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Central Bank Of India Ltd. v. Gokal Chand .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant is a tenant of Premises No. 7, Sriram Road, Delhi. The respondent/landlord initiated eviction proceedings before the Rent Controller, asserting that he bona fide required the premises for his own occupation. The respondent currently resides at No. 17, Alipur Road, Delhi.
During the eviction proceedings, the appellant applied to the Controller for the issue of a commission to inspect No. 17, Alipur Road and prepare a plan, contending that the respondent already had accommodation exceeding three rooms and therefore lacked a bona fide need for the disputed premises. On 29 May 1965, the Controller rejected this application, treating it as a repetition of an earlier, previously rejected request.
The appellant appealed to the Rent Control Tribunal. The Tribunal held that no appeal lay under Section 38(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 against the Controller’s interlocutory order and dismissed the appeal. The Delhi High Court affirmed the Tribunal’s view. The appellant thereafter obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, leading to the present decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an interlocutory order of the Rent Controller—specifically, an order refusing to issue a commission for inspection of premises—is appealable to the Rent Control Tribunal under Section 38(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shankarlal Aggarwal v. Shankarlal Poddar, [1964] 1 SCR 717 | Wide appellate clauses are construed to exclude purely procedural orders that do not affect substantive rights or liabilities. | The Court used the reasoning in this case to justify limiting the breadth of the phrase “every order of the Controller” in Section 38(1), thereby excluding interlocutory procedural orders from its ambit. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Justice Bachawat observed that although Section 38(1) employs the expansive phrase “every order of the Controller made under this Act,” the legislative intent could not have been to allow appeals from routine procedural orders, which would invite delay and expense. The Court drew a distinction between:
- Orders that affect substantive rights or liabilities, which are appealable; and
- Interlocutory or procedural orders, such as issuing commissions, summoning witnesses, or regulating evidentiary steps, which merely facilitate the conduct of the case and do not affect rights or liabilities.
Relying on analogous reasoning adopted for similar wording in other statutes (notably the Companies Act, 1913 in Shankarlal Aggarwal), the Court held that interlocutory orders should be reviewable, if necessary, in an appeal against the final decision, rather than via separate interlocutory appeals.
The Controller’s refusal to issue a commission was characterised as purely procedural. Because it did not determine any right or liability of the parties, it fell outside the scope of Section 38(1). Consequently, the Tribunal and the High Court were correct in dismissing the appellant’s interlocutory appeal.
Holding and Implications
Appeal dismissed with costs.
The Supreme Court affirmed that Section 38(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 does not confer a right of appeal against procedural or interlocutory orders that do not impact substantive rights or liabilities. The immediate consequence is that the appellant cannot challenge the Controller’s refusal to issue a commission until, if necessary, an appeal is taken from the final eviction order. The decision clarifies the appellate framework under the Act and discourages piecemeal litigation by limiting interlocutory appeals.
Bachawat, J.— This appeal raises a question of construction of Section 38(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (Act 59 of 1958). The appellant is a tenant of Premises No. 7, Sriram Road, Delhi, under the respondent. The respondent made an application to the Controller for eviction of the appellant on the ground that he bona fide required the premises for his occupation. The respondent resides at No. 17, Alipur Road, Delhi. The appellant filed an application before the Controller alleging that the accommodation in Premises No. 17, Alipur Road consisted of more than three rooms and consequently, the respondent did not bona fide require the premises in dispute for his own occupation and praying for the issue of a commission to go to No. 17, Alipur Road and to prepare a plan of the premises. By his order dated May 29, 1965 the Controller rejected the application. He said:
The petitioner came into the witness box and the respondent had full opportunity to cross-examine him regarding the extent of accommodation in his possession. He has stated that the other portions of 17, Alipur Road, Delhi are in possession of other persons. Previously also, such an application was made by the tenant which was disallowed by me, vide my order dated 7th March, 1964. I see no further reason to review my previous order and allow this application.”
From this order, the appellant filed an appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal. The Tribunal hold that no appeal lay from the aforesaid order of the Controller under Section 38(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and on this finding dismissed the appeal. The High Court agreed with this decision of the Tribunal. The appellant now appeals to this court by special leave. The question in this appeal is whether an appeal lay to the Tribunal under section 38(1) from the aforesaid order of the Controller.
2. The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 empowers the Controller to pass orders for fixing the standard rent or lawful increase thereof, eviction of tenants and various other orders on the applications filed before him by the landlord or the tenant. Under Sections 36 and 37(2), the Controller may pass interlocutory orders in a pending proceeding. Under Section 36, he may pass orders for the summoning of witnesses, the issue of commissions for examination of witnesses, discovery, production and inspection of documents and inspection of premises. By Section 37(2), he is required to follow as far as may be the practice and procedure of a court of Small Causes, and following such practice and procedure, he may pass other interlocutory orders. Section 38 gives a right of appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal from every order of the Controller made under the Act. The Tribunal has all the powers vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when hearing an appeal. Under Section 39, an appeal lies to the High Court from an order of the Tribunal if the appeal involves some substantial questions of law. By Section 43, save as expressly provided in the Act, every order made by the Controller or an order passed on appeal under the Act is final and cannot be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. Section 38(1) reads:
“An appeal shall lie from every order of the Controller made under this Act to the Rent Control Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) consisting of one person only to be appointed by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
3. The object of Section 38(1) is to give a right of appeal to a party aggrieved by some order which affects his right or liability. In the context of Section 38(1), the words “every order of the Controller made under this Act”, though very wide, do not include interlocutory orders, which are merely procedural and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. In a pending proceeding, the Controller may pass many interlocutory orders under Sections 36 and 37, such as orders regarding the summoning of witnesses, discovery, production and inspection of documents, issue of a commission for examination of witnesses, inspection of premises, fixing a date of hearing and the admissibility of a document or the relevancy of a question. All these interlocutory orders are steps taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceeding; they regulate the procedure only and do not affect any right or liability of the parties. The legislature could not have intended that the parties would be harassed with endless expenses and delay by appeals from such procedural orders. It is open to any party to set forth the error, defect or irregularity, if any, in such an order as a ground of objection in his appeal from the final order in the main proceeding. Subject to the aforesaid limitation, an appeal lies to the Rent Control Tribunal from every order passed by the Controller under the Act. Even an interlocutory order passed under Section 37(2) is an order passed under the Act and is subject to appeal under Section 38(1) provided it affects some right or liability of any party. Thus, an order of the Rent Controller refusing to set aside an ex parte order is subject to appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal.
4. Similar considerations have induced the courts to give a limited construction on the apparently wide words of other statutes conferring rights of appeal. Section 202 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 confers a right of appeal “from any order or decision made or given in the matter of the winding up of a company by the court.” In Shankarlal Aggarwal v. Shankarlal Poddar [1964] 1 SCR 717 this court decided that these words, though wide, would exclude merely procedural orders or those which did not affect the rights or liabilities of parties.
5. The order of the Controller dated May 29, 1965 refusing to issue a commission for inspection and preparation of a plan of premises No. 17, Alipur Road was a mere procedural order not affecting any right or liability of the appellant. The issue of a commission is only a step for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case. It is open to the appellant to canvass the error, defect or irregularity, if any, in the order in an appeal from the final order passed in the proceeding for eviction. But no appeal from the order lay to the Rent Control Tribunal under Section 38(1).
6. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
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