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Purshottam Das v. Raj Mani Devi (Smt) .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent (landlord) sought to evict the appellant (tenant) from House No. 5B, Old 122 Maya Mirganj, Allahabad. Key procedural steps were:
- 11 Oct 1961: Rent Control and Eviction Officer granted permission under Section 3(1) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (“the Act”).
- 14 Oct 1961: Landlord filed the ejectment suit.
- 27 Mar 1962: Commissioner, Allahabad Division, revoked the permission under Section 3(3).
- 30 Mar 1963: State Government, exercising Section 7-F powers, set aside the Commissioner’s order and directed that leave to sue would be effective after four months (i.e. 30 Jul 1963).
- 11 Jul 1963: Trial court decreed eviction.
- 4 Nov 1963: Appellate court remanded the case for fresh trial.
- 2 Mar 1964: Trial court again decreed eviction.
- 28 Nov 1964: First appellate court dismissed tenant’s appeal.
- 28 Apr 1966: High Court dismissed second appeal.
- Tenant obtained special leave and filed the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, after the Commissioner revoked the initial permission and the State Government later restored it, a “valid permission” under Section 3(1) existed to sustain the pending ejectment suit.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Tenant)
- Relied on observations of Hegde, J. in Bhagwan Das v. Paras Nath that once the Commissioner cancels permission, “there is no effective permission left,” rendering a suit filed in the interim incompetent.
- Contended that the Commissioner’s revocation on 27 Mar 1962 nullified the suit, and the subsequent State Government order could not cure that defect.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bhagwan Das v. Paras Nath, CA 1617 of 1968 (decided 09-09-1968) | A suit validly instituted after obtaining permission does not become incompetent if that permission is later revoked by the State Government under Section 7-F. | Used to analogise and distinguish: in Bhagwan Das permission came from the Commissioner; here it came from the Rent Control Officer. Nevertheless, once the State Government restored the original permission, the suit regained competence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a sequential statutory analysis:
- The suit was initially competent, having been filed after permission under Section 3(1).
- The Commissioner’s later revocation under Section 3(3) did render the suit incompetent at that point, aligning with Hegde, J.’s dictum.
- However, Section 3(4) makes the Commissioner’s order “subject to” any order of the State Government under Section 7-F. When the State Government set aside the Commissioner’s revocation, the original Section 3(1) permission was “revived.”
- The State Government’s additional directive that permission would become operative four months later meant the landlord had effective leave as of 30 Jul 1963—well before the decree of 2 Mar 1964.
- Thus, at the time judgment was rendered, the suit was backed by valid, subsisting permission; the procedural defect had been cured by statutory revision powers.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED. No order as to costs.
Immediate effect: the eviction decree stands affirmed, leaving the tenant liable to vacate. The decision clarifies that a State Government order under Section 7-F can restore an original Section 3(1) permission and thereby revitalise a pending suit; however, it does not announce a new broader precedent beyond the statutory interpretation applied to the specific timeline.
Bachawat, J.— The appellant is the tenant and the respondent is the landlord of House No. 5B, Old 122 Maya Mirganj, Allahabad. The appeal arises out of a suit for ejectment by the landlord against the tenant from the house. On October 11, 1961, the landlord obtained permission to institute the suit from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under Section 3(1) of the U.P (Temp) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. On October 14, 1961 the landlord instituted the present suit for eviction against the tenant. On March 27, 1962 the Commissioner Allahabad Division acting under Section 3(3) revoked the permission to institute the suit. On March 30, 1963 the State Government acting under Section 7-F set aside the Commissioner's order and gave leave to the landlord to file the suit with effect from July 30, 1963. On July 11, 1963 the trial court decreed the suit. The tenant filed an appeal against the decree. On November 4, 1963 the appellate court set aside the decree and remanded the suit for fresh trial. After the suit went back on remand the trial court decreed the suit on March 2, 1964. The trial court held that the permission granted by the State Government became effective from July 30, 1963 and as the suit was still pending a decree could be passed in the suit. An appeal against the decree was dismissed on November 28, 1964. A second appeal was dismissed by the High Court on April 28, 1966. The present appeal has been filed by the tenant after obtaining special leave. The sole question in the appeal is whether in the circumstances there was a valid permission to institute the suit under Section 3(1).
2. In Bhagwan Das v. Paras Nath CA 1617 of 1968 decd on 9-9-1968 this court held that a suit validly instituted after obtaining permission of the Commissioner under Section 3(3) did not become incompetent if the State Government acting under Section 7-F revoked the permission after the institution of the suit. In that case the District Magistrate refused to give permission under Section 3(1) to institute the suit. The Commissioner acting under Section 3(3) set aside the order and granted permission to institute the suit. The suit was decreed by the trial court on November 2, 1960. The tenant filed an appeal against the decree. During the pendency of the appeal the State Government acting under Section 7-F revoked the permission granted by the Commissioner. The court held that though the order under Section 3(3) was subject to an order under Section 7-F the Government's power under Section 7-F to revoke the permission granted by the Commissioner became exhausted once the suit was validly instituted.
3. In support of his contention that the present suit is not maintainable, the appellant relies on the following observations of Hegde, J.
“When the Commissioner sets aside the order passed by the District Magistrate granting permission to file a suit for ejecting a tenant, the order of the Commissioner prevails. If he cancels the permission granted by the District Magistrate there is no effective permission left and the suit instituted by the plaintiff without waiting his decision must be treated as one filed without any valid permission by the District Magistrate.”
Having regard to these observations the present suit though validly instituted after obtaining the permission under Section 3(1) became incompetent when the permission was revoked by the Commissioner under Section 3(3). But the order under Section 3(3) itself was set aside by the State Government under Section 7-F during the pendency of the suit. The question is what is the effect of this order under Section 7-F. Now, Section 3(4) provides that the order of the Commissioner under Section 3(3) subject to an order passed by the State Government under Section 7-F. If the State Government acting under Section 7-F sets aside the order of the Commissioner revoking the permission, the order under Section 3(1) granting permission is revived. The result is that there is an effective permission to institute the suit under Section 3(1) and the suit is validly instituted.
4. In Bhagwan Das case CA 1617 of 1968 decd on 9-9-1968 the suit was validly instituted after obtaining permission from the Commissioner under Section 3(3). The State Government could not render such a suit incompetent by any order under Section 7-F. In the present case the suit was validly instituted after obtaining permission from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under Section 3(1). The effect of the order of the Commissioner revoking the permission was that the suit became incompetent. The State Government acting under Section 7-F had power to revise and set aside the Commissioner's order and restore the permission granted under Section 3(1) so as to make the suit competent.
5. The order of the State Government after stating that in the interest of justice the house should be available to the landlord for his use, set aside the Commissioner's order under Section 3(3). The result was that the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed under Section 3(1) stood restored. The further direction in the order that the landlord “is advised to file a suit for eviction from the house in dispute against the opposite party in a civil court under Section 3 of the Act, which will be applicable four months after the date of the order” really means that the permission under Section 3(1) would become effective on the expiry of 4 months. The landlord had thus an effective permission to institute the suit under Section 3(1) on the expiry of four months from March 30, 1963, that is to say, as from July 30, 1963. The decree in the suit was passed on March 2, 1964. On that date the landlord had a valid permission to institute the suit. The suit was therefore maintainable.
6. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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