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Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Union Of India .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant contracted with the Union of India for the construction of highway bridges. Disputes arising out of the contract were referred to two arbitrators who disagreed, whereupon the matter went to an umpire, Shri Dildar Hussain, Retired Chief Engineer, Hyderabad. The umpire rendered an award on 27 May 1961, preparing it in duplicate and sending one copy to each party. On 4 August 1961 the appellant filed an application under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, before the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Delhi, asking the court to compel the umpire to file the award and to pass a decree in its terms. After notice, the umpire forwarded what he described as a signed and certified copy of the award. On 1 November 1961 the Union of India objected that the award had not been “validly and legally” filed under Section 14. The Subordinate Judge upheld the objection, holding that neither the original award nor a “signed copy” had been filed, and dismissed the Section 17 application. A revision petition to the Punjab High Court met the same fate. Special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was subsequently granted.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the document filed by the umpire constitutes a “signed copy of the award” within the meaning of Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, thereby permitting the court to proceed under Section 17.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The document forwarded by the umpire is a “signed copy” of the award as contemplated by Section 14(2).
- Because a signed copy has been filed, the court was obliged to move forward to pronounce judgment in terms of the award under Section 17.
Respondent's Arguments
- The document is merely a “certified copy,” not a “signed copy,” and therefore fails to satisfy Section 14(2).
- Absent valid filing of either the original award or a signed copy, no proceedings under Section 17 can be entertained.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mohesh Lal v. Busunt Kumaree (1881) ILR 6 Cal 340 | Defines “signature” as writing one’s name on a document in a manner that acknowledges authorship. | Adopted to hold that the umpire’s writing of his name on the reproduced award is sufficient to constitute a signature, thereby making the document a “signed copy.” |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court began by examining the statutory language of Section 14(2), observing that the arbitrator or umpire must file “the award or a signed copy of it.” Because the term “copy” is not defined in the Evidence Act, the Court referred to Section 63 of that Act and ordinary dictionary meaning, concluding that a “copy” is a true and full reproduction of the original. The Court then analysed the concept of “sign” using Webster’s Dictionary, Section 3(56) of the General Clauses Act, and the decision in Mohesh Lal. From these sources it distilled the principle that a document bearing the arbitrator’s signature, which authenticates its accuracy, satisfies the statutory requirement.
Applying these principles, the Court scrutinised the document filed by the umpire. It noted that:
- The accompanying letter expressly stated that the umpire was forwarding the award “signed and certified.”
- The document itself began with the words, “Now I hereby reproduce a true copy of the said award,” followed by the umpire’s signature.
- It ended with the phrase, “Certified as correct copy of the award dated 27th May, 1961,” again signed by the umpire.
These features demonstrated that the document was a complete, accurate reproduction, and that its accuracy had been authenticated by the umpire’s own signature. The Court rejected the High Court’s view that use of the words “certified copy” disqualified the document, emphasising that certification under the umpire’s signature actually reinforces authenticity. Consequently, the Court held that the statutory requirement of a “signed copy” was met.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; orders of the Subordinate Judge and High Court set aside. The Supreme Court declared that a signed copy of the award had been duly filed under Section 14(2) and directed the Subordinate Judge to proceed with the matter in accordance with law. Costs in the Supreme Court will abide the final result.
Implications: The decision clarifies that a document qualifying as a “signed copy” under Section 14(2) need only be a full and accurate reproduction of the award bearing the arbitrator’s or umpire’s authenticating signature, even if described as a “certified copy.” This guidance will aid courts and arbitrators in future filings under the Arbitration Act, 1940, although the ruling primarily affects the parties by reviving the appellant’s application for judgment on the award.
Wanchoo, J.— This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Punjab High Court and arises in the following circumstances. The appellant entered into a contract with the Union of India, respondent herein, for construction of certain highway bridges. In connection with the execution of the contract, some disputes arose between the parties and were referred to the joint arbitration of Sri B.K Guha and Sri N.P Gurjar. As there was difference of opinion between the two arbitrators, the matter was referred to an umpire, namely, Sri Dildar Hussain, retired Chief Engineer, Hyderabad. The umpire recorded evidence of the parties and gave his award on May 27, 1961. It appears that the award was made in duplicate and one copy was sent to each party. On August 4, 1961, the appellant made a petition before the Subordinate Judge First Class, Delhi under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 10 of 1940, (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). It was prayed that the umpire be directed by the court to cause the award or a signed copy thereof together with any depositions and documents which might have been taken and proved before him to be filed in court (Section 14). It was further prayed that a judgment be passed in terms of the award (Section 17).
2. It appears that on this petition the court issued notice to the umpire to file the award and the arbitration proceedings. On September 13, 1961, the umpire wrote to the court that he was forwarding along with that letter the award in the case duly signed and certified by him. On November 1, 1961, an objection was taken on behalf of the respondent that the award said to have been filed by the umpire had not been validly and legally filed under Section 14 and as such no proceedings in pursuance of the said filing could be taken in court.
3. This objection was considered as a preliminary objection by the Subordinate Judge. He came to the conclusion that the document filed in court was neither the original award nor a signed copy thereof, and as such the court could not take any action on that document. He therefore allowed the objection and dismissed the application under Section 17 for passing a judgment in terms of the award. The appellant then went in revision to the High Court. The High Court dismissed the revision application holding that the document filed in court was admittedly not the original award and that it was clear from a perusal of the document itself that it was not a signed copy thereof. Certain alternative arguments were submitted to the High Court which were rejected and the revision application thus failed. Thereupon the appellant obtained special leave, and that is how the matter has come up before us.
4. The main question that has been argued on behalf of the appellant is that the document in question is a signed copy of the award within the meaning of those words in Section 14(2) and therefore further proceedings should have been taken under Section 17 of the Act. Now the relevant part of Section 14(2) reads thus:
“(2) The arbitrators or umpire shall, at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the court ... cause the award or a signed copy of it, together with any depositions and documents which may have been taken and proved before them, to be filed in court ....”
5. Therefore when a notice is issued by a court to the arbitrators or umpire it is their duty to file in court either the award in original or a signed copy thereof as directed by the court. It is not in dispute that in the present case the original award has not been filed. The dispute is whether the document filed is a signed copy of the award. The main contention on behalf of the appellant is that the document is a signed copy of the award within the meaning of those words in Section 14(2), and thus should have been acted upon by the court. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the respondent that what has been filed is a certified copy of the award and not a signed copy thereof, and therefore it cannot be acted upon. The High Court has accepted the contention of the respondent and all that it has said in that behalf is that it is clear from a perusal of the award that it is not a signed copy of the award but it is certified as correct copy of the award dated the 27th May, 1961. Unfortunately, the High Court has not considered what exactly the words “signed copy of the award” mean, and it is to this problem that we must now turn.
6. Now the word “copy” as such is not defined in the Indian Evidence Act, 1 of 1872. But we get an idea of what a copy is from the provisions of Section 63 of the Evidence Act. That section inter alia defines what secondary evidence means and includes namely — (i) certified copies as provided, in Section 76 of the Evidence Act, (ii) copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies, and (iii) copies made from or compared with the original. Obviously, therefore a copy means a document prepared from the original which is an accurate or true copy of the original. In Webster's New World Dictionary, the word “copy” means “a thing made just like another; full reproduction or transcription”. What the word “copy” in Section 14(2) therefore requires is that it must be a full reproduction of the original and that it should be accurate or true. When a document is an accurate or true and full reproduction of the original it would be a copy. In the present case it is not in dispute that what was produced by Sri Dildar Hussain was a true or accurate and full reproduction of the original. It was therefore a copy of the original, and the only question that remains is whether it was signed, for if it was signed, it would be a signed copy.
7. This brings us to the meaning of the word “sign” as used in the expression “signed copy”. In Webster's New World Dictionary, the word “sign” means “to write one's name on, as in acknowledging authorship, authorising action etc.” To write one's name is signature. Section 3(56) of the General Clauses Act, 10 of 1897, has not defined the word “sign” but has extended its meaning with reference to a person who is unable to write his name to include “mark” with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions. This provision indicates that signing means writing one's name on some document or paper. In Mohesh Lal v. Busunt Kumaree (1881) ILR 6 Cal 340, a question arose as to what “signature” meant in connection with Section 20 of the Limitation Act, 9 of 1871. It was observed that “where a party to a contract signs his name in any part of it in such a way as to acknowledge that he is the party contracting, that is a sufficient signature”. It was further observed that the document must be signed in such a way as to make it appear that the person signing it is the author of it, and if that appears it does not matter what the form of the instrument is, or in what part of it the signature occurs.
8. We accept these observations and are of the opinion that so long as there is the signature of the arbitrator or umpire on the copy of the award filed in court and it shows that the person signing authenticated the accuracy or correctness of the copy of the document would be a signed copy of the award. It would in such circumstances be immaterial whether the arbitrator or umpire put down the words “certified to be true copy” before signing the copy of the award. If anything, the addition of these words (namely, certified to be true copy) would be the clearest indication of the authentication of the copy as a true copy of the award, which is what Section 14(2) requires, so long as the authentication is under the signature of the arbitrator or the umpire himself. In the present case, the document was sent by the umpire along with a letter forwarding it to the court. In the letter it was stated that he was sending the award only signed and certified by him. Then turning to the document we find that it begins with the words “now I hereby reproduce a true copy of the said award which is as follows” and this is signed by Sri Dildar Hussain, the umpire. Then follows the copy of the award, at the end we find the words “certified as correct copy of the award dated 27th May, 1961”. Underneath appears the signature of Sri Dildar Hussain, the umpire. Clearly therefore the document filed is a true or accurate and full reproduction of the original award and it bears the signature of the umpire, Sri Dildar Hussain, and thus is a signed copy of the award.
The fact that the umpire wrote the words “certified as correct copy of the award dated the 27th May, 1961” above his signatures does not in our opinion make any difference and the document it still a signed copy of the award. If anything, these words show that document filed is a true copy of the award and as it bears the signature of the umpire, it is a signed copy thereof. It may be added that the words “now I hereby reproduce a true copy of the said award which is as follows” which appear at the beginning of the document and which are signed by the umpire Sri Dildar Hussain also in our opinion are sufficient to show that what was produced in court was a signed copy of the award as required by Section 14(2).
9. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to consider the alternative argument raised on behalf of the appellant. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the orders of the courts below and, holding that a signed copy of the award has been filed as required by Section 14(2), direct that further proceedings will be taken in the matter as required by law by the Subordinate Judge in whose court the signed copy of the award was filed. Costs of this Court will abide the final result.
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