- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Shri Thepfulo Nakhro Angani v. Smt Ravaluei Alias Rano M. Shaiza .
Factual and Procedural Background
An election appeal under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 came before a two-judge Bench (Shah, C.J. and Grover, J.) on 14 September 1970. During the initial hearing the Bench identified “an important question of procedure” concerning the scope of an appeal under Section 116-A (as amended in 1967) and whether a respondent, without filing a separate appeal, could argue that charges rejected by the High Court were nevertheless proved. Owing to the importance of this issue, the matter was referred to a larger Bench of five judges with directions for an expedited hearing.
When the five-judge Bench assembled, it decided to confine itself to that single procedural question rather than determine the entire appeal. Reasons for the ruling, first announced on 14 September 1970, are set out in this opinion by K.S. Hegde, J.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in an appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (post-1967 amendment), a respondent may, without filing a substantive appeal or cross-appeal, support the judgment in his favour on grounds that were decided against him by the High Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments (Mr. S. V. Gupte)
- Attempted to distinguish Ramanbhai Ashabhai Patel v. Debhi Ajitkumar Fulsinji on the basis that:
- (a) The earlier case involved an appeal by special leave, allegedly giving the Court a wider jurisdiction than an appeal under Section 116-A.
- (b) The scope of Section 116-A prior to its 1966 amendment differed materially from its present scope.
- On the merits of the election dispute (mentioned in the referral order), contended that the charge under Section 123(6) read with Section 77 of the Act was not made out.
Respondent’s Arguments (Mr. Chari)
- Asserted entitlement to rely, in the present appeal, on charges the High Court had rejected, without the necessity of filing a separate appeal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ramanbhai Ashabhai Patel v. Debhi Ajitkumar Fulsinji (1965) 1 SCR 712 | The Supreme Court has power to decide all points arising from the judgment under appeal and may allow a party to support that judgment on grounds decided against him, even absent a provision identical to Order 41 Rule 22 CPC; the Court can adapt procedural rules to fill gaps. | The Bench held that this precedent “concluded” the present question of law and must therefore govern the appeal, rejecting attempts to distinguish it on jurisdictional or pre-/post-amendment grounds. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court treated Ramanbhai as directly governing the procedural issue, emphasizing that:
- The earlier ruling was not dependent on the appeal having been brought by special leave; its rationale applied equally to statutory appeals under Section 116-A.
- The reasoning in Ramanbhai was not tied to the pre-1966 text of Section 116-A; instead, it rested on the Supreme Court’s inherent authority to frame appropriate procedures and to borrow suitable provisions from the Code of Civil Procedure when the Court’s own rules are silent.
- Justice requires permitting a successful party, who ordinarily would not obtain special leave, to defend the judgment on any available ground, including those rejected below.
On these bases, the Court rejected both distinctions urged by the appellant and reaffirmed that a respondent may, without a cross-appeal, advance such grounds in an appeal under Section 116-A.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The procedural question is answered in the affirmative: a respondent in an appeal under Section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, may support the judgment in his favour on grounds that were decided against him by the High Court, notwithstanding the absence of an express rule akin to Order 41 Rule 22 CPC. The appeal itself is to proceed before the Bench presided over by Mitter, J., for determination of the remaining issues.
Implications: The ruling reaffirms and extends the principle in Ramanbhai, confirming that the Supreme Court can and will allow respondents in statutory election appeals to rely on adverse findings without filing separate appeals. The immediate effect is procedural guidance for the continuation of this election appeal; no new substantive precedent was created beyond the reaffirmation of existing Supreme Court practice.
K.S Hegde, J.— The decision on the question of law considered by this Bench was announced on the 14th of this month. We are now proceeding to give our reasons in support of that decision. On September 14, 1970, two of us (Shah, C.J and Grover J.), passed the following order:
“This appeal raises an important question of procedure. We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties. Mr Gupte appearing for the appellant contended that the charge under Section 123 (6), read with Section 77 of the Representation of the People Act was not made out. Mr Chari appearing on behalf of the respondent contended that he was entitled to submit without preferring a substantive appeal to this Court that the charges in respect of which the appellant has been absolved by order of the High Court are proved and he should be permitted to raise those questions in this appeal. Our attention has not been invited to any case which interprets the provisions of Section 116(a) of the Representation of the People Act as it stands after the amendment made in the year 1967.
In view of the importance of the question, we direct that the case be referred to a larger Bench of five Judges. Hearing expedited.”
2. Though the entire appeal was referred to a larger Bench for decision, at the hearing it was considered advisable to decide only the question of law set out in the order and not the whole case. We accordingly heard arguments only on that question. In our opinion that question is concluded by the decision of this Court in Ramanbhai Ashabhai Patel v. Debhi Ajitkumar Fulsinji (1965) 1 SCR 712.
3. Mr S.V Gupte learned counsel for the appellant tried to distinguish that decision on two grounds viz. (1) that the decision in question was rendered in an appeal to this Court by special leave and as such the jurisdiction of this Court was much wider than that conferred on this Court by Section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and (2) that the scope of an appeal under Section 116-A before its amendment in 1966 was different than from its scope at present. We are unable to accept either of these two contentions. In the above decision, it was ruled that this Court has power to decide all the points arising from the judgment appealed against and even in the absence of an express provision like Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court can devise appropriate procedure to be adopted at the hearing and there could be no better way of supplying the deficiency than by drawing upon the provisions of a general law like the Code of Civil Procedure and adopting such of those provisions as are suitable. The decision of the Court did not rest either on the ground that the appeal before it was brought by special leave of this Court or on the interpretation of Section 116-A as it then stood. The reasons behind the Rule laid down by this Court are found at p. 725 of the report. Therein it is observed:
“It is true that the Rules framed by this Court in exercise of its rule-making powers do not contain any provision analogous to Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure which permits a party to support the judgment appealed against upon a ground which has been found against him in that judgment. The provision nearest to it is the one contained in Order 43 Rule 3 of the Rules of this Court which requires parties to file statement of cases. Sub-rule (1) of that rule provides that Part I of the statement of the case shall also set out the contentions of the parties and the points of law and fact arising in the appeal. It further provides that in Part II a party shall set out the propositions of law to be urged in support of the contentions of the party lodging the case and the authorities in support thereof. There is no reason to limit the provision of this rule only to those contentions which deal with the points found in favour of that party in the judgment appealed from. Apart from that we think that while dealing with the appeal before it this Court has the power to decide all the points arising from the judgment appealed against and even in the absence of an express provision like Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure it can devise the appropriate procedure to be adopted at the hearing. There could be no better way of supplying the deficiency than by drawing upon theprovisions of a a general law like the Code of Civil Procedure and adopting such of those provisions as are suitable. We cannot lose sight of the fact that normally a party in whose favour the judgment appealed from has been given will not be granted special leave to appeal from it. Considerations of justice, therefore, require that this Court should in appropriate cases permit a party placed in such a position to support the judgment in his favour even upon grounds which were negatived in that judgment.”
4. The decision referred to above will govern the question of law with which we are concerned in this case. The appeal was already directed by the Chief Justice to be posted before the Bench presided over by Mitter, J., for further hearing.
Alert