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Paramananda Mahapatra v. Commr., Hindu Religious Endowments
Factual and Procedural Background
Dayanidhi Mahapatra allegedly built a temple with his personal funds, installed a family deity, and endowed property for the deity’s worship. Upon Dayanidhi’s death, the plaintiff, Sri Baman Mahapatra, became the manager and shebait of the temple. The Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa (Respondent 1) treated the temple as subject to the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939 (“the Act”) and collected an annual contribution of Rs 386 under Section 49.
Contending that the temple was private and outside the Act, the plaintiff sought a declaration under Section 64(1). On 1 November 1953, the Commissioner rejected this contention, declared the temple a “public excepted temple” under Section 6(5), and appointed hereditary trustees from the plaintiff’s family.
The plaintiff then filed a suit under Section 64(2) before the Subordinate Judge, Puri, who held the temple to be private. On appeal, the Orissa High Court reversed on a preliminary ground: the suit was defective because members of the public had not been impleaded in accordance with Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), relying on its earlier decision in Padma Charan v. Commissioner.
The plaintiff obtained a certificate and appealed to the Supreme Court. A second, connected appeal raised the identical legal issue; both are disposed of by this judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in a suit instituted under Section 64(2) of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, it is mandatory to implead the general public as parties in accordance with Order 1 Rule 8 CPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Section 64(2) grants a personal statutory right of suit to “any person affected” by the Commissioner’s decision; it contains no requirement to implead the public or invoke Order 1 Rule 8 CPC.
- The Commissioner, as a statutory authority, sufficiently represents public interest; therefore, adding individual members of the public is unnecessary.
Respondent's Arguments
- The High Court’s view, based on Padma Charan, was that the public are necessary parties because the dispute concerns a public religious institution.
- Before the Supreme Court, however, the Solicitor-General conceded that neither the Act nor the rules framed under Section 52 require public notice or participation in proceedings under Section 64(1); correspondingly, he did not press the necessity of impleading the public under Section 64(2).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Padma Charan v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ILR 1961 Cuttack 183 | Held that suits under Section 64(2) must implead the public under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC. | Expressly overruled; the Supreme Court held the precedent to be erroneous. |
| Attorney-General v. Brown (1818) 1 Swan 265 | Doctrine that the Crown (through the Attorney-General) is parens patriae and protector of charitable trusts. | Cited to analogise the Commissioner’s role as representative of public interest in religious endowments. |
| Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury (1724) PWM 103 | Attorney-General is the proper plaintiff to enforce charitable purposes. | Used to support the view that individual members of the public need not be parties because the Commissioner represents them. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court analysed the statutory scheme as follows:
- Text of Section 64: The right to sue under sub-section (2) is conferred on “any person affected” by the Commissioner’s decision; the provision is silent on impleading the public or following Order 1 Rule 8 CPC.
- Absence of procedural requirement: The Court noted the Solicitor-General’s concession that neither the Act nor its rules oblige the Commissioner to issue public notice or hear public objections under Section 64(1). Imposing a stricter requirement on the plaintiff under Section 64(2) would be illogical.
- Representative role of the Commissioner: Relying on Section 54, the Court held that the Commissioner is the statutory guardian of public interest in religious endowments, analogous to the Attorney-General in English charitable-trust law. Consequently, the Commissioner’s presence suffices to safeguard public rights.
- Inapplicability of Order 1 Rule 8 CPC: Because the Commissioner alone represents the public, a Section 64(2) suit is not a “representative suit” within Order 1 Rule 8. Sections 92 and 93 CPC are expressly excluded by Section 54(2) of the Act, reinforcing the legislative intent to channel such litigation through the Commissioner.
- Rejection of High Court precedent: The reasoning in Padma Charan was held to overlook the Act’s scheme. The High Court’s dismissal of the suit for non-joinder of the public was therefore incorrect.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeals are ALLOWED; the judgments and decrees of the Orissa High Court dated 22-11-1961 (First Appeal No. 53 of 1956) and 16-11-1961 (First Appeal No. 78 of 1958) are SET ASIDE, and both matters are REMANDED to the High Court for fresh decision on the merits.
Implications: The Supreme Court clarifies that in litigation under Section 64(2) of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, the Commissioner alone represents public interest; individual members of the public are not necessary parties, and Order 1 Rule 8 CPC does not apply. The ruling removes a procedural barrier imposed by the Orissa High Court but does not establish new substantive doctrine beyond interpreting the Act’s procedural framework.
Ramaswami, J.— This appeal is brought by a certificate on behalf of the plaintiff against the judgment and decree of the Orissa High Court dated 22-11-1961.
2. In the suit which is the subject-matter of this appeal the plaintiff alleged that his ancestor — Dayanidhi Mahapatra — constructed a temple out of his own funds and established a family deity and made endowments for the maintenance of Seba-Puja of the deity. After the death of Dayanidhi the plaintiff became the Manager and Shebait of the family deity. The case of the plaintiff was that the temple and the endowments were never dedicated to the public nor had the public any kind of right in the temple or the endowed properties, but that Respondent 1, acting under the provisions of Section 49 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowment Apt (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) realised a sum of Rs 386 as the annual contribution from the plaintiff. Consequently Sri Baman Mahapatra filed an application under Section 64(1) of the Act for a declaration that the temple in question was a private one and did not fall within the purview of the Act. On 1-11-1953 Respondent 1 rejected the contention of the plaintiff and declared the temple as a “public excepted temple” within the meaning of Section 6(5) of the Act and appointed members of the plaintiff's family as the hereditary trustees. Thereafter Sri Baman Mahapatra filed a suit in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Puri under Section 64(2) of the Act for a declaration that the order passed by Respondent I was illegal and should be set aside. Respondent 1 filed a written statement in that suit and after hearing the evidence on behalf of both the parties the Subordinate Judge held that the temple was a private temple belonging to the family of the plaintiff and Defendants 2 and 3 and not a public excepted temple as erroneously held by Respondent 1 in his order dated 1-11-1953. Aggrieved by this judgment, Respondent 1 filed an appeal before the Orissa High Court which allowed the appeal on the preliminary ground that the suit was not maintainable as the plaintiff had not impleaded the public in accordance with the requirements of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code. The High Court took the view that the omission to implead the public in a suit under Section 64(2) of the Act was fatal and the suit as framed was, therefore, not maintainable and should be dismissed. In taking this view the High Court followed its previous decision in Padma Charan v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa ILR 1961 Cuttack 183.
3. The question of law involved in this appeal is whether the High Court is right in its view that in a suit brought under Section 64(2) of the Act the public should be impleaded as necessary parties under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code.
4. Section 6(13) of the Act defines a “temple” as “a place, by whatever designation known, used as a place of public religious worship and dedicated to, or for the benefit of, or used as of right by, the Hindu community, or any section thereof, as a place of religious worship”. Section 6(5) defines an “excepted temple” to mean and include “a temple the right of succession to the office of trustee or the offices of all the trustees (where there are more trustees than one) whereof has been hereditary, or the succession to the trusteeship whereof has been specially provided for by the founder”.
5. Section 64 of the Act states:
“64. (1) If any dispute arises as to whether an institution is a math or temple as defined in this Act or whether a temple is an excepted temple, such dispute shall be decided by the commissioner.
(2) Any person affected by a decision under sub-section (1) may, within one year, institute a suit in the Court to modify or set aside such decision; but subject to the result of such suit, the order of the commissioner shall be final”.
6. The right of instituting a suit conferred by Section 64(2) on any person affected by the decision of the commissioner is a statutory right and there is nothing in that section which makes it incumbent upon the plaintiff to make the public as party-defendants to the suit or to take recourse to the procedure prescribed under Order l Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was conceded by the Solicitor-General on behalf of Respondent 1 that there is also nothing in the rules framed under Section 52 of the Act requiring the commissioner to give public notice and invite objections from the members of the public interested in the temple in a proceeding under Section 64(1) of the Act. If the Commissioner is not required to give public notice or to grant a hearing to members of the public before making an order under Section 64(1) of the Act, there is no reason why the person affected by the decision of the commissioner should be compelled to implead members of the public as party-defendants in a suit brought under Section 64(2) of the Act. In our opinion, the suit brought under Section 64(2) is not a suit of the nature contemplated by Order l rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code. Having regard to the scheme and object of the Act it is manifest that the commissioner represents the interest of the public and he is the only person who is entitled to take proceedings on behalf of the religious and charitable trust and individual members of the public have no locus standi in the matter. Reference may be made in this connection to Section 54 of the Act which states:
“54. (1) The commissioner or any person having interest and having obtained the consent of the commissioner may institute a suit in the Court to obtain a decree —
(a) to recover possession of property, comprised in a religious endowment;
(b) appointing or removing the trustee of a math or excepted temple or of a specific endowment attached to a math or excepted temple;
(c) vesting any property in a trustee;
(d) declaring what proportion of the endowed property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the endowment;
(e) directing account and enquiries; or
(f) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require.
(2) Sections 92 and 93 and Rule 8 of Order 1 of the First Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall have no application to any suit claiming any relief in respect of the administration or management of a religious endowment and no suit in respect of such administration or management shall be instituted, except as provided by this Act.
(3) All suits or other legal proceedings by or against the commissioner under this Act shall be instituted by or against him in his name”.
The principle underlying the section is based, to some extent, upon the principle of English law for enforcement of charitable trusts in the interest of general public. In English law the Crown as parens patriae is the constitutional protector of all property, subject to charitable trusts, such trusts being essentially matters of public concern — A.G v. Brown (1818) 1 Swan 265; and the Attorney-General, who represents the Crown for all legal purposes, is accordingly the proper person to take proceedings on this behalf and to protect charities — Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury (1724) PWM 103. Whenever an action is necessary to enforce the execution of a charitable purpose, to remedy any abuse or misapplication of charitable funds, or to administer a charity, the Attorney-General is the proper plaintiff, whether he is acting alone ex officio as the officer of the Crown and as such the protector of charities, or ex relatione, that is to say at the request of a private individual who thinks that the charity is being or has been abused. The same principle is, to some extent, the basis of different legislative enactments in our country with regard to enforcement of public religious and charitable trusts. We are, therefore, of opinion that the High Court was in error in holding that in the suit brought by the plaintiff under Section 64(2) of the Act the members of the public were necessary parties and it was incumbent on the plaintiff to follow the provisions of Order l Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code and the view of the High Court on this point should be overruled.
7. For the reasons expressed we hold that this appeal should be allowed and the judgment and decree of the High Court of Orissa in First Appeal No. 53 of 1956 dated 22-11-1961 should be set aside and the appeal should be remanded to the High Court for being dealt with and decided in accordance with law. Both the parties will bear their own costs up to this stage.
8. This appeal is brought by a certificate against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Orissa dated 16-11-1961 and the question of law involved in this appeal is identical with the one involved in Civil Appeal No. 310 of 1963. For reasons given in that case we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the Orissa High Court in First Appeal No. 78 of 1958 dated 16-11-1961 and order that the appeal should go back in remand to the High Court for being dealt with and determined in accordance with law. Both the parties will bear their own costs up to this stage.
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