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Md. Usman And Others v. State Of Andhra Pradesh And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The controversy arose after certain clerks in the Registration and Stamps Department of Andhra Pradesh—including clerks from the offices of the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages and the Registrar of Firms—were recruited in March 1965 as Sub-Registrars Grade-II. A group of fellow clerks (“the petitioners”) filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging both the validity of their colleagues’ recruitment and the constitutionality of Rule 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Registration Subordinate Service Special Rules (“the Rules”).
A Single Judge of the High Court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, a Division Bench upheld most of the recruitment process but struck down Rule 5 as violative of Article 14, thereby quashing the impugned appointments. The aggrieved parties obtained a certificate, and the matter reached the Supreme Court, where only two questions were pressed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Rule 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Registration Subordinate Service Special Rules is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
- Whether the disputed recruitments to the post of Sub-Registrar Grade-II were made in accordance with the applicable Rules.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- Upper Division Clerks (UDCs) and Lower Division Clerks (LDCs) form distinct classes: UDCs hold superior posts, draw higher salaries, and meet stricter promotional criteria (including completion of the Accounts and Registration Tests).
- By pooling UDCs and LDCs together for recruitment to Sub-Registrar Grade-II, Rule 5 treats “unequals as equals,” offending Article 14. Equality is violated both when equals are treated unequally and when unequals are treated equally.
- Cited Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala to illustrate that lack of proper classification amounts to unconstitutional discrimination.
Respondents' Arguments
- Rule 5 must be examined in light of the practical context: Sub-Registrars form a state-wide cadre, whereas UDCs/LDCs belong to district-wise cadres where promotional prospects vary sharply by district.
- If UDCs alone were favored, clerks in districts with scarce UDC posts would be unfairly disadvantaged despite equal or greater seniority and efficiency.
- The Rule mitigates this inequity by treating all permanent clerks with seven years’ service as one pool while still giving preference to UDCs (or those with five years’ UDC service) during selection.
- The Registrar’s method—preparing a seniority list of all eligible clerks and selecting candidates on a “seniority-cum-merit” basis—complied with the Rules.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala, AIR 1961 SC 552; (1961) 3 SCR 77 | A statute can violate Article 14 by making no classification where one is necessary, thus treating unequals equally. | Referenced by petitioners to argue that Rule 5 fails to distinguish between UDCs and LDCs; the Supreme Court acknowledged the principle but found the factual setting distinguishable. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Justice K.S. Hegde, writing for the Court, first identified the practical problem: promotion from LDC to UDC occurs on a district-wise basis, leading to significant disparities in the time required for promotion across districts. If UDC status were made the threshold criterion, clerks in districts with few UDC posts would be placed at an unwarranted disadvantage.
The Court held that:
- For a state-wide recruitment to Sub-Registrar Grade-II, pooling all permanent clerks with at least seven years of service constituted a reasonable classification that advanced, rather than impaired, equality.
- Rule 5 still noted a preference for candidates with five years’ UDC service, thereby recognizing their higher qualifications without creating absolute barriers for equally senior LDCs.
- The High Court erred by overlooking the rationale underpinning Rule 5 and focusing solely on the formal difference between UDCs and LDCs.
- Regarding the recruitment process, the Registrar’s “seniority-cum-merit” approach—preparing a consolidated seniority list, assessing suitability, and applying the rule-based preference—conformed to the Rules, which do not mandate selection on merit alone.
Consequently, the Court rejected the claim that Rule 5 treats unequals as equals and affirmed that the impugned appointments were made in accordance with the Rules.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed. The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench judgment, restored the Single Judge’s dismissal of the writ petition, upheld the constitutionality of Rule 5, and validated the March 1965 recruitments of Sub-Registrars Grade-II.
Implications: The decision confirms that, in evaluating equality challenges, the Court will consider the underlying administrative rationale and practical realities of service structures. While no new legal doctrine was announced, the judgment stabilizes recruitment practices in the Andhra Pradesh Registration Department by affirming the validity of Rule 5 and the state-wide pooling of clerks for promotional posts.
K.S Hegde, J.— The principal question that arises for decision in this appeal by certificate is as to the vires of Rule 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Registration Subordinate Service Special Rules, to be hereinafter referred as “the Rules”. The High Court has struck down this Rule on the ground that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. As a result of that conclusion, it has also quashed the recruitment of some of the respondents made in March 1965, for being posted as Sub-Registrars Grade-II.
2. The petitioners as well as Respondent 3 onwards in the writ petition were serving as clerks, either in the upper division or in the lower division, in the Registration and Stamps Department including the Office of the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages and the Office of the Registrar of the Firms. Some of the respondents had been recruited by the Inspector-General of Registration and Stamps, Andhra Pradesh for being appointed as Sub-Registrars. The petitioners challenged the validity of their recruitment on various grounds, by means of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. But that petition was summarily dismissed by a Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Thereafter, the matter was taken up in appeal to a Division Bench of that Court. The Division Bench rejected all the contentions of the petitioners except one viz. that Rule 5 of the Rules is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. As a result of that conclusion it struck down the impugned recruitment. Only two questions were presented before us for decision viz.—
(i) whether Rule 5 of the Rules is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution; and
(ii) whether the recruitments made are not in accordance with the rules.
At this stage, it may be mentioned that the High Court has held that the impugned recruitments were made in accordance with the rules. In other words, the second question was decided against the petitioners.
3. We shall first take up the question as to the vires of Rule 5. The Rules provide for the promotion to the posts of Sub-Registrar as well as for recruitment to those posts. Rule 2 provides that a post of Grade-I Sub-Registrar should be filled up by promotion from Grade-II Sub-Registrar. So far as Grade-II Sub-Registrars are concerned, they are to be appointed either by promotion from reserve Sub-Registrars or by “recruitment by transfer from the clerks of the Registration and Stamps Department including the Office of the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages and the Office of the Registrar of the Firms”. Rule 5 deals with qualifications for being recruited as Grade-II Sub-Registrars. That Rule reads:
“Qualifications.— No person shall be eligible for appointment to the category mentioned below unless he possesses the qualification shown.
Category and qualifications.— (1) Sub-Registrars, II-Grade:— (i) Must be a permanent clerk and must have served for a period of not less than seven years on duty as clerk in the Registration and Stamps Department including the Office of the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages and the Office of the Registrar of Firms;
(ii) must have passed the Registration Test; and
(iii) (1) must have taken at the final examination at the end of his school or college course, one of the following languages, namely:
Telugu, Hindi, Oriya, Kannada, Tamil, Urdu or Marathi, or
(2) must have passed the Government Translation Test or the Second Class Language Test — Full Test.
‘(iv) must have passed the second class language Test — Full Test — in a language other than that taken for SSLC or University’.
Preference shall be given to persons who, in addition to the qualifications specified in items (i) to (iii) possess a Degree in Law of a University in the State or any other equivalent qualification or a Pleadership Certificate in the First Grade or who have put in five years service in the category of Upper Division Clerks in the Registration Department.”
4. It was urged that this rule is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution because though among the clerks there are UDCs as well as LDCs, yet all of them had been put in one class for the purpose of recruitment. As per the Ministerial Service Rules the UDCs had to be selected from the LDCs after the LDCs had put in certain number of years of service and after they had passed the Accounts Test as well as the Registration Test. A UDC holds superior post to that of an LDC His salary is higher and his conditions of service are better than that of an LDC Hence it was urged that as Rule 5 treats UDCs as well as LDCs as equal for the purpose of recruitment for the post of a Grade-II Sub-Registrar, the Rule violates the doctrine of equality. According to the petitioners the equality doctrine is attracted not only when equals are treated as unequals but also where unequals are treated as equals. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that a statutory provision may offend Article 14 of the Constitution both by finding differences where there are none and by making no difference where there is one. The proposition of law advanced on behalf of the petitioners is unexceptionable. This Court ruled in Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair v. The State of Kerala AIR 1961 SC 552, (1961) 3 SCR 77, (1961) 2 SCJ 269 that when the statute obliged every person who held land to pay tax at the flat rate prescribed, whether or not he made any income out of the property, or whether or not the property was capable of yielding any income, there being no attempt at classification in the provisions of the statute, the statute denied equality before law because of lack of classification. Similar views have been expressed by this Court in other decisions. It is not necessary to refer to those decisions.
5. On the other hand it was argued on behalf of the contesting respondents that before considering the vires of Rule 5, we must first ascertain the reason behind the rule to find out whether in fact there is discrimination. The contesting respondents do not deny that the position of a UDC is superior to that of a LDC But according to them it became necessary for the State to pool together UDCs as well as the LDCs for the purpose of recruitment in question for the following reasons.
6. The Grade-II Sub-Registrars are in a statewise cadre whereas the UDCs and LDCs belong to a districtwise cadre. Promotion from LDC to UDC is made districtwise. The chances of promotion from LDC to UDC in one district materially differs from another district. It depends on the number of posts available in a particular district. In one district an LDC may be promoted as a UDC as soon as he puts in a service of five years, whereas in another district an LDC possessing the same or better qualifications as well as efficiency may not be promoted as an UDC for fifteen years or more. That being so while making recruitment to a Statewise cadre it was not possible for the State to make distinction between the LDCs and the UDCs. The only reasonable basis that could have been adopted was to treat the UDCs and LDCs as one class for the purpose of recruitment. But at the same time the rule provides for giving preference to the UDCs who had put in a service of five years or more. There is force in these contentions though there may be some anomaly in the case of LDCs and UDCs serving in the same district. But that anomaly cannot be avoided. The validity of a rule has to be judged by assessing its overall effect and not by picking up exceptional cases. What the Court has to see is whether the classification made is a just one taking all aspects into consideration.
7. On the facts before us we are unable to agree that for the purpose of recruitment with which we are concerned herein the State should have classified the UDCs and LDCs separately. If the State had treated the UDCs as being superior to the LDCs for the purpose of that recruitment it would have resulted in a great deal of injustice to a large section of the clerks. The fortuitous circumstance of an officer in a particular district becoming an UDC would have given him an undue advantage over his seniors who might have been as efficient or even more efficient than himself, merely because they chanced to serve in some other district. For the reasons mentioned above, we do not think that in the present case the State can be said to have treated unequals as equals. The rule of equality is intended to advance justice by avoiding discrimination. In our opinion the High Court by overlooking the reason behind Rule 5 came to the erroneous conclusion that the said rule violated Article 14 of the Constitution.
8. We agree with the High Court that there is no substance in the petitioners' contention that the impugned recruitments were not made in accordance with Rule 5. It is clear from the affidavit filed on behalf of the State and the Registrar that the Registrar had considered the case of all the qualified clerks, but the Registrar thought that the best basis for recruitment was to prepare a list of all the clerks, UDCs as well as LDCs arranging the names in the order of seniority as LDCs and thereafter consider each name and reject the unfit. In other words, the selection was made on the basis of seniority-cum-merit — the seniors among the clerks were selected subject to suitability. Those persons who were entitled to be given preference under the rules considered separately and recruited at the first instance. Only thereafter the other recruitments were made. The rules do not prescribe that the recruitment should be made on the basis of merit and merit alone. Bearing in mind the fact that the recruitment with which we are concerned in this case is a recruitment by transfer which means recruitment from among the ministerial officials, the method adopted by the Registrar appears to us to be the most reasonable one.
9. In the result this appeal is allowed, the order of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and that of the Single Judge restored. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in all the courts.
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