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Radha Rani Bhargava v. Hanuman Prasad Bharg...
Factual and Procedural Background
Kalyan Singh died in 1918 leaving a widow, Mst Bhagwati, and two daughters, Mst Indrawati and Mst Radha Rani. On 10 October 1919 the widow alienated the entire estate. On 23 October 1931 Mst Indrawati, suing in a representative capacity on behalf of all reversioners, filed a suit in the Court of the Additional Civil Judge, Mathura, seeking a declaration that the alienation was void beyond the widow’s lifetime.
The trial court decreed the suit on 12 August 1941. The alienees appealed to the Allahabad High Court on 12 February 1942. During the appeal Mst Indrawati died and, by order dated 11 May 1950, Mst Radha Rani was substituted as the next reversioner. While the appeal was pending, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force. Relying on Sections 14–16 of that Act, the High Court held that reversionary rights had been abolished and dismissed the suit on 25 September 1957.
The High Court granted a certificate of fitness under Article 133 of the Constitution, and the record was transmitted to the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court appeal was filed, Mst Bhagwati (the widow) died on 29 May 1961. When the appeal was eventually filed (26 March 1962), the widow—already dead—was still shown as a respondent, and certain descendants of Mst Indrawati and Mst Radha Rani were improperly added. The alienees (Respondents 1–3) filed Civil Misc. Petition No. 2219 of 1964 raising these preliminary objections, which were heard together with the appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, a suit by reversioners challenging an alienation made by a Hindu female before the Act remains maintainable.
- Whether the Supreme Court appeal was defective for non-joinder or mis-joinder of parties—specifically, (a) the inclusion of the deceased widow as a respondent, and (b) the omission of her legal heirs after her death.
Arguments of the Parties
Alienees’ (Respondents’) Preliminary Objections
- The appeal should be dismissed because the petition wrongly impleaded the deceased widow (Mst Bhagwati) as a respondent.
- The appeal was not maintainable in the absence of the heirs of the deceased widow, who were alleged to be necessary parties.
- Certain descendants (Respondents 8–12) were improperly added without the Court’s leave and should be struck off.
Appellant’s Position
- Conceded that Respondents 8–12 were improperly joined and could be struck off.
- Contended that the heirs of Mst Bhagwati were not necessary parties because no relief was sought against the widow personally; effective relief could be granted against the alienees alone.
- On merits, asserted that Sections 14–16 of the Hindu Succession Act do not bar reversioners’ suits concerning property alienated before the Act, as settled by subsequent Supreme Court authority.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veerayya (1959 SCR Supp I) | Section 14, Hindu Succession Act, 1956 does not affect property already alienated by a limited owner; reversioners’ suits remain maintainable. | Relied upon to overrule the High Court’s view that reversionary rights were abolished. |
| Brahmadeo Singh v. Deomani Missir | Affirmed Kotturuswami; Patna High Court’s contrary approach incorrect. | Cited to reinforce that reversioners can sue despite the Act. |
| Ramsaroop Singh v. Hiralall Singh, AIR 1958 Pat 319 | Earlier Patna view that Section 14 abolished reversionary suits. | Identified as wrongly decided; contrasted with Supreme Court authority. |
| Hanuman Prasad v. Indrawati, AIR 1958 All 304 | Allahabad High Court decision adopting the abolished-reversioners theory. | Held to be incorrect; it was the judgment under appeal. |
| Bijoy Gopal Makherji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi (1907 ILR 34 Cal 329) | Reversioners may wait until widow’s death and sue alienee directly for possession; heirs of widow not necessary parties. | Used to dismiss the contention that heirs of the deceased widow were indispensable to the suit/appeal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Maintainability of the Suit: The Supreme Court noted that its own decisions in Kotturuswami and Brahmadeo Singh expressly hold that Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act does not extend to property alienated prior to the Act. Consequently, reversioners retain the right to challenge such alienations. The High Court’s contrary conclusion, based on earlier Patna and Allahabad rulings, was therefore erroneous.
2. Preliminary Objection — Improper Joinder (Respondents 8–12): Because these individuals had never been parties before the High Court and no leave had been obtained for their inclusion, the Court ordered their names to be struck off. The appellant conceded this point.
3. Preliminary Objection — Deceased Widow Impleaded: Although Mst Bhagwati was deceased when the appeal was filed, the Court held that proceedings could continue against the surviving respondents; the presence of a deceased person on the record does not nullify the entire appeal.
4. Preliminary Objection — Non-joinder of Heirs of Mst Bhagwati: Drawing on Bijoy Gopal Makherji and established principles, the Court reasoned that heirs of the widow are not necessary parties to either (a) a declaratory suit by a reversioner challenging an alienation, or (b) an ensuing appeal after the widow’s death. No relief was claimed against the widow personally, and effective relief could be granted solely against the alienees. Thus, the appeal was not defectively constituted.
5. Outcome on Miscellaneous Petition: Civil Misc. Petition No. 2219 of 1964 was dismissed save for the directive striking out Respondents 8–12.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside; First Appeal No. 232 of 1942 remanded to the Allahabad High Court for decision on merits.
Immediate Effect: The Supreme Court’s order revives the original suit and requires the High Court to adjudicate the substantive questions concerning the validity of the 1919 alienation. Costs of the Supreme Court proceedings are payable by the contesting respondents to the appellant.
Broader Implications: The judgment re-affirms the Supreme Court’s earlier interpretation that Sections 14–16 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 do not extinguish reversioners’ rights where the property had been alienated before the Act. It also clarifies procedural law on necessary parties in reversionary litigation, confirming that heirs of a deceased limited owner are not indispensable once the widow has died.
Bachawat, J.— One Kalyan Singh died sonless in the year 1918 leaving him surviving his widow, Mst Bhagwati and two daughters, Mst Indrawati and Mst Radha Rani. By a deed dated October 10, 1919, Mst Bhagwati alienated her husband's estate in favour of certain alienees. On October 23, 1931, Mst Indrawati suing in a representative capacity on behalf of the reversioners to the estate of Kalyan Singh, instituted the suit in the Court of the Additional Civil Judge of Mathura, out of which this appeal arises, impleading the alieness as also Mst Bhagwati and Mst Radha Rani as defendants and claiming a declaration that the alienation was null and void against the subsequent heirs of Kalyan Singh and that on the death of Mst Bhagwati, his next heirs would be entitled to get possession of the alienated properties. On August 12, 1941, the trial Judge decreed the suit and granted a declaration that the alienation “is void beyond the lifetime of Mst Bhagwati and does not bind the reversioners, who would be entitled after the death of Mst Bhagwati to possession over the assets of Babu Kalyan Singh”. On February 12, 1942 some of the alienees preferred an appeal to the Allahabad High Court impleading Mst Bhagwati, Mst Indrawati and Mst Radha Rani, as respondents to the appeal. Three sons of Mst Indrawati and two sons of Mst Radha Rani were also impleaded as Respondents 8 to 12, but by an order dated March 11, 1942, the High Court directed that those persons would not be allowed to be impleaded as respondents. During the pendency of the appeal in the High Court, Mst Indrawati died. By an order dated May 11, 1950, the High Court directed that Mst Radha Rani would continue to be on the record in place of her deceased sister, Mst Indrawati and as the next reversioner to the estate of Kalyan Singh. During the pendency of the appeal, on June 17, 1956 the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force. At the hearing of the appeal before the High Court, the alienees raised the preliminary contention that after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, there are no reversioners and no reversionary rights, and a suit for a declaration that the alienation is not binding on the reversioners is no longer maintainable. The High Court accepted this contention, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. The High Court did not go into the other questions raised in the appeal. On January 2, 1958, Mst Radha Rani applied to the High Court for grant of a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution of India. On August 8, 1958, the High Court granted the certificate, and on February 27, 1959, the High Court declared the appeal admitted. On May 29, 1961, Mst Bhagwati died. On or about November 13, 1961, the High Court despatched the records to this Court. No order of the High Court under Order 16 Rule 12(a) of the Supreme Court Rules substituting the heirs of Mst Bhagwati in her place was obtained, and the appeal abated against her. On March 26, 1962, Mst Radha Rani filed the petition of appeal in this Court. In this petition of appeal, Mst Bhagwati and also the abovementioned three sons of Mst Indrawati and two sons of Mst Radha Rani were impleaded as respondents. On August 24, 1964, Respondents 1 to 3 filed Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 2219 of 1964 raising certain preliminary objections, and praying that the appeal be dismissed. This petition was posted for hearing along with the appeal.
2. On the merits, the respondents have very little to say. The High Court took the view that the effect of Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was that after the coming into force of the Act, there are no reversioners and no reversionary rights. The Patna High Court in some of its earlier decisions took the same view, but other High Courts took the view that Section 14 did not apply to properties in the possession of alienees under an alienation made by the Hindu female before the Act came into force, and in respect of such properties, as 14, 15 and 16 of the Act did not abolish the reversioners and reversionary rights. In Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veerayya 1959 SCR Supplt I this Court approved of the latter view, and this opinion was followed by this Court in Brahmadeo Singh v. Deomani Missir. In the last case, the trial court had decreed a suit by the reversioners for a declaration that two sale deeds executed by a Hindu widow were without legal necessity and not binding upon them. The Patna High Court allowed an appeal by the alienees and dismissed the suit holding that by reason of the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, a suit by a reversioner for a declaration that an alienation made by a Hindu female is not binding on the reversioner is not maintainable. From the decision of the Patna High Court the reversioners preferred an appeal to this Court. This Court held that the view taken by the Patna High Court following its earnier decision in Ramsaroop Singh v. Hiralall Singh AIR 1958 Patna 319 and of the Allahabad High Court in Hanuman Prasad v. lndrawati AIR 1958 All 304 (the decision under appeal in this case) was incorrect, and Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 did not extend to property already alienated by a Hindu female. This Court accordingly allowed the appeal, and reversed the decree of the Patna High Court. The effect of this decision is that it is open to a reversioner to maintain a suit for a declaration that an alienation made by a Hindu female limited owner before the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was without legal necessity and was not binding upon the reversioners. It follows that the High Court was in error in holding that the present suit was not maintainable since the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
3. But the contesting respondents raise certain preliminary objections, and they contend that the appeal should be dismissed.
4. The first preliminary objection is that the three sons of Mst Indrawati and the two sons of Mst Radha Rani are improperly joined as Respondents 8 to 12 in the petition of appeal. Respondents 8 to 12 were not parties to the appeal before the High Court, nor was any order obtained permitting their joinder in the appeal to this Court. The contesting respondents therefore pray that the names of Respondents 8 to 12 be struck off from the record. The appellant does not object to this prayer. We direct accordingly that the names of Respondents 8 to 12 be struck off from the record.
5. The next preliminary objection is that the petition of appeal is a nullity as Mst Bhagwati, a dead person was impleaded as a party respondent therein. As Mst Bhagwati was dead on the date of the filing of the petition of appeal, she could not be shown as a respondent in this appeal. But the appeal may proceed against the other respondents on the footing that Mst Bhagwati is not a party to the appeal.
6. The next preliminary objection is that the appeal is defectively constituted and is not maintainable in the absence of the heirs of Mst Bhagwati. The heirs of Mst Bhagwati are Mst Radha Rani and the sons and daughters of Mst Indrawati. The appellant did not obtain any order of Court substituting the heirs of Mst Bhagwati in her place. Besides the three sons of Mst Indrawati who are shown as Respondents 10, 11 and 12 in the petition of appeal, Mst Indrawati left another son, Lallu also known as Ram Prasad and two daughters, Ram Dulari and Vimla. Lallu, Ram Dulari and Vimla are not parties to the appeal. Respondents 10, 11 and 12 were improperly added as parties in the petition of appeal and their names must be struck off. The result is that none of the sons and daughters of Mst Indrawati are parties to the appeal. It follows that all the heirs of Mst Bhagwati are not parties to the appeal, and the question is whether the appeal is defectively constituted in their absence.
7. In this connection, it is necessary to consider whether the heirs of the widow were necessary parties to a suit against the alienee either for a declaration that the alienation is void beyond her lifetime or for possession of the alienated property. In the case of an alienation by a Hindu widow without legal necessity, the reversioners were not bound to institute a declaratory suit during the lifetime of the widow. They could wait until her death and then sue the alienee for possession of the alienated property treating the alienation as a nullity without the intervention of any court. See Bijoy Gopal Makherji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi (1907) ILR 34 Cal 329. To such a suit by the reversioners for possession of the property after the death of the widow, the heirs of the widow were not necessary parties. The reversioners could claim no relief against the heirs of the widow and could effectively obtain the relief claimed against the alienee in their absence. Instead of waiting until her death, the next reversioner as representing all the reversioners of the last full owner could institute a suit against the alienee for a declaration that the alienation was without legal necessity and was void beyond her lifetime. The widow was usually added as a party defendant to such a suit. The widow was certainly a proper party, but was she a necessary party to such a suit? On behalf of the appellant it is suggested that the widow is not a necessary party to the suit, and in this connection, reference is made to Illustration (e) to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. For the purposes of this appeal, it is not necessary to decide this broad question; it is sufficient to say that in the case of the death of the widow during the pendency of the declaratory suit, the heirs of the widow are not necessary parties to the suit. Though the widow was joined as a party to the suit, no relief was claimed against her personally. On the death of the widow, the entire estate of the last full owner is represented by the plaintiff suing in a representative capacity on behalf of all the reversioners, and the plaintiff can get effective relief against the alienee in the absence of the heirs of the widow. In view of the fact that on the death of the widow, the reversioners become entitled to possession of the property, in a proper case leave may be obtained to amend the plaint in the declaratory suit by adding all the reversioners as plaintiffs and by including in the plaint a prayer for possession of the property. If the plaint were amended and the suit were converted into one for possession of the property, clearly the heirs of the widow would not be necessary parties to the suit. The fact that the plaint is no amended makes no difference. The plaintiff is entitled to continue the declaratory suit without joining the heirs of the widow as parties to the suit.
8. As the reversioners were not entitled to the possession of the property at the time of the institution of the suit, the next reversioner could then sue for a bare declaration and the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relife Act, 1877 did not constitute a bar to the suit. The declaratory: suit does not become defective because during the pendency of the suit, the reversioners become entitled to further relief. The next reversioner is entitled to continue the declaratory suit; but in the absence of an amendment of the plaint, a decree for possession of the property cannot be passed in the suit, and if the reversioners are to get any real benefit, they must institute a suit for possession of the property within the period of limitation.
9. Had Mst Bhagwati died during the pendency of the suit, her heirs would not have been necessary parties to the suit. The position is not altered because the suit has been dismissed on appeal by a decree of the High Court, and during the pendency of the further appeal to this Court, Mst Bhagwati died, and the appeal against her has abated. The appeal against the surviving respondents has not abated, and we think that the appeal is not defectively constituted in the absence of the heirs of Mst Bhagwati. In the appeal to this Court, Mst Radha Rani asks for the identical relief which the original plaintiff sought in the suit. She can get effective relief in the appeal in the absence of the heirs of Mst Bhagwati just as the original plaintiff could obtain the relief in the suit is their absence. The fact that the suit was dismissed by the High Court in the presence of Mst Bhagwati makes no difference. In the suit, the plaintiff asked for the necessary relief again the alienees; Mst Bhagwati was joined as a party to the suit, but no relief was claimed against her personally. The High Court dismissed the suit against the alienees. The appellant to this Court now seeks for reversal of the High Court decree in the presence of the alienees. In reversal of the High Court decree in the absence of the heirs of Ms Bhagwati would not lead to the passing of inconsistent and contradiction decrees. The High Court did not pass any decree in favour of Ms Bhagwati. The success of this appeal cannot lead to the passing of decree by this Court in conflict with any decree passed by the High Court in favour of Mst Bhagwati. The cause of appeal in this Court survives against the surviving respondents, and the appeal can proceed to a final adjudication in the absence of the heirs of Mst Bhagwati.
10. We hold that the appeal is not defective on account of the non-joinder of necessary parties. Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 2219 of 1964 is dismissed, save that we direct that the names of Respondents 8 to 12 be struck off from the record.
11. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree dated September 25, 1957 of the High Court are set aside, and First Appeal No. 232 of 1942 must now be heard on the merits by the High Court. The contesting respondents must pay to the appellant the costs in this Court.
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