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Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika v. Narain Das Haribansh .

Supreme Court Of India
Aug 20, 1969
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, originally the Municipal Board, Kanpur (now Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika), and the respondent entered into a written contract for constructing zone pumping stations and reservoirs at Kanpur. The contract contained an arbitration clause.

In 1946 the respondent filed Original Suit No. 45 of 1946 before the Civil and Sessions Judge, Kanpur, claiming Rs 60,802-4-9 for unpaid balances, interest, and refund of security deposit. The appellant sought a stay under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, asserting that the dispute was covered by the arbitration clause. On 9 August 1952 the trial court stayed the suit. After an unpressed appeal by the plaintiff, the High Court (4 November 1957) directed that the matter proceed to arbitration, and on 17 May 1958 the Additional Civil Judge appointed Shri A.K. Roy, Superintending Engineer, as arbitrator.

On 8 March 1960 the arbitrator awarded the respondent Rs 42,772-2-9 (final bill), Rs 9,705 (refund of security deposit) and interest. The appellant applied to set aside the award, alleging the arbitrator had failed to hold the claim barred by Section 326 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (six-month limitation) and had therefore “misconducted” himself. The Additional Civil Judge accepted the objection and set aside the award (31 May 1960). On appeal the High Court of Allahabad reversed that order (3 May 1962). The present Supreme Court judgment decides the appellant’s further appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the arbitrator’s alleged failure to apply the six-month limitation period under Section 326 of the U.P. Municipalities Act constituted an “error of law apparent on the face of the award” justifying its being set aside.
  2. Whether, in the absence of a stated legal proposition in the award, the courts can probe the arbitrator’s reasoning on limitation to find misconduct or error.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The award is vitiated by an error of law apparent on its face because the arbitrator ignored the mandatory six-month limitation under Section 326 of the U.P. Municipalities Act.
  • An award containing such an error must be remitted or set aside unless the parties specifically referred the legal question to arbitration, which they did not.
  • The arbitrator should have expressly addressed the limitation issue; failure to do so shows misconduct.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not provide the respondent’s specific submissions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd. v. Union of India (1962 SCR 793) Distinguishes between a general reference to arbitration and a specific reference of a question of law; error of law reviewable unless specifically referred. Used to explain that, as no specific question of law was referred, only an error apparent on the face could upset the award.
Champsay Bhara & Co. v. Jivraj Balloo Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. (1923 AC 480) Defines “error of law on the face of the award” as a legal proposition visible in the award or an incorporated document. Relied on to show that no such visible legal proposition existed in the impugned award.
Dr S. Dutt v. University of Delhi (AIR 1958 SC 1050) An award discloses an error only when it contains, on its face or in an incorporated paper, a demonstrably erroneous legal proposition. Cited to reinforce that the present award contained no explicit legal proposition and therefore no reviewable error.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court examined whether the award displayed any legal proposition forming its basis that could be said to be erroneous. Referring to the definitions in Champsay Bhara and Dr S. Dutt, the Court held that an error must be apparent from the face of the award or an incorporated document. Here, the arbitrator did not articulate any proposition on Section 326 or limitation; the award was a simple determination of amounts due. Therefore, even assuming the arbitrator erred on limitation, such error was not apparent and could not justify interference.

The Court further noted that arbitrators need only decide the dispute as a whole and are not obliged to set out findings on every issue. Mistakes of law or fact lying outside the award’s face are not grounds to set it aside. Consequently, the High Court correctly refused to disturb the award.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed with costs; the award stands.

Direct effect: The respondent’s monetary award is revived and enforceable. Broader implication: The judgment reaffirms the narrow scope of judicial review over arbitral awards—courts will not set aside an award absent an error of law apparent on its face, thus strengthening finality of arbitration.

Show all summary ...

A.N Ray, J.— This is an appeal from the judgment dated 3 May, 1962 passed by the High Court at Allahabad reversing the order of the Civil Judge setting aside an award.

2. The appellant was formerly known as Municipal Board, Kanpur and thereafter as Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika. The appellant in the former name of Municipal Board, Kanpur and the respondent entered into a contract in writing for construction of zone pumping stations and reservoirs at Kanpur. One of the clauses in the said agreement in writing contained an arbitration agreement between the parties.

3. The respondent filed Original Suit No. 45 of 1946 in the Court of Civil and Sessions Judge, Kanpur, against the Municipal Board, Kanpur and claimed a sum of Rs 60,802-4-9 representing the claims on account of balance sum due according to the final bills, interest on the amount due, refund of security deposit and interest thereon. The suit was instituted in the year 1946. The Municipal Board, Kanpur, thereafter made an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for stay of the suit contending that the suit related to matter agreed to be referred to arbitration. On 9 August, 1952, the Court ordered stay of the proceedings. The plaintiff preferred an appeal against the order. By an order dated 4 November, 1957 the High Court at Allahabad directed that since the appeal was not pressed by the plaintiff the Court should proceed with the matter of reference. Thereafter on 17 May, 1958 the Court of Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur, sent the matter to Shri A.K Roy, Superintending Engineer, who was appointed an arbitrator on the reference.

4. The arbitrator on 8 March, 1960 made an award in favour of the plaintiff respondent for the sum of Rs 42,772-2-9 on account of final bill, a sum of Rs 9,705 on account of refund of security deposit and interest on the security deposit.

5. The appellant thereafter made an application for setting aside the award on the ground that the arbitrator misconducted himself in the proceedings by not properly considering and deciding that the claim of the plaintiff was barred by Section 326 of the U.P Act 2 of 1916. The Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur, by judgment dated 31 May, 1960 set aside the award by holding that the arbitrator wrongly decided the point of limitation and thereby misconducted himself. The High Court referred to two lines of decisions of the Allahabad High Court on the question as to whether the claim by the contractor for money due on account of the work done by him for the Municipal Board was governed by Section 326 of the U.P Act prescribing six months as the period of limitation or by the period of limitation for three years under the Limitation Act. The High Court came to the conclusion that if the arbitrator had decided it in favour of the plaintiff and did not accept the prescribed period of limitation under Section 326 of the Municipalities Act, it would not be an error of law apparent on the face of the Award.

6. Counsel for the appellant contended that the award in the present case was bad by reason of an error apparent on the face of the award. If an error of law appears on the face of the award it is a ground for remitting it or setting it aside. An exception arises where the parties choose specifically to refer a question of law to arbitration. This Court in the case of Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd. v. Union of India 1962 SCR 793 pointed out the distinction between a general reference on the one hand and the specific reference on the other on any question of law.

7. In the present case, the award does not lay down any proposition of law on the question of limitation. The award does not put any construction on Section 326 of the Municipalities Act. Lord Dunedin in Champsay Bhara & Co. v. Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. (1923) AC 480 said “an error of law on the face of the award means ... that one can find in the award, or in a document actually incorporated thereto, as for instance, a note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which one can then say is erroneous”. The award in the present case cannot be impeached either for stating the reasons for the judgment or for stating any legal proposition which is the basis of the award.

8. This Court in the case of Dr S. Dutt v. University of Delhi AIR 1958 SC 1050 said “in our view all that is necessary for an award to disclose an error on the face of it is that it must contain, either in itself or in some paper intended to be incorporated in it, some legal proposition which on the face of it and without more, can be said to be erroneous”.

9. In the present case, it cannot be predicated of the award that there is any proposition of law forming the basis of the award, and, therefore, it cannot be said that there is any error apparent on the face of the award. The arbitrator is under the agreement in the present case to decide the questions which were within the province of the arbitrator's jurisdiction. It cannot be said on the face of the award that the arbitrator has decided on any principle of construction which the law does not countenance.

10. Counsel for the appellant contended that the arbitrator should have specifically dealt with the question of limitation. It is sufficient if the arbitrator gives an award on the whole case and he need not deal with each issue separately. It was open to the arbitrator to decide on the rival contentions of the parties as to limitation. In doing so, if an arbitrator makes a mistake either in law or on fact and if such mistake does not appear on the face of the award, the award will not be bad notwithstanding any mistake.

11. We must not in the present case be understood to express any opinion that there was however any mistake.

12. The High Court was correct in refusing to set aside the award. For the reasons mentioned above, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.