devoid of substance.”
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.
The dismissal leaves intact the eviction decree in favour of the plaintiffs–respondents. The decision affirms that a party cannot seek to introduce additional evidence for the first time in second appeal absent compelling reasons, and minor pleading defects will not outweigh substantive concurrent findings on bona fide need. No new precedent of broader application was articulated.
N.L Untwalia, J.— This is a defendants' appeal by special leave of this Court from the judgment and decree dated February 7, 1974 of the Rajasthan High Court dismissing the appellants second appeal preferred from the appellate judgment of the District Judge of Jaipur. The plaintiffs respondents filed a suit against the appellants for their eviction after termination of their tenancy by service of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on the ground that they required the suit premises bona fide for their personal necessity. The suit was contested by the appellants on various grounds. The learned Munsif who tried the suit in the first instance held in favour of the plaintiffs on some of the issues which arose for determination on the pleadings of the parties. He, however, dismissed the suit on the finding that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that they required the suit premises bona fide for their personal necessity. They went up in appeal before the District Judge of Jaipur who reversed the findings of the trial court on the question of personal necessity of the plaintiffs, accepted their case and decreed the suit. The defendants filed a second appeal in the High Court. When it came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge of that Court a contention was raised on behalf of the plaintiffs respondents that the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 had not been extended to Chomu where the suit premises are situate. This contention was accepted and the appeal was dismissed by the High Court on January 23, 1973. Subsequently it was found that the Act aforesaid had been applied to Chomu by a notification on a date which fell during the pendency of the suit in the trial court. The judgment of dismissal of second appeal was reviewed and the appeal was heard afresh by another Judge of the High Court sitting singly. The appeal was dis-missed again by the judgment dated February 7, 1974. The defendants presented this appeal by special leave of this Court.
2. Mr S.M Jain, learned Counsel for the respondents asked us to revoke the grant of the special leave on certain grounds. We did not feel persuaded to examine the question of revocation of the special leave in view of an earlier order of this Court made on November 4, 1974 whereby instead of revoking the special leave the appeal itself was directed to be posted for hearing at an early date.
3. Mr Manchanda, learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the judgment of the High Court is erroneous in law as it wrongly affirmed the decision of the District Judge on the question of the allegedly personal necessity of the respondents and without recording a finding that they required the premises bona fide for their own use. Counsel submitted that the statements in the plaint were too sketchy to permit admission of evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs in this regard. In any event the appellants did not get sufficient opportunity to rebut that evidence. Counsel further urged that the High Court ought to have admitted additional evidence which it was asked to do by an application filed on behalf of the appellants under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He, therefore, strenuously urged before us to remit back the case to any of the courts below for a fresh decision after giving an opportunity to the parties to adduce further evidence.
4. In our opinion the submissions made for the appellants are devoid of substance. On perusal of the judgment of the High Court as also of the First appellate court we have come to the conclusion that in clear terms the requisite findings of fact have been recorded on appraisal of the evidence adduced by the parties. The appellants had adduced evidence to show that the respondents had more shops than the one in question and did not require it bona fide for their personal use. But the evidence adduced on their behalf was found to be too meagre as conceded also before the District Judge on behalf of the appellants. The issue was decided on the evidence adduced by the parties and the defect of pleading was not such that could enable the Court to obliterate and ignore the evidence adduced on the point of bona fide personal necessity of the plaintiffs. The High Court committed no error, rather, it was right in not permitting the appellants to adduce any additional evidence at the second appellate stage. No such prayer had been made in the first appellate court. We see no justification for making an order of remand in this case as repeatedly asked for by Mr Manchanda, learned Counsel for the appellants.
5. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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