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Seth Badri Prasad v. Srimati Kanso Devi .
Badri Prasad v. Smt. Kanso Devi
(Civil Appeal by Special Leave from the Punjab High Court – decided by the Supreme Court of India)
Factual and Procedural Background
Gajju Mal died in 1947, leaving five sons—Badri Prasad, Ganesh Dass, Devi Chand, Narain Das and Isher Das—and his second wife, Smt. Kanso Devi. Differences arose over the partition of his urban immovable properties and other assets. On 5 August 1950, the parties appointed Tulsi Ram Seth as arbitrator; he delivered an award on 31 October 1950. Clause 6 of the award allotted three sets of properties, including Bungalow No. 20, Alipore Road, Delhi, to Smt. Kanso Devi, specifying that she would hold a “widow's estate.” The award was made the rule of the court.
In August 1961 Badri Prasad filed a suit seeking a perpetual injunction restraining Smt. Kanso Devi from alienating or committing waste in the suit properties, alleging she held only a limited (life) estate. The trial court framed seven issues, the principal one being whether the defendant was awarded only a life estate. On 17 April 1963 the trial court dismissed the suit, finding (a) no waste proved, and (b) that under the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937, read with Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the respondent had become full owner of her share. The first appellate court and the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench, Delhi) affirmed that decree. Badri Prasad obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Smt. Kanso Devi’s interest in the suit properties is governed by Section 14(1) (absolute ownership) or by Section 14(2) (restricted estate) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments (Badri Prasad)
- The respondent acquired the properties only under the 1950 arbitration award (or the decree making it a rule of court), both of which expressly limited her interest to a widow’s estate, thereby attracting Section 14(2).
- The Court should first test the case under Section 14(2); only if it does not apply should Section 14(1) be considered.
Respondent’s Arguments (Smt. Kanso Devi)
- Under the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937, she already had a pre-existing share and a right to partition in the joint properties of her husband.
- The 1950 award merely separated her acknowledged share by metes and bounds; therefore the property was “acquired … at a partition” and she was “possessed” of it when the Hindu Succession Act commenced, bringing the case squarely within Section 14(1).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Teeravva (1959 Supp 1 SCR 968) | Meaning of the word “possessed” in Section 14 – includes actual, constructive or any legally recognised possession. | Used to emphasise that the respondent was “possessed” of the properties in the broad sense required by Section 14(1). |
| S.S. Munna Lal v. S.S. Raj Kumar (1962 Supp 3 SCR 418) | A female’s share declared in a preliminary decree before 1956 amounts to possession, making her full owner under Section 14(1). | Relied upon to illustrate that a pre-existing share crystalises into absolute ownership under Section 14(1). |
| Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal (AIR 1964 Mad 387) | Section 14 is intended to remove women’s disabilities, not to disturb instruments that voluntarily impose restrictions. | Cited to explain that Section 14(2) operates only where the female acquires property for the first time solely under a restrictive instrument. |
| Sukhram v. Gauri Shankar (1968 1 SCR — citation as given) | A widow who acquired an interest under the 1937 Act became full owner by virtue of Section 14(1). | Treated as directly on point; confirmed that a widow with a pre-existing limited interest becomes absolute owner under Section 14(1). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court read Section 14 as a whole, treating sub-section (2) as an exception that applies only when a female acquires property for the first time under a restrictive instrument and had no pre-existing right. Key analytical steps:
- Interpretation of “possessed” and “acquired”: following Kotturuswami, “possessed” is used in the widest sense; coupled with the expansive meaning of “acquired” (underscored by the Explanation), any property obtained at a partition falls within Section 14(1).
- Pre-existing right: Under Sections 3(1)–(3) of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937, the respondent had, on her husband’s death, the same share as a son and the same right to seek partition, albeit as a limited owner.
- Effect of the 1950 award: The award merely separated her already existing share; it did not confer a fresh grant. Therefore the properties were both “possessed” and “acquired” by her before the Hindu Succession Act commenced.
- Inapplicability of Section 14(2): Because the respondent’s title flowed from a pre-existing statutory right, the award and decree did not create a new, restricted estate; hence the exception in sub-section (2) could not dislodge the operation of sub-section (1).
- Reliance on precedents: The Court adopted the reasoning in Munna Lal and Sukhram to affirm that women’s limited interests convert into absolute ownership upon commencement of the Act when the property was already possessed.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed with Costs.
The Supreme Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the courts below that Smt. Kanso Devi became the absolute owner of the suit properties on the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The direct consequence is that she may freely alienate the properties, and the reversionary claim asserted by Badri Prasad fails. The decision reiterates—without creating a new precedent—that Section 14(1) governs property held by a female under a pre-existing statutory right, even when such property is later allotted to her by an award or decree.
A.N Grover, J.— This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench, Delhi). The facts may be briefly stated: One Gajju Mal had five sons, Badri Prasad, Ganesh Dass, Devi Chand, Narain Das and Isher Das. The first four were by his first wife whereas the 5th son Isher Das was by his second wife Smt Kanso Devi. Gajju Mal died in 1947, leaving him surviving the said five sons and Smt Kanso Devi. On August 5, 1950 Tulsi Ram Seth was appointed by the parties as an arbitrator for resolving certain differences which had arisen relating to partition of the urban immovable properties and other assets and liabilities left by Gajju Mal. On October 31,1950 the arbitrator gave his award. Under clause 6 of this award Smt Kanso Devi was awarded three sets of property including Bungalow No. 20, Alipore Road, Delhi. The award was made the rule of the court. It was stated in the award that Smt Kanso Devi would have a widow's estate in the properties awarded to her. It was also provided that the immovable properties allotted and awarded to the various parties would be individually and exclusively owned by them and each party would be entitled to take physical or constructive possession of the properties allotted and awarded to his or her share.
2. Badri Prasad, the appellant before us, filed a suit in August 1961 against the respondent Smt Kanso Devi pleading inter alia that she was a limited owner of the property which had been given to her by the award and that she was trying to alienate the same and commit acts of waste to the prejudice of the reversioners. He asked for a perpetual injunction restraining her from committing acts of waste and from alienating the suit properties. The respondent contested the suit. On the pleas of the parties the trial court framed seven issues out of which the material one was No. 4 which was in these terms:
“Whether the defendant was awarded life estate only in the property in suit?”
On April 17, 1963 the trial court dismissed the suit holding that no act of waste on the part of the respondent had been proved and that she had inherited the property under the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 and that the award had simply separated her share by metes and bounds, and under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act she had become full owner thereof. The first appellate court and the High Court affirmed the decree of the trial court.
3. The sole question for determination is whether the case of the respondent was governed by sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, hereinafter called the Act. This section reads:
“14. (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
Explanation.—In this sub-section, ‘property’ includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.”
According to the appellant the suit property was acquired by the respondent under the award given by Tulsi Ram Seth or alternatively under the decree based on the award, the estate being restricted by both the award and the decree. The provision in the award that the respondent was to have a widow's estate under Hindu Law, it is said, conferred on her only a limited estate and sub-section (1), would be inapplicable. The position of the respondent throughout has been that she had interest in all the joint properties together with the right to partition under the provisions of Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 (Act 18 of 1937). Thus the property was acquired by the respondent at a partition within the terms of the Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 14. As she was possessed of that property at the time the Act came into force she became full owner thereof by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act even though previously she was a limited owner.
4. Under Section 3(1) of Act 18 of 1937 as amended by Act 11 of 1938 when a Hindu governed by any School of Hindu law other than the Dayabhaga School died intestate leaving separate property his widow was entitled to the same share as a son in respect of the property left by her husband. Under Section 3(2) when any such Hindu died having at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu Joint Family property his widow was to have the same interest in the property as he himself had. Sub-section (3) provided that any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the aforesaid provision was to be a limited interest known as Hindu women's estate but that the widow was to have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner.
5. The case in the courts below proceeded on the footing that all the properties left by Gajju Mal were his separate acquisitions. It was apparently for that reason that the High Court gave a finding that before the partition effected by the arbitrator by means of the award, the five sons and the widow (respondent) of Gajju Mal enjoyed equal shares in the properties left by him.
6. The point for our consideration is narrowed down to this. When a female acquires an interest under the provisions of Act 18 of 1937 in the properties of her husband which are subsequently separated by means of a partition does she become an absolute owner under sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act or does she get only a restricted estate under sub-section (2) of that section. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the court should first look at sub-section (2) and if the case does not fall within its ambit and scope then alone sub-section (1) will become applicable. This manner of reading of the section is not warranted either on principle or authority. The section has to be read as a whole and it would depend on the facts of each case whether the same is covered by the first sub-section or sub-section (2). The critical words in sub-section (1) are “possessed” and “acquired”. The word “possessed” has been used in its widest connotation and it may either be actual or constructive or in any form recognised by law. In the context in which it has been used in Section 14 it means the state of owning or having in one's hand or power (see Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Teeravva (1959) Supp 1 SCR 968). In S.S Munna Lal v. S.S Rajkumar (1962) Supp 3 SCR 418 it was held that 1/4th share of a female which had been declared by the preliminary decree passed before the enactment of the Act was possessed by her within the meaning of Section 14 and she became the full owner so that on her death the said property descended to her grandsons in accordance with the provisions of Sections 15 and 16 of the Act. The word “acquired” in sub-section (1) has also to be given the widest possible meaning. This would be so because of the language of the Explanation which makes sub-section (1) applicable to acquisition of property by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift or by a female's own skill or exertion or by purchase or prescription or in any manner whatsoever. Where at the commencement of the Act a female Hindu has a share in joint properties which are later on partitioned by metes and bounds and she gets possession of the properties allotted to her there can be no manner of doubt that she is not only possessed of that property at the time of the coming into force of the Act but has also acquired the same before its commencement.
7. Sub-section (2) of Section 14, is more in the nature of a proviso or an exception to sub-section (1). It can come into operation only if acquisition in any of the methods indicated therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the female Hindu who is in possession of the property. The Madras High Court was right in the observations made in Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal AIR 1964 Mad 387 that sub-section (2) made it clear that the object of Section 14 was only to remove the disability on women imposed by law and not to interfere with contracts, grants or decrees etc. by virtue of which a women's right was restricted. In Sukhram v. Gauri Shankar (1968) 1 SCR one Kishan Devi had acquired in 1952, the same interest in the property of the joint family which her husband Hukan Singh had under the provisions of Act 18 of 1937. The question arose, whether after the coming into force of the Act she got rights of full ownership and could alienate the properties in which she had acquired a limited interest without the consent of the male members of the family. This Court decided that she had become full owner by virtue of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act. This case is quite opposite for our purpose and we must hold that the respondent became a full owner of the suit properties when the Act came into force. The mere fact that there was a partition by means of arbitration which resulted in an award and a decree based on it would not bring the matter within sub-section (2) as the provisions of sub-section (1) became fully applicable particularly in view of the express terms of the Explanation.
8. This appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.
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