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Bai Chanchal And Others v. Syed Jalaluddin And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
In 1895 the predecessors-in-interest of plaintiff–respondents leased two parcels of land (Survey Nos. 503 and 506, Asarva, within the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation limits) to three individuals for 49 years at a yearly rent of Rs 199. Over time the original lessees transferred their interests, sub-let portions, and numerous chawls and other buildings were erected on the land.
After serving notices to vacate, the lessors filed a suit for possession in 1945. The litigation culminated in:
- 8 July 1946: A consent decree against several defendants (including the present four appellants) allowing them to remain in possession for five years on payment of mesne profits aggregating Rs 2,731-8-0 per annum.
- 28 January 1949: A second consent decree, on similar terms, against the remaining defendants; collectively all defendants were to pay Rs 7,314-8-0 per annum.
Before expiry of either five-year period, the Custodian of Evacuee Property took control in 1950 because one decree-holder became an evacuee. When the property was later released, the decree-holders filed an execution application on 26 March 1953 seeking possession and mesne profits. The execution court ordered eviction, overruling multiple objections. Successive challenges—first appeal, second appeal, and a Letters Patent appeal—were dismissed. The present appeal, by special leave to the Supreme Court, is directed against the Division Bench judgment upholding the execution order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the consent decree dated 8 July 1946 was a nullity for contravening Section 11(1) of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1939.
- Whether the consent decree created a new tenancy that attracted protection under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, thereby barring eviction of the appellants.
- Whether, in a single suit, the court lacked competence to pass two separate decrees (8 July 1946 and 28 January 1949), rendering either decree void.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The 8 July 1946 decree violated Section 11(1) of the 1939 Rent Restriction Act because the leased land fell within the Act’s definition of “premises”, being land let principally for business or trade.
- The terms of the consent decree effectively created a fresh five-year tenancy; once the 1947 Rent Control Act came into force, that tenancy enjoyed statutory protection against eviction.
- A single suit could not validly conclude with two different decrees; Rules 1 and 12 of Order 20 CPC allegedly barred the trial court from issuing the second decree of 28 January 1949.
Respondents' Arguments
This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gurpadappa Shivlingappa Itgi v. Sayad Akbar Sayad Budan Kadri (Bombay HC) | Illustrates circumstances in which a consent decree can create a new tenancy. | Distinguished: the consent decree in that case expressly recognised the defendant as a monthly tenant, unlike the decree under review. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Issue 1 – Applicability of the 1939 Act: The Court analysed the lease deed of 1895 and the pleadings. It found no indication that the land was let “principally for business or trade” as required by Section 4(2)(b) of the 1939 Act. References in the lease to construction of houses and freedom to use the land “in any manner” did not transform the lease into one for business. Consequently, the Act did not apply, and the 1946 decree was not void.
Issue 2 – Alleged creation of a new tenancy: Examining the language of the consent decree, the Court noted that it merely allowed judgment-debtors to stay for five years on payment of enhanced mesne profits, with immediate eviction upon default. There was no clause stating that the appellants became tenants. The substantial increase in monthly payments and the option of immediate eviction on default were inconsistent with an intention to grant tenancy rights. Therefore, no new tenancy arose and the 1947 Rent Control Act afforded no protection.
Issue 3 – Validity of two decrees in one suit: Relying on Order 23 Rule 3 and Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, the Court held that multiple decrees can validly be passed in the same suit—e.g., one on compromise with some defendants and later another dealing with remaining parties. The first decree (8 July 1946) resolved the rights of defendants who compromised then; the second decree (28 January 1949) settled matters with the rest. Hence both decrees were competent and enforceable.
The Court concluded that the execution court correctly dismissed the objections and ordered delivery of possession.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the execution court and the lower appellate courts, directing eviction of the appellants and enforcing the consent decree.
Implications: The decision secures immediate relief to the decree-holders without establishing new legal doctrine; it reiterates that (i) permissive occupation under a consent decree does not ipso facto create a tenancy and (ii) courts may enter multiple decrees in a single suit when compromises with different defendants occur at different times.
V. Bhargava, J.— The predecessors-in-interest of plaintiff-Respondents 1 to 3 gave, in 1895, land, bearing Serial Nos. 503 and 506 of Asarva within the limits of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, on lease for a period of 49 years at an annual rent of Rs 199, to three persons, Sha Ramchandra Ambaram, Pardesi Sukhlal Anandram and Mehta Bogha Mugatram. These original lessees, during the currency of the lease, made transfers of their rights and also granted sub-leases. A number of Chawls and some other buildings were constructed on the land and some of them were let out on rent. In 1945, the lessors, after serving notice on the occupants to give vacant possession, filed a suit for recovery of possession. The suit was decreed on 8th July, 1946 on the basis of a consent decree as against some of the occupants including the four defendant-appellants. In the agreement, on the basis of which the decree was passed, it was agreed that the defendant-appellants will continue in possession of property for a period of five years and will hand over possession after the expiry of this period of five years. For this period, they undertook to pay mesne profits every month at various rates on the lands in their possession. Between them, the four appellants were required to pay at Rs 227-10-0 per mensem making up an annual amount of mesne profits of Rs 2731-8-0. Similar terms were included in the consent decree against other defendants who joined the compromise on the basis of which the decree was passed on 8th July, 1946. The remaining defendants in the suit entered into a later compromise and, as a result, another consent decree was passed on 28th January, 1949 against those defendants. Under this decree, these remaining defendants were also entitled to continue in possession for a period of five years from the date of the decree, but were required to pay mesne profits for this period. All the defendants governed by the two decrees, dated 8th July, 1946 and 28th January, 1949, had to pay between them mesne profits monthly which worked out to an amount of Rs 7314-8-0 per annum. Before the expiry of the period of five years prescribed by either of the two decrees, the Custodian of Evacuee Property, in 1950, took possession of all the properties, as one of the decree-holders had become an evacuee. After the property was released by the Custodian of Evacuee Property, an application was filed of the decree-holders on 26th March, 1953 for execution of the consent decree, dated 8th July, 1946 and, in that execution, possession was sought against the appellants of the property which was in their possession. Subsequently, a number of suits were filed for recovery of mesne profits also. The Execution Court directed eviction of the appellants after overruling the various objections raised by them in the execution proceedings. The decision of the Execution Court on the objections taken by the appellants was challenged in appeal before the District Judge, in second appeal before a Single Judge of the High Court of Gujarat, and by a letters patent appeal before a Division Bench. All the Courts rejected the objections raised by the appellants and upheld the order of the Execution Court directing delivery of possession. It is against the judgment of the Division Bench in Letters Patent appeal in this execution that the appellants have come up to this Court in this appeal by special leave.
2. It is unnecessary for us to mention all the various objections that were taken at various stages by the appellants in the Execution Court, in the Court of the District Judge, or before the Single Judge or the Division Bench in the High Court. Only three of the points raised have been urged before us and, therefore, we are called upon to deal with these three points only.
3. The first point raised is that the decree which was passed on 8th July, 1946 was a nullity, because it was passed in contravention of Section 11(1) of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act 16 of 1939 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). This objection has been overruled by the High Court on the ground that the,provisions of the Act were not attracted by the lease in question on the expiry of which the suit for ejectment was decreed under the consent decree, dated 8th July, 1946. Counsel appearing for the appellant urged that the terms of the decree passed as well as the terms contained in the lease-deed of 1895 show that the Act was applicable because the land, to which the suit for ejectment related, was covered by the definition of “premises” to which the Act applies. The expression “premises” is defined in Section 4(2) of the Act as meaning—
“(a) any building or part of a building let separately for any purpose whatever, including any land let therewith, or
(b) any land let separately for the purpose of being used principally for business or trade”.
Admittedly, the lease of 1895 was not in respect of any building or part of a building let separately for any purpose whatever. Reliance was placed on Section 4(2)(b) of the Act on the contention that the land had been let for the purpose of being used principally for business or trade. Having gone through the documents relied upon by counsel for the appellants, we are unable to accept this submission. In the plaint of the suit, as well as in the decree dated 8th July, 1946, there is no mention of the purpose for which the land was let out by the lease of 1895. Reliance was, however, placed on one of the pleadings in the plaint which had been reproduced in the decree in which the plaintiff-respondent recited one of the terms of the lease in the following words:
“On the expiry of the period of 49 years, the land shall be handed over without raising any dispute or objection or causing any” obstruction, after removing whatever structures that might have been erected thereon and after making it as clear as it is.”
The argument was that this pleading indicates that the land was let out for making structures and those structures could only be utilised by being let out on rent. This purpose would constitute business or trade. We are unable to see any justification for such an inference. The mere fact that there was a mention that structures that might have been erected will be removed can in no way lead to a reasonable conclusion that the principal purpose of the lease was the use of the land for business or trade.
4. Reference, in this connection, was also made to the terms of the lease of 1895; but we are unable to hold that it establishes the case of the appellants that the lease was taken principally for the purpose of using the land for business or trade. All that the lease mentions is that it is for constructing houses and, at a later stage, there is a mention that “in the said fields, the lessees could construct houses in any manner or use it in any manner.” The other parts of the lease, on which reliance has been placed are as follows:
“1. On the land of those fields we can build houses in any manner and we will receive income thereof and you will not raise any dispute or obstruction in respect thereof. We can spend any amount on the construction of those houses which we will not demand from you for whatever reason nor we will have the right to deduct from rent payable to you.
2. If any houses are constructed thereon, we will remove the superstructures. If we do not remove the structures then you will be the owners of the said structures. If you take them, then we and our heirs and representatives will not object.”
We are unable to find even in these quotations from the lease any mention that the land is going to be used principally for the purpose of business or trade. The lease does mention that it was being taken for constructing houses. There was no mention at all, however, of the manner in which the constructed houses were to be utilised. Further, there is clear option given to the lessees that they could use the land in any manner if they did not construct any houses. These are terms on the basis of which it cannot be said that the land was being let out for business purposes.
5. The submission of Counsel for the appellants was that, if the purpose was to construct houses and let them out on rent, that would constitute the use of the land for the purpose of business inasmuch as the lessees would be earning income from letting out those houses. We are unable to accept this submission, because we do not think that the word “business” or “trade” used in the definition of “premises” in Section 4(2)(b) of the Act comprehends within it a lease which is merely for constructing houses. Learned counsel cited before us a number of decisions of Indian and English Courts, including decisions of the Privy Council and this Court, in which the scope of the word “business” was interpreted. That interpretation was given in connection with the word “business” as used either in income-tax law or in the terms of a covenant or the Companies Act, etc.. We do not consider that it will be at all profitable to refer to them when interpreting the word “business” or “trade” as used in Section 4(2)(b) of the Act, because none of those interpretations will cover a case similar to the one before us, where the lease was merely a permissive one giving a right to the lessees to construct houses and let them out or to use the land in any manner. When the purpose of the lease was expressed in this way, it is impossible to hold that the principal use, to which the land was to be put by the lessees, was business or trade. As a consequence of this interpretation, it has to be held that the Act was not applicable to the lease of 1895 and, therefore, no question arises of the decree of 8th July, 1946, being invalid on the ground of contravening Section 11(1) of the Act.
6. The second point urged by learned counsel was that, by the consent decree itself, a new tenancy was created which was to continue for five years and, in the meantime, the Bombay (Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates) Control Act, 1947, came into force and the appellants were protected from ejectment under the provisions of that Act. The consent decree does not state that a new tenancy is being created. The argument was that the terms of that consent decree should be interpreted as indicating an intention to create a new tenancy. We are unable to find any such terms. On the face of it, all that the consent decree envisaged was that, though the judgment-debtors were liable to immediate eviction, the decree-holders agreed to let them continue in possession for a period of five years. Since this concession was being granted as a special case, the decree-holders insisted that mesne profits should be paid at a much higher rate so much so that between all the defendants, governed by the two decrees of 8th July, 1946 and 28th January, 1949, the amount payable as mesne profits became Rs 7314-8-0 per annum which had no relation with the original rent of Rs 199 per annum for the entire land fixed by the lease of 1895. In fact, the decree-holders sought further protection by requiring the judgment-debtors to pay the mesne profits in monthly instalments, and the instalments were so fixed that the mesne profits due for five years were to be paid within a period of three years. There was the further clause that, in case of default of payment of the mesne profits, the defaulting judgment-debtors could be immediately called upon to deliver possession. These terms can, in no way, be interpreted as creating a new tenancy constituting the decree-holders as landlords and the judgment-debtors as their tenants. The terms of the consent decree neither constituted a tenancy nor a licence. All that the decree-holders did was to allow the judgment-debtors to continue in possession for five years on payment of mesne profits as a concession for entering into a compromise. The argument advanced must, therefore, be rejected.
7. Reference was made by learned counsel for the appellants, in support of his argument, to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Gurpadappa Shivlingappa Itgi v. Sayad Akbar Sayad Budan Kadri, but that case, in our opinion, has no application. In that case, in the consent decree itself, the first clause was that the defendant admits that he is a monthly tenant of the plaintiff and is to continue in possession till January 31, 1948. This clause specifically and clearly, in the language used, made it manifest that the defendant was a monthly tenant and was to continue in that capacity in possession. It was in these circumstances that it was held that a new tenancy had been created from the date of the consent decree. In the case before us, the terms of the consent decree are in no way comparable with the terms used in the consent decree in that case. The language used in the consent decree in the present case contains no indication of any intention to create a tenancy, so that the Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947 could never apply to the case of the appellants.
8. The third point raised by learned counsel was that, since there was one single suit based on the lease of 1895 for ejectment of persons in possession, there could be only one single decree in that suit and the Court was incompetent to pass two separate decrees on 8th July, 1946 and 28th January, 1949. Counsel, in this connection, relied on the provisions of Rules 1 and 12 of Order 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure which relate to the pronouncement of judgment and the Court passing a decree in a suit. These rules have really no relevance. On the other hand, Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC, clearly envisages a decree being passed in respect of part of the subject-matter of the suit on a compromise, and Rule 6 of Order 12 CPC, permits the passing of a judgment at any stage without waiting for determination of other questions. Thus, it is clear that, in the same suit, there can be more than one decree passed at different stages. In the present case, the first decree of 8th July, 1946, was based on a compromise between the plaintiffs and some of the defendants, while the second decree, dated 28th January, 1949, decided the rights of the remaining defendants. The two decrees were separate and independent and neither of them could be treated as a nullity.
9. In these circumstances, the Execution Court was right in rejecting all the objections raised by the appellants and in directing delivery of possession. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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