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Bachan Singh v. Dhian Das And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Tehal Singh sold the suit properties on 11 October 1894 to the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants. On 11 October 1895 his son, Krishna Singh, filed a suit claiming the alienation was not binding because the property was ancestral and the sale lacked consideration and legal necessity. By decree dated 28 November 1895 the court held that Krishna Singh could recover possession after his father’s death upon payment of Rs 2,500. Krishna Singh died before Tehal Singh. On 11 April 1944 Tehal Singh adopted the present appellant, who survived Tehal Singh’s death in 1949. The appellant instituted the present suit for possession in 1959.
The trial court dismissed the suit as time-barred under the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920. The first appellate court and the High Court affirmed that decision. The appellant obtained special leave and brought the present appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit properties were “ancestral” in the hands of Tehal Singh so as to attract Article 2(A)(b) of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920.
- Whether the limitation period prescribed by Article 2(A)(b) stood suspended on the basis of general principles of suspension of limitation or right of action, in view of earlier litigation concerning the validity of the appellant’s adoption.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 does not apply because the suit properties were not ancestral in the hands of Tehal Singh.
- Even if the Act applies, the limitation period under Article 2(A)(b) was suspended while the appellant litigated the validity of his adoption between 1949 and 1959; therefore the suit filed in 1959 was within time.
Respondents’ Arguments
This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Murli Dhar v. Ram Saran Dass, AIR 1947 All 256 | Invoked by appellant for the alleged general principle of suspension of limitation/right of action beyond the statutory provisions. | The Court declined to examine in detail and held that, in any event, the appellant could have sued from 1952 onwards; hence no suspension applied. |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
1. Ancestral nature of the property: The Court held that if the property had not been ancestral, Krishna Singh could not have challenged the 1894 sale. Because the present suit itself relied on the 1895 declaratory decree obtained by Krishna Singh, the property must necessarily be ancestral. Moreover, the appellant raised this contention for the first time in second appeal, which involved factual determinations and should not have been entertained.
2. Applicability of Article 2(A)(b): Once the property was accepted as ancestral, clause (b) of Article 2(A) prescribed a three-year limitation period for a successor who already possessed a declaratory decree like the one obtained in 1895.
3. No statutory suspension of limitation: Sections 14 and 15 of the Limitation Act, 1908 did not apply. The earlier adoption litigation involved different parties and did not legally restrain the appellant from suing the defendants.
4. Rejection of extra-statutory suspension: Even assuming a broader “general principle” of suspension existed, the appellant’s title was definitively recognised in 1952 when the first appellate court upheld his adoption. From that date he faced no legal impediment to sue for possession; waiting until 1959 exceeded the statutory three-year period.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.
The Supreme Court affirmed the concurrent findings that the suit was barred by limitation. The decision upholds the strict application of Article 2(A)(b) of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 and declines to expand limitations law through extra-statutory suspension doctrines. No new precedent is announced; the immediate effect is dismissal of the appellant’s claim for possession.
K.S Hegde, J.— This is an appeal by special leave. The facts of the case lie within a narrow compass and the questions of law arising for decision are also few.
2. The suit from which this appeal arises is for possession of the suit properties on the basis of the plaintiff's title. One Tehal Singh sold the suit properties to the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants by means of a deed, dated October 11, 1894. His son Krishna Singh sued for a declaration that the said alienation being an alienation of ancestral properties was inoperative against his reversionary interest as it had been effected without consideration and without legal necessity. This suit was filed on October 11, 1895. The suit was decreed in part. The decree declared that the plaintiff Krishna Singh will be entitled to recover possession of the suit properties after the death of his father on payment of Rs 2500. This decree was made on November 28, 1895. But Krishna Singh died during the life time of Tehal Singh. Thereafter Tehal Singh adopted the appellant on April 11, 1944. Tehal Singh died in 1949. The present suit was brought in 1959.
3. The trial court dismissed the suit as being barred under the provisions of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 (Act 1 of 1920). That decision was affirmed by the first appellate court as well as by the High Court in second appeal.
4. The material portion of Section 5 of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 runs:
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the 1st Schedule of the said Act (Indian Limitation Act, 1908), every suit, of any description specified in the Schedule annexed to this Act instituted after the period of limitation prescribed, therefore, in the Schedule shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence.”
Article 2(A) of the Schedule provides:
“Description of suit Period of limitation 2(A) Suit for possession of ancestral immovable property which has been alienated on the ground that the alienation is not binding on the plaintiff according to custom— (a) if no declaratory decree the nature referred to in article ... 6 years (b) if such a declaratory decree is obtained … 3 years.”
5. It was conceded at the bar that if the suit property is held to be the ancestral property qua Tehal Singh then the relevant period of limitation is that prescribed in clause (b) of Article 2(A) of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920.
6. The first contention taken on behalf of the appellant is that the provisions of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 do not apply to the facts of the present case as the suit properties were not the family properties of Tehal Singh. This contention does not appear to have been taken either before the trial court or before the first appellate court. It was taken for the first time before the High Court in second appeal. The High Court considered that contention and rejected the same. In our opinion, the High Court should not have allowed that contention to be raised for the first time in second appeal as a decision on that contention involved determination of questions of fact.
7. Prima facie the contention of the appellant that the suit properties were not ancestral in the hands of Tehal Singh is unsustainable. If those properties were not ancestral properties of Tehal Singh, Krishna Singh could not have interdicted the sale effected by his father. The very basis of the present suit is the decree obtained by Krishna Singh. Hence we are unable to accept the contention that the suit properties were not ancestral in the hands of Tehal Singh.
8. The next contention taken on behalf of the appellant is that the period of limitation fixed for filing the suit under Article 2(A) of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 stood suspended because of the general principles of suspension of limitation or right of action. In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to state a few more facts. After the death of Tehal Singh, his collaterals contested the genuineness and validity of the adoption of the appellant. The Revenue Authorities refused to transfer the registry in the name of the appellant until his title was established in a civil court. Consequently the appellant sued for a declaration that he had been validly adopted by Tehal Singh. This suit was dismissed by the trial court. But the first appellate court allowed the appeal of the appellant and decreed his suit in 1952. Thereafter the opposite party took up the matter in second appeal to the High Court. The second appeal was dismissed in 1959. It may be noted that to that litigation, the present defendants or their predecessors-in-title were not parties. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that because of the litigation between the appellant and the collaterals of his adoptive father, the period of limitation for filing the present suit stood suspended.
9. Quite clearly the appellant cannot get the benefit of either Section 14 or Section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The previous litigation was not a litigation between the parties to the present suit or between their predecessors-in-title. Section 15 of the Limitation Act is equally inapplicable as the appellant was not restrained from filing the suit from which this appeal has arisen for any of the reasons mentioned in that section. Hence the appellant was compelled to fall back on what is called the general principles of suspension of limitation or right of action. In support of this contention reliance was primarily placed on the decision of the High Court of Allahabad in Murli Dhar v. Ram Saran Dass AIR 1947 All 256, ILR 1946 All 633, 1947 ALJ 170. We have not thought it necessary to examine whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908 were exhaustive and whether it can be said that there are any general principles of suspension of limitation or right of action in addition to those mentioned in that Act. Admittedly the appellant's title was cleared in 1952 when the first appellate court declared that he had been lawfully adopted as the son of Tehal Singh. This cleared his way — if clearing of the way was necessary — for instituting the suit for possession against the defendants. He had no justification either in law or in equity for not suing the defendants for possession of the suit properties thereafter.
10. For the reasons mentioned above, we find no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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