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Ram Narain Singh And Others v. State Of Bihar .

Supreme Court Of India
Jul 28, 1972
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants—Ram Narain Singh and six others—were involved in a long-standing land dispute with Ram Prasad and his associates over Plot No. 23 in Village Beayapur, District Patna. In September 1958, proceedings under Section 144 CrPC were initiated because of tensions between the groups. In October 1959, hostilities allegedly escalated when an idol of Durga, said to have been installed by Ram Prasad, was broken; a related criminal case ended in acquittal of the accused.

On 7 May 1959, Ram Prasad filed an application under Section 107 CrPC before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Dinapur, alleging that the appellants threatened him with lathis and intended to damage his mango crop. Acting on a police report, the Magistrate started cross-cases and ordered each appellant to execute a peace-bond of ₹2,000 with two sureties for one year, with nine months’ simple imprisonment in default.

The Additional Sessions Judge, Patna, partly allowed the appeal by reducing the bond to ₹1,000 with two sureties of ₹500 each, still for one year; Arjan Singh’s appeal was fully allowed. The Patna High Court dismissed the appellants’ criminal revision in limine. Because successive courts granted stay orders, no bonds were ever furnished. The present Supreme Court appeal was heard in 1972—thirteen years after the incidents that triggered the Section 107 proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in view of the thirteen-year lapse since the 1959 incidents, the appellants could still be compelled in 1972 to furnish bonds for keeping the peace under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  2. Whether an order under Section 107 CrPC becomes ineffective once the one-year period for which the bond was originally required has expired.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The incidents prompting the Section 107 proceedings occurred in 1959; compelling the appellants to execute bonds in 1972 would be inequitable and purposeless.
  • Because stay orders prevented execution of the bonds, the original one-year period had long since expired, rendering the order nugatory.

State’s Arguments

  • The Supreme Court should not disturb the concurrent findings and orders of the courts below, which directed the appellants to furnish peace-bonds.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Justice H. R. Khanna reiterated that Section 107 CrPC is preventive, aiming to forestall breaches of the peace rather than to punish past misconduct. A Magistrate may demand a bond if satisfied that a person is likely to disturb public tranquillity.

The Court rejected the categorical claim that the expiry of the original bond period automatically nullifies pending Section 107 proceedings; otherwise, an individual could evade preventive action by merely delaying the process. Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that subsequent events are relevant. If circumstances show the apprehension of breach of peace has disappeared—either through reconciliation or a long stretch of calm—the court may drop the proceedings.

Applying this principle, the Court noted that:

  • All material incidents dated back to 1959, and no untoward event had occurred in the intervening thirteen years.
  • There was no evidence of continuing tension or threat posed by the appellants.

These facts led the Court to infer that the original danger had evaporated. Consequently, compelling the appellants to execute bonds in 1972 would neither be “expedient” nor serve the preventive purpose of Section 107.

Holding and Implications

Appeal allowed; appellants discharged.

The Supreme Court set aside the orders requiring the appellants to execute peace-bonds, concluding that, after thirteen years without incident, preventive action was no longer justified. The decision provides guidance that courts may consider subsequent lapse of time and changed circumstances when determining whether to maintain proceedings under Section 107 CrPC, although it does not establish a new binding precedent beyond the case’s specific facts.

Show all summary ...

H.R Khanna, J.— This is an appeal by special leave by Ram Narain Singh and six others against the judgment of Patna High Court, whereby their revision petition was dismissed in limine.

2. There was a dispute between the appellants on the one side and Ram Prasad and others on the opposite side in respect of Plot No. 23 situated in Village Beayapur in District Patna. Proceedings under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were taken in September 1958, because of that dispute. In October 1959, dispute again arose between the parties because of the alleged breaking of the idol of Durga by some of the appellants. The idol was stated to have been installed by Ram Prasad. The breaking of the idol gave rise to a criminal case against Ram Narain Singh and Arjan Singh. The accused were, however, stated to have been acquitted in that case. On May 7, 1959 Ram Prasad filed an application before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Dinapur against the appellants and some others for taking action under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In that application it was stated that there was a good mango crop in the land of Ram Prasad and the appellants and their companions wanted to cause loss to Ram Prasad. The appellants, it was further stated, used to carry lathis and held out threats to Ram Prasad. The learned Magistrate sent that application to the police. The police then submitted a report and two cross-cases were started against the opposite parties under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Notices were thereafter issued to the parties to furnish bond. The appellants denied the allegations against them and stated that they were peace-loving citizens. They denied having held out any threat to Ram Prasad or having removed his mango fruits. The learned Magistrate ordered the appellants to furnish bonds in the sum of Rs 2000 with two sureties each for the same amount for one year, and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of nine months.

3. On appeal the Additional Sessions Judge, Patna reduced the amount of bond to Rs 1000 with two sureties of Rs 500 each for a period of one year. In default each of the appellants was ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of nine months. The appeal of one Arjan Singh, who had also been ordered to be bound down, was allowed. The High Court dismissed in limine the criminal revision filed by the appellants.

4. Mr U.P Singh on behalf of the appellants has contended in this Court that as the matter relates to the year 1959, it would not be proper to bind down the appellants in the year 1972. It is pointed out that because of the stay orders granted by the different courts, no bond has so far been furnished by the appellants. As against that, Mr Bindra on behalf of the State has urged that this Court should not interfere with the order of the courts below.

5. Under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class may require a person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for keeping the peace for a period not exceeding one year as the Magistrate thinks fit to fix, if such Magistrate is informed that the said person is likely to commit breach of peace or disturb public tranquillity or to do any wrongful act that may occasion breach of peace, or disturb public tranquillity and if the Magistrate is further of the opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against that person. The underlying object of the section is preventive and not penal. The section is designed to enable the Magistrate to take measures with a view to prevent commission of offences involving breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquillity. Wide powers have been conferred on the Magistrates specified in this section and as the matter affects the liberty of the subject who has not been found guilty of an offence, it is essential that the power should be exercised strictly in accordance with law.

6. The question with which we are concerned in this appeal is whether because of an incident which took place in 1959, the appellants should be compelled in 1972 to furnish bonds for keeping the peace, for that would be the necessary consequence of the dismissal of the appeal. We may at the outset state that we find it difficult to accede to the submission made by Mr Singh that once the period for which bond was ordered to be executed, has expired the order becomes nugatory and the proceedings under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be dropped. The proceedings under Section 107 of the Code, in our opinion, can continue despite the fact that the period for which the bond was required to be executed has expired. To hold otherwise would lead to the result that the proceedings under the section would have to be dropped if the person proceeded against succeeds in protracting the proceedings, even though the apprehension of breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquillity still persists. At the same time, the court is not precluded from taking into account the subsequent events. If the material on record discloses that though there was a danger of breach of peace at one time, because of the happening of a subsequent event the danger of breach of peace has disappeared, the court can drop the proceedings and discharge the person proceeded against. Even in the absence of some positive evidence of reconciliation between the opposing parties, if the court finds that since the date of incident complained of, a very long period has elapsed during the course of which nothing untowards has happened, the court may well draw the inference that the danger of breach of peace has vanished.

7. In the present case the proceedings against the appellants were initiated in 1959. The proceedings relate to an incident also of 1959. There is nothing to show that during the period of 13 years since then, the appellants have done anything as may cause apprehension of breach of peace. In the context of the above circumstances, we are of the opinion that it would not be expedient or essential to compel the appellants to execute bonds under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the year 1972. We, therefore, accept the appeal and discharge the appellants.