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Union Of India v. Sukumar Pyne .

Supreme Court Of India
Oct 6, 1965
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1954, foreign currency and Travellers Cheques were recovered from premises at 311, Bow Bazar Street, Calcutta, where the respondent conducted a jewellery business with his mother and brother. On 23 April 1958, the Director of Enforcement issued a notice asking the respondent to show cause why adjudication proceedings should not be initiated for an alleged contravention of Section 23(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (“the Act”). The respondent replied on 10 May 1958, explaining how he obtained the currency and denying any sale of Travellers Cheques. After considering the reply, the Director decided to hold adjudication proceedings and asked the respondent to appear on 13 May 1958. On 13 May 1959, the respondent filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Calcutta High Court, challenging the adjudication mainly on constitutional grounds. A single-judge bench (Mitter, J.) allowed the petition, declared Sections 23(1)(a) and 23-D ultra vires, and quashed the proceedings. The Union of India obtained a certificate of fitness under Article 132(1) of the Constitution, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Sections 23(1)(a) and 23-D of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, as amended by Act 39 of 1957, violate Article 14 or Article 20 of the Constitution.
  2. Whether the 1957 amendment, which transferred adjudication to the Director of Enforcement, can be applied retrospectively to an alleged contravention committed in 1954, or whether the respondent had a vested right to be tried by an ordinary criminal court.
  3. Whether the amended Section 23(1)(a) prescribes a higher penalty in breach of Article 20(1) by introducing a mandatory minimum punishment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments (Solicitor-General of India)

  • The High Court erred in holding that an accused enjoys a vested right to be tried by a particular court; the amendment merely shifts the venue from a magistrate to the Director of Enforcement.
  • Reliance on Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, where the Supreme Court held that Article 20 bars only ex post facto conviction or sentence, not changes in forum or procedure.
  • Procedural statutes are presumed to operate retrospectively; no express retrospective clause is required.
  • No right of appeal under the Code of Criminal Procedure was impaired because no criminal proceedings had begun.
  • Amended Section 23(1)(a) sets only a maximum penalty (“not exceeding…”) and therefore does not infringe Article 20(1).

Respondent’s Arguments (Mr P. K. Chatterjee)

  • Sections 23(1)(a) and 23-D offend Articles 14 and 20 of the Constitution.
  • The respondent possessed a substantive vested right to be tried by an ordinary criminal court with appellate remedies, which the amendment impermissibly removed.
  • Maxwell’s treatise supports the principle that procedural changes should not apply retrospectively where vested rights are affected.
  • The amended Section 23(1)(a) effectively imposes a mandatory minimum penalty greater than that which could previously have been imposed, violating Article 20(1).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shanti Prasad Jain v. Director of Enforcement (1963) 2 SCR 297 Sections 23(1) and 23-D do not violate Article 14. Relied on to concede that the Article 14 challenge was no longer open.
Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh (1953) SCR 1188 Article 20 forbids ex post facto conviction or sentence, not changes in forum or procedure; no vested right to a particular tribunal or procedure. Used as the main authority to reject the High Court’s view that the respondent had a vested right to trial by an ordinary court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court (Sikri, J.) approached the case in two stages:

  1. Article 14 challenge: The Court referred to its own earlier decision in Shanti Prasad Jain to affirm that Sections 23(1) and 23-D are constitutionally valid under Article 14. The respondent’s counsel conceded this point.
  2. Retrospectivity and vested right: Relying heavily on Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh, the Court held that no accused has a fundamental or vested right to be tried by a particular forum or procedure. Procedural amendments generally apply to pending matters unless expressly excluded. Because adjudication by the Director of Enforcement is merely a change in forum and procedure, it is retrospective by default and does not impair any substantive right.
  3. Article 20(1) argument on penalties: The Court analysed the wording “not exceeding” in Section 23(1)(a) and concluded that the provision sets only an upper limit, not a mandatory minimum. Hence, the amended section does not expose the respondent to a greater punishment than was available in 1954 and therefore does not contravene Article 20(1).
  4. The Court noted that no criminal proceedings had been initiated under the old law, so no right of appeal under the Code of Criminal Procedure was affected.
  5. Given the long lapse of time (offence in 1954, notice in 1958, judgment in 1965), the Court directed that adjudication be completed expeditiously.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; WRIT PETITION DISMISSED. The order of the Calcutta High Court quashing the adjudication proceedings is set aside, and costs are awarded to the appellant in both courts.

Implications: The decision reaffirms that amendments affecting only the forum or procedure—such as transferring jurisdiction from criminal courts to an administrative adjudicating authority—operate retrospectively unless expressly stated otherwise and do not violate Articles 14 or 20. While no new constitutional doctrine was established, the ruling clears the way for the Director of Enforcement to proceed with adjudication for pre-1957 contraventions under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.

Show all summary ...

Sikri, J.— This is an appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Calcutta under Article 132(1) of the Constitution and is directed against the judgment of the High Court accepting a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and quashing adjudication proceedings under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (7 of 1947) — hereinafter referred to as “the Act”.

2. The relevant facts are as follows. Following the recovery in 1954 of some foreign currency and Travellers Cheques at No. 311, Bow Bazar Street, Calcutta, where the respondent alongwith his mother and brother, carried on the business of jewellers, the Director of Enforcement issued a notice on April 23, 1958, on the petitioner calling upon him to show cause within 10 days of the receipt of the notice why adjudication proceedings should not be held against him for contravention of Section 23(1) of the Act. On May 10, 1958, the respondent replied to the above memorandum giving his version as to how he came into possession of the foreign currency, but he denied having sold any travellers cheques. He prayed that the proceedings may be dropped and the currency seized returned to him. The Director of Enforcement, after considering the cause shown by the respondent, came to the conclusion that the adjudication proceedings should be held. He, therefore, requested the respondent to arrange to be present either personally or through his authorized representative before the Director on May 13, 1958, in the office of the Calcutta Branch of the Directorate. On this, on May 13, 1959, the respondent filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the adjudication proceedings on various grounds, the principal grounds being that Section 23(1)(a) and Section 23-D of the Act were ultra-vires of Article 20(2) of the Constitution, and that the offence having been committed in 1954, the proposed adjudication was illegal and entirely without jurisdiction.

3. Before the High Court, at the time of the final hearing, the petitioner was allowed to raise the point that Section 23(1)(a) as well as Section 23-D contravened Article 14 of the Constitution.

4. Mitter, J. held that Section 23(1)(a) violated Article 14 of the Constitution, and was accordingly ultra vires the Constitution, and that the relative provision of Section 23-D must also be condemned. Regarding the second point, namely, whether Section 23(1)(a), having been substituted by the Amending Act 39 of 1957, would have retrospective operation in respect of the alleged offence, which took place in 1954, the High Court came to the conclusion that the petitioner “had a vested right to be tried by an ordinary court of the land with such rights of appeal as were open to all”, and although Section 23(1)(a) was procedural, where a vested right was effected, prima facie, it was not a question of procedure. Therefore, the High Court came to the conclusion that the provision as to adjudication by the Director of Enforcement could not have any retrospective operation. The learned Judge observed that “the impairment of a right by putting a new restriction thereupon is not a matter of procedure only. It impairs a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment.” Accordingly, as stated before, the adjudication proceedings were quashed being without jurisdiction.

5. This Court held in Shanti Prasad Jain v. Director of Enforcement (1963)2 SCR 297 that Section 23(1) and Section 23-D of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act did not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. Mr P.K Chatterjee, counsel for the respondent, properly concedes that he cannot press this point.

6. The learned Solicitor-General, who appeared on behalf of the appellant, contends that the High Court was in error in holding that the accused had a vested right to be tried by an ordinary Criminal Court. He says that the amendment only changed the venue of trial from a Magistrate to the Director of Enforcement in some cases and no vested right was affected. He refers to the decision of this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh (1953) SCR 1188 where Jagannadhadas, J., speaking for the Court, observed at p. 1200 as follows:

“In this context it is necessary to notice that what is prohibited under Article 20 is only conviction or sentence under an ex post facto law and not the trial thereof. Such trial under a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the commission of the offence or by a court different from that which had competence at the time cannot ipso facto be held to be unconstitutional. A person accused of the commission of an offence has no fundamental right to trial by a particular court or by a particular procedure, except insofar as any constitutional objection by way of discrimination or the violation of any other fundamental right may be involved.”

18. Before its amendment by Act 39 of 1957, Section 23(1) of the Act read as follows:

“23. (1) Whoever contravenes any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both, and any court trying any such contravention may, if it thinks fit and in addition to any sentence which it may impose for such contravention, direct that any currency, security, gold or silver, or goods or other property in respect of which the contravention has taken place shall be confiscated......”
After the amendment by Act 39 of 1957, another Section 23(1) was substituted and Section 23-D was added, which read as follows:
“23. (1) — If any person contravenes the provisions of Section 4, Section 5, Section 9, Section 10, sub-section (2) of Section 12, Section 17, Section 18-A or Section 18-B or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder, he shall —
(a) be liable to such penalty not exceeding three times the value of the foreign exchange in respect of which the contravention has taken place, or five thousand rupees, whichever is more, as may be adjudged by the Director of Enforcement in the manner hereinafter provided, or....”
23-D. (1) For the purpose of adjudging under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 23 whether any person has committed a contravention the Director of Enforcement shall hold an inquiry in the prescribed manner after giving that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard and if, on such inquiry, he is satisfied that the person has committed the contravention, he may impose such penalty as he thinks fit in accordance with the provision of the said Section 23:
Provided that if, at any stage of the inquiry, the Director of Enforcement is of opinion that having regard to the circumstances of the case, the penalty which he is empowered to impose would not be adequate, he shall, instead of imposing any penalty himself, make a complaint in writing to the Court.…”

19. The effect of these provisions is that after the amendment of 1957, adjudication proceedings or criminal proceedings could be taken up in respect of a contravention mentioned in Section 23(1) while before the amendment only criminal proceedings before a court could be instituted to punish the offender. The High Court, as already observed, held that the new amendment did not apply to contraventions which took place before the Act came into force.

20. Mr Chatterjee, the learned counsel for the respondent, urges that a substantive vested right to be tried by an ordinary court existed before the amendment, and he relied on Maxwell 11th Edn., p. 217, where it is stated that “the general principle, however, seems to be that alterations in procedure are retrospective, unless there be some good reason against it.” He says that there is a good reason if the principles of Article 20 are borne in mind. In our opinion, there is force in the contention of the learned Solicitor-General. As observed by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh (1953) SCR 1188 a person accused of the commission of an offence has no vested right to be tried by a particular court or a particular procedure except insofar as there is any constitutional objection by way of discrimination or the violation of any other fundamental right is involved. It is well recognized that “no person has a vested right in any course of procedure” (vide Maxwell 11th Edn., p. 216), and we see no reason why this ordinary rule should not prevail in the present case. There is no principle underlying Article 20 of the Constitution which makes a right to any course of procedure a vested right. Mr Chatterjee complains that there is no indication in the Amending Act that the new procedure would be retrospective and he further says that this affects his right of appeal under the Criminal Procedure Code. But if this is a matter of procedure, then it is not necessary that there should be a special provision to indicate that the new procedural law is retrospective. No right of appeal under the Criminal Procedure Code is affected because no proceedings had ever been started under the Criminal Procedure Code.

21. Mr Chatterjee's next point is that the new Section 23(1)(a) contravenes Article 20(1) of the Constitution. He says that Section 23(1)(a) prescribes a minimum penalty while under the old Section 23(1) the Magistrate had an option of fixing a fine less than the minimum prescribed under Section 23(1)(a). But we are unable to agree with him that the new section prescribes any minimum. What it does prescribe is a maximum. The words “not exceeding” cover not only the expression “three times the value of the foreign exchange” but also the words “five thousand rupees”. Therefore, no greater penalty than might have been levied under the old section has been prescribed by the new Section 23(1)(a), and consequently there is no breach of Article 20(1) of the Constitution.

22. We may add that the offence is alleged to have been committed in 1954 and notice of adjudication was sent in 1958 and now we are in the year 1965. It would be expedient if the adjudication proceedings are disposed of as expeditiously as possible.

23. In the result the appeal is accepted and the petition under Article 226 dismissed. The appellant will have his costs here and in the High Court.