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Vijay Kumar (Dr.) And Others v. Raghbir Singh Anokh Singh
Factual and Procedural Background
Dr. Vijay Kumar (first appellant) was the original tenant of Shop No. 2855 in Guru Nanak Building, Kashmiri Gate, Delhi. On 12 January 1965, the respondent–landlord filed an application before the Rent Controller under proviso (b) to Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, seeking eviction on the ground that Dr. Vijay Kumar had sub-let or otherwise parted with possession of a portion of the shop to his sons, Ajay Kumar and Ashok Kumar (second and third appellants).
After a contested hearing, the Rent Controller on 6 December 1966 ordered the ejectment of all three appellants. The appellants’ first appeal was dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal on 25 April 1968, and their second appeal was dismissed by the Delhi High Court on 29 October 1971. They then approached the Supreme Court by way of a special-leave petition, which resulted in the present judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the first appellant had, in fact, sub-let, assigned, or otherwise parted with possession of a distinct portion of the demised premises to the second and third appellants so as to attract proviso (b) to Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
- Whether the appellants could, at the Supreme Court stage, raise a new factual plea that the occupation of the second and third appellants was merely permissive and consequent to a father assisting his sons in business.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- Counsel contended—raised for the first time in the special-leave petition—that the second and third appellants were in the shop with the permission of their father, who, in a natural parental role, had established them in business. Their occupation was therefore permissive, not a sub-letting or parting with possession.
Respondent’s Position
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent’s legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court accepted, as concurrent findings of the Rent Controller, the Rent Control Tribunal, and the High Court, that:
- The shop had been physically divided by a wooden partition, creating two separate portions, each with its own locked entrance.
- The second and third appellants were in exclusive possession of one portion where they conducted a motor-car business; the first appellant used the other portion as his clinic.
- The plea that the business was a joint venture of all three appellants lacked evidentiary support—income-tax returns did not reflect joint earnings, and account books were not produced.
Given these facts, the Court held that the first appellant had “parted with possession” of half the premises, thereby satisfying the statutory ground for eviction.
As to the new plea of permissive occupation, the Court refused to entertain it because:
- It was never pleaded in the written statement or urged before the forums below.
- The plea was fact-dependent and inconsistent with the original defence that the first appellant remained in possession of the entire premises.
- Allowing the plea at this late stage would prejudice the respondent, who had no opportunity to contest it before the lower authorities.
- No presumption of permissive use could be drawn merely from the father-son relationship or joint residence/messing.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the factual findings and legal conclusions of the subordinate authorities.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed. No order as to costs.
Immediate Effect: The eviction order against all three appellants stands confirmed.
Broader Implications: The judgment reinforces two principles—(i) exclusive occupation by a third party can constitute “parting with possession” under the Delhi Rent Control Act, and (ii) new factual pleas inconsistent with prior defences will not be entertained for the first time at the Supreme Court stage, especially where their late introduction would prejudice the opposing party. No new precedent was explicitly set beyond reaffirming these settled doctrines.
S.N Dwivedi, J.— The first appellant, Dr Vijay Kumar, is the father of the second and third appellants, Ajay Kumar and Ashok Kumar. Dr Vijay Kumar was the tenant of the Shop No. 2855, Guru Nanak Building, Kashmiri Gate, Delhi. The respondent is the owner of the shop. On January 12,1965, he applied for ejectment of the appellants from the shop. The application was made to the Rent Controller under proviso (b) to sub-section (i) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The application alleged that the first appellant has sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with a part of the shop to the other appellants. The application was contested by the appellants. By his order, dated December 6, 1966, the Rent Controller allowed the application and directed ejectment of the appellants. Their first appeal against his order was dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal on April 25, 1968. Their second appeal was dismissed by the High Court of Delhi on October 29, 1971. They have preferred the present appeal by special leave.
2. The Rent Controller has found that the appellants have partitioned the shop in two portions. The two portions are demarcated by a wooden partition wall. In one portion there is the clinic of the first appellant. In the other portion the other appellants are carrying on the business of sale and purchase of motar cars. The wooden partition wall has divided the single door of the shop in two parts, so that there are now two doors, one in the portion in the occupation of the first appellant, and the other in the portion in the occupation of the other appellants. One cannot go directly from one portion to the other on account of the wooden partition wall. The first appellant locks his portion. The other appellants lock their portion separately. On these findings the Rent Controller has held that the second and third appellants are in exclusive possession of their portion. Hence he has come to the conclusion that the first appellant has parted with possession of their portion to them. The Rent Controller did not accept the plea of the appellants that the business which was being carried on in their portion was the joint business of all the appellants. The first appellant is assessed to Income tax. He has never shown the income from the motor business in his Income tax returns. The appellants did not produce the account books of the motor business. The Rent Controller accordingly held that the plea of joint business has not been established.
3. The findings of facts and the conclusions reached by the Rent Controller were confirmed by the Rent Control Tribunal. The High Court agreed with the Appellate Authority. These findings cannot be impeached before us. In the result, we would accept the conclusion of the Rent Controller that half of the shop was exclusively occupied by the second and third appellants and that the first appellant has parted with possession of that portion to them. The rejection by the Rent Controller of the plea of joint business also cannot be disturbed by us. It is a well reasoned finding.
4. Counsel for the appellants has urged before us that the first appellant, being the father of the other two appellants established them in the business and permitted them to occupy a half portion of the shop for that purpose. As a father it was natural for him to establish them in life. In short, the argument is that the second and third appellants were occupying a half portion of the shop with his permission.
5. It is a plausible argument, but we are unable to entertain it at this stage. Such a plea was never taken in their written statement. It was not pressed even during the hearing before the Rent Controller or the Rent Control Tribunal or the High Court. It has been taken for the first time in the special leave petition. The plea is inconsistent with the plea taken in the written statement. In the written statement, the plea, in substance, was that the first appellant was in possession over the entire accommodation. The plea now sought to be raised is that the second and third appellants were in possession of the half portion of the shop exclusively but with his permission. The new plea is not a pleading of law; it is a pleading of fact. The respondent had no opportunity of confuting the plea. If we allow the appellants to take the new plea now, it is likely to cause him prejudice.
6. No presumption can be drawn from mere relationship of the father and son or from joint living and joint messing that the second and third appellants were in permissive possession of the half portion. If the appellants had taken this plea in their written statement, the respondent would have got an opportunity of proving that the plea was false.
7. Having regard to these circumstances, we are not permitting the appellants to raise the new plea. It is now too late.
8. There is no force in this appeal and accordingly it is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.
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