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R.L Kapur v. State Of Madras .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant was proceeded against in Contempt Case No. 3 of 1962 before the High Court of Madras for a letter he had written to the then Chief Justice containing derogatory remarks about the dismissal of his revision application by a Single Judge. To secure his appearance in those contempt proceedings, the appellant deposited Rs 500 in the High Court. On 25 February 1964 the High Court found him guilty of contempt, sentencing him to six months’ simple imprisonment and imposing a fine (amount unspecified in the opinion). He served the custodial sentence but did not pay the fine.
The deposit of Rs 500 remained untouched until 1971, when two applications were filed: (i) the appellant sought a refund of the security deposit, and (ii) the State sought adjustment of that amount toward the unpaid fine. On 29 June 1971 the High Court dismissed the appellant’s application and ordered that the Rs 500 be applied to satisfy the outstanding fine. The present appeal, brought to the Supreme Court of India by special leave, challenges that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the recovery of the fine was barred by limitation under Section 70 of the Indian Penal Code because more than six years had elapsed since the sentence was passed.
- Whether, by virtue of Section 25 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, Sections 63-70 of the Penal Code and the warrant-execution provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to fines imposed in contempt proceedings by the High Court.
- Whether the High Court possessed the inherent or incidental power to appropriate the Rs 500 security deposit toward satisfaction of the fine.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Invoked Section 70 IPC, contending that the State’s 1971 application was time-barred because the fine could be levied only within six years of the sentencing order.
- Relied on Section 25 of the General Clauses Act, asserting that the order imposing the fine must be regarded as one passed under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952; hence Sections 63-70 IPC (including the six-year limitation) and the CrPC procedure governed recovery.
State's Position
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the State’s legal arguments, but the State sought adjustment of the security deposit toward the unpaid fine.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu High Court, AIR 1954 SC 186; (1954) SCR 454 | The Contempt of Courts Act assumes, rather than confers, the High Court’s inherent contempt jurisdiction; the Act merely regulates procedure and imposes limits. | Cited to support the conclusion that the High Court’s power to punish for contempt is a special, inherent jurisdiction derived from Article 215 of the Constitution, not from the 1952 Act; therefore Section 70 IPC and CrPC provisions do not apply. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Source of Contempt Power: The Court held that Article 215 of the Constitution makes every High Court a court of record with inherent power to punish for contempt of itself. This jurisdiction is “special” and does not emanate from the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952.
2. Effect of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952: Sections 3–5 of the Act merely recognize and regulate the pre-existing contempt jurisdiction; they do not create it. Consequently, the Act does not transform contempt orders into ones made “under” an Act for purposes of Section 25 of the General Clauses Act.
3. Inapplicability of Section 25, General Clauses Act: Because the contempt power is constitutional and special, fines imposed in exercise of that power are not fines “under any Act, Regulation, rule or bye-law.” Therefore Sections 63-70 IPC and the CrPC warrant provisions do not automatically apply.
4. Limitation under Section 70 IPC: As Section 70 governs only fines imposed under the Penal Code or statutes assimilated via Section 25 of the General Clauses Act, it has no application here. Accordingly, no six-year limitation restricts recovery of the fine.
5. Power to Appropriate the Deposit: Being a court of record with inherent powers, the High Court may take incidental measures to effectuate its contempt jurisdiction, including ordering that a security deposit made by the contemnor be applied toward the unpaid fine.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s order directing that the Rs 500 deposit be adjusted toward the unpaid fine. No order as to costs.
Implications: The judgment clarifies that contempt fines imposed by a High Court stem from its constitutional, inherent jurisdiction; hence statutory limitation periods under Section 70 IPC do not constrain their enforcement. It also affirms the High Court’s power to apply funds deposited in court toward satisfaction of such fines. The ruling sets no new broad precedent but reinforces the autonomy of High Courts in contempt matters.
J.M Shelat, J.— This appeal, by a special leave, is directed against the order of the High Court of Madras, directing a sum of Rs 500, deposited in the High Court as security for the appellant's appearance before it in certain contempt of court proceedings, to be adjusted against the fine imposed upon him in those proceedings. It appears that the contempt of court proceedings, being No. 3 of 1962, were taken against the appellant in the High Court in respect of a letter written and addressed by the appellant to the then Chief Justice of the High Court and which contained certain remarks in regard to the dismissal of the appellant's revision application by a Single Judge of the High Court. Thus, the contempt with which the plaintiff was charged in those proceedings was contempt of the High Court, and not the City Civil Court, Madras, in which the appellant had filed the suit from out of which the said revision application arose. In those proceedings, the High Court, by its judgment and order, dated February 25, 1964, held the appellant guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to six months' simple imprisonment and fine. The appellant served out the sentence of imprisonment, but failed to pay the fine.
2. It appears that the said amount of Rs 500, deposited, as aforesaid, in the said contempt proceedings, remained unattached till 1971. In 1971, two applications were filed in the High Court, one by the appellant for refund of the said amount and the other on behalf of the State for adjustment of the said amount towards the fine remaining unpaid. By an order, dated June 29, 1971, the High Court dismissed the appellant's application for refund and allowed the State's application for payment of the said sum towards satisfaction of the said unpaid fine.
3. As against the said order, counsel for the appellant relied on Section 70 of the Penal Code and urged that six years having elapsed since the passing of the order imposing fine upon the appellant, the State's application was time-barred and the High Court could not pass the impugned order, the effect of which was to collect the said fine from out of the said deposit. If Section 70 were to apply to the said contempt of court proceedings, there is no doubt that the State's application would be time-barred as that section in terms provides that such fine can be levied within six years after the passing of the order of conviction and sentence. But Section 5 of the Penal Code provides, inter alia, that its provisions are not to affect the provisions of any special or local law. Under Section 41 of the Penal Code, a special law is one applicable to a particular subject. Therefore, if the law as to contempt of court, as administered by the High Court of Madras, a chartered High Court, were to be regarded as special law, Section 70 of the Penal Code, obviously, cannot apply, and since such a special law does not prescribe any period of limitation for collecting and satisfying a fine imposed thereunder, no question of limitation would arise.
4. Counsel, however, relied on Section 25 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which provides that Sections 63 to 70 of the Penal Code and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the issue and execution of warrants for the levy of fines shall apply to all fines imposed under “any Act, Regulation, rule or bye-law” unless such Act, Regulation, rule or bye-law contains an express provision to the contrary. The argument was that the order of sentence which imposed upon the appellant the fine was and must be regarded as an order passed under the Contempt of Courts Act, 32 (of 1952, and consequently, Section 70 of the Penal Code was applicable.
5. The question is, does the power of the High Court of Madras to punish contempt of itself arise under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, so that under Section 25 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, Sections 63 to 70 of the Penal Code and the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure would apply? The answer to such a question is furnished by Article 215 of the Constitution and the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, themselves. Article 215 declares that every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Whether Article 215 declares the power of the High Court already existing in it by reason of its being a court of record, or whether the article confers the power as inherent in a court of record, the jurisdiction is a special one, not arising or derived from the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, and therefore, not within the purview of either the Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such a position is also clear from the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. Section 3 of that Act provides that every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in accordance with the same procedure and practice in respect of contempt of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself. The only limitation to the power is, as provided by sub-section (2), that it shall not take cognizance of a contempt committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Penal Code. As explained in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu High Court, AIR 1954 SC 186, (1954) SCR 454 at 463, (1954) SCJ 67 Section 3 of the Act is similar to Section 2 of the 1926 Act, and “far from conferring a new jurisdiction, assumes, as did the old Act, the existence of a right to punish for contempt in every High Court and further assumes the existence of a special practice and procedure, for it says that every High Court shall exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority “in accordance with the same procedure and practice....”. In any case, so far as contempt of the High Court itself is concerned, as distinguished from that of a court subordinate to it, the Constitution vests these rights in every High Court, and so no Act of a Legislature could take away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority. No doubt, Section 5 of the Act states that a High Court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into and try a contempt of itself or of a court subordinate to it whether the alleged contempt is committed within or outside the local limits of its jurisdiction and whether the contemnor is within or outside such limits. The effect of Section 5 is only to widen the scope of the existing jurisdiction of a special kind and not conferring a new jurisdiction. It is true that under Section 4 of the Act the maximum sentence and fine which can be imposed is respectively simple imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs 2000, or both. But that again is a restriction on an existing jurisdiction and not conferment of a new jurisdiction. That being the position, Section 25 in the General Clauses Act, 1897, cannot apply. The result is that Section 70 of the Penal Code is no impediment by way of limitation in the way of the recovery of the fine.
6. It is true that the deposit was made for a particular purpose, that is, to secure the presence of the appellant at the time of the hearing of the said contempt proceedings. But the High Court, as a court of record, being clothed with a special jurisdiction, has also all incidental and necessary powers to effectuate that jurisdiction. Consequently, it had the power to order satisfaction of fine imposed by it from out of an available fund deposited by or on behalf of or for the benefit of the appellant.
7. In our view, the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant cannot, for the reasons aforesaid, be sustained. The appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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